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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the role liquor has played in shaping 
both the rural and the urban 1 Coloured 1 working class 
in the Western Cape. 
The dramatic events during the 1976 Soweto uprisings 
and the subsequent blatant and dramatic restructuring 
conveniently illustrate the complex interplay between 
the interests of liquor capital, the State, and the 
urban Black workforce. Furthermore it exposed the 
blatancy with which liquor consumption was manipulated 
by the State to reproduce the work-force to the needs 
of capital in general. The Decriminalisation of shebeens, 
and the withdrawal of the State from overt liquor 
distribution, is seen as an attempt at co-optive 
strategies by which class stratification among urban 
Blacks is accellerated. 
A historical examination of the relationship between 
primary liquor capital (the winefarmers) and the State 
creates the context within which the contemporary role 
of liquor is explored. The power and influence of primary 
liquor capital has resulted in perennial over-production 
which of necessity had to be distributed through illicit 
channels. 
By a process of selective enforcement of liquor laws, 
the State has colluded with liquor capital to enable 
continued accumulation to take place. At the same time 
this process co-opts the illicit distributors, the 
shebeeners of the Cape Flats, into an uneasy alliance 
in terms of which they assist in controlling the urban 
working class. 
In the rural context, the tot system forms part of 
coercive management, by which the agricultural labour 
force is kept underdeveloped, dependent, and both 
spatially and occupationally immobile. The processes 
of informal criminalisation and recriminalisation augment 
the control over the labour force achieved by the 




During the uprisings of 1976, over 250 state-run liquor 
• outlets in Black townships over the entire country 
were destroyed! This action on the part of the working 
class showed that they recognised and rejected the 
part which the system of liquor distribution played 
in their oppression. It left the State, found with 
the extent of the destruction and the danger of its 
recurrence, no real alternative but to institute some 
fundamental change in this particular section of the 
overall system of racial capitalism. The State was 
called upon to respond. However, the re3ponse which 
it produced 
contradictory: 
was in appearance at least, highly 
* It supported moves towards greater centralisation 
and control (and less competition) in production 
and distribution of liquor. 
* At the same time it passed the Competitions Act 
of 19 7 9 with the apparent intention of preventing 




It sold its liquor outlets in Black townships to 
Black entrepreneurs? 
It legalised shebeens in Black townships. 
At the same time it launched, through the Department 








an influence over drinking behaviour! 
It is the intention of this thesis to argue that this 
apparently contradictory sequence of events was a 
manifestation of far deeper contradictions which have 
characterised the production, distribution and 
consumption of liquor from the beginning of the Colonial 
State in South Africa. These contradictions are based 
on the following postulates: 
* Liquor producers and distributors, like all other 
producers aim to expand their markets as much as 
possible. For particular historical reasons, which 
will be detailed below, the grape farmers and wine 
producers constitute a particularly powerful 
political pressure group with exceptional influence 
on the State. This influence they have consistently 
used to promote market expansion. 
* Wine farmers, like some other producers, rely heavily 
for their profits on very cheap and docile labour. 
This has traditionally been obtained by the strategy 
of paying part of their labourers' wages in cheap 
surplus wine. Not only does this directly reduce 
the costs of labour, it also serves to induce alcohol 
dependence in the workforce. The workforce is thus 
made more manageable and less mobile; furthermore 
it helps reproduce the labour-force in the form 
most useful to the farmers. 
* Certain other producers share the winefarrners need 
for imrnobi le and docile workers, 5 but do not share 
in their desire to expand markets for liquor. 
* Other sections of capital increasingly require 
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a costly and 
destabilising nuisance. 
* Whether this directly relates to the 
lastmentioned group or 
religious/philanthropic 
consistently fought to 
liquor by the working 
with the ideological 
not, there is a number of 
pressure groups which have 
reduce the consumption of 
class since it is in conflict 
framework characterised by 
the "Protestant work ethic". 
While these particular contradictions are peculiar 
to the issue of liquor, it is argued that they are 
also specific manifestations of general contradictions 
which constantly operate 
capitalism. It is also 
State in society is to 





the system of racial 
that the role of the 
constantly to lessen 
contradictions with 
the goal of maintaining the overall smooth functioning 
of the system. Thus it could be expected that the 
reaction of the State following the 1976 uprisings 
would be an attempt to control the disruptive effects 
of the contradictions specific to liquor while at 
the same time using the specific terrain of the liquor 
dispensation, if not to address deeper contradictions, 
at least not to aggravate them. 




of enactment and enforcement of 
this expectation 
of the spheres 
legislation. The 
steps by which this will be done, which are reflected 
in the chapters of the thesis are as follows: 
4 
1) History 
A brief historical section (Chapter 2) will review 
the major trends and a few particularly significant 




since its inception. Particular attention 
paid to the legal and law 
The section will show the 
enforcement 
development 
the crisis of the contradictions to the point of 
of 1976, indicating the various actors and their 
respective influences. 
2) Liquor Distribution and its Impact on the Working 
Class : The Case of Urban Blacks 
The second section 
development of the 
as they effect one 
(Chapter 3) will explore the 
contradictions specifically 
section of the working class 
the urban Blacks. These contradictions led 
up to the crisis of 1976 and the State's major 
response - the decriminalisation of Black shebeens. 
This section will establish an explanatory 
framework showing how the actions 
constituted an attempt to reduce 
contradictions in such a way as to 
maintenance. The evidence which 
is drawn from secondary sources. 
should be seen as establishing 








framework within which to situate the study of 
the role of liquor as a means by which the State 
reinforces the process of system maintenance through 
class formation and control. 
This is intended to be a generalised framework 
and not one to relate only to the specific action 
of legalising shebeens. The differing regional 
5 
configuration of capital and the exigencies of 
of climatic and 
as the differing 
production under a variety 
technological conditions as well 
degrees of consciousness and resilience of the 
force under labour 
caused contradictions 
varying circumstances, have 




These, in turn, have evoked a varying 
the State. If the framework is 
should help to explain the role 
of liquor in all these situations. 
3) Testing the Framework 1: Liquor Distribution and 
Impact on the Cape Urban Working Class 
In at least one area the State's response appears 
to have been substantially different over a number 
of years. The 'Coloured' 6 working class in the 
Western Cape and elsewhere has been treated 
differently from its Black counterpart. Consumption 
of liquor has never been criminalised for 
'Coloureds' to the extent that it was for Blacks. 
On the other hand, while Black shebeens are being 
legalised, Coloured shebeens are not. 
Chapters four and five of the thesis will present 
two, in depth, empirical case studies which will 
show the extent to which the theoretical 
understanding gained in chapter 2 is borne out 
in practise in different situations. The work 
contained in these chapters is original and is 
seen as constituting the major contribution of 
the thesis to the extension of knowledge. 
4. Testing the Framework 2: The Reproduction of 
Agricultural Labour through the Tot System (Chapter~ 
This chapter examines in depth a different situation 
6 
that of the wine farmers in the Western Cape. 
Once again a spatially specific case study serves 
to indicate the way in which liquor is used to 
ensure the maintenance and stability of the overall 
system. By means of alcohol dependence that was 
structurally induced in the labour force the wine 
farmers were able to conceal the harshness of 
coercive labour relations. Through their dependence 
on liquor the labourers tacitly condoned their 
relative underdevelopment. At the same time they 
succumbed to their own subjugation and control 
by the tot system. The tot system is one means 
of reproducing the farm labour force to suit the 
productive needs of 
system renders the 
and spatially immobile. 
winefarming 
labour force 
B LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
capital. The 
occupationally 
With a few notable exceptions! the available 
literature on liquor approaches the matter from 
the sectarian view of one or other professional 
discipline and considers it only within the confines 
of those parameters. Without, for the moment, 
questioning the importance or validity of the 
internal logic of such studies, they are hampered 
by a number of shortcomings arising out of their 
confined perspective, in particular the medical 
and the social-work oriented studies use the concept 
of consumption, and usually over-consumption, 
as their starting point. Liquor· abuse and its 
effect on the body ,8 the mind, 9 the unborn child ;o 
the family group ,11 and community 12 are ana lysed, 
and treatment programmes devised which could heal 
7 
or rectify the physical damage as well as change 
the behaviour patterns of the affected persons 
or groups. 
The shortcoming of this approach is that it accepts 
uncritically the concept of consumption on its 
own without recourse to the related 
concepts of production and distribution. By this 
exclusion the liquor problem is individualised. 
Bolstered by the free enterprise 
no-one is forced to purchase or 




to exonerate itself from any complicity or 
. b. 1 . 13f h f . t responsJ. J. J. ty or t e consequences o J. s process 
of accumulation. 
From the specialised perspective with which the 
various professions approach liquor consumption, 
it is necessary to couple consumption with 
individualisation. How else, they would ask, can 
one treat the alcoholic and his family? The problem 
with that form of treatment is that it only 
addresses part of the cause of consumption and 
overconsumption. It assumes total responsibility 
on the part of the individual that s/he acts 
totally out of her/his own free will in deciding 
on how much to drink, or whether to drink at all. 
Similarly, the unproblematic treatment of 
consumption ignores the role the State has played 
in contributing towards consumption and 
overconsumption. Very few studies have realised 
the important role liquor has played in the 
reproduction of an unskilled and/or under skilled, 
proletarianised labour force, nor have the combined 
8 
interests of liquor capital and the State been 
scrutinized sufficiently when consumption has 
been studied .14 
I am not, on the other hand, arguing that liquor 
consumption is absolutely determined. That would 
be an equally fragmented approach, and could not 
stand up to scrutiny. Instead, I favour a 
class-based analysis which addresses the processes 
by which ideology is either assimilated, deflected 
or resisted by various classes under specific 
conditions. By facilitating and understanding 
of these processes in the context of capitalist 
production, a class based analysis provides the 
theoretical handle with which the complex matter 
of liquor production, distribution and consumption, 
with all its consequences and ideological overtones 
can be grasped. 
Individualisation of overconsumption, coupled 
to an emphasis on alcohol abuse amongst all classes 
obscures the fact that liquor impacts differently 
on different groupings. Not only does the State 
pursue a different policy vis-a-vis availability 
of liquor to different classes or even segments 
of the same class at different times and places, 
but liquor capital also promotes its produce in 
different ways to different classes at different 
times and places. These and other shaping forces 
(the elements which go into reproducing classes) 
result in differing classes and class fractions.15 
In the area of liquor production, on the other 
hand a noticable effort has been made to investigate 
the linkages particularly between producers and 
9 
the State. 
Thus, for example, Venturas, writing about "Economic 
aspects of the Development of the SA wine industry 
in the twentieth century" ~ 6 attempts to demonstrate 
how State policy aimed at price stabilisation 
in the agricultural 




of the demand 






the market for agricultural 
economy. " 17 This framework 
to account for the perennial 
overproduction and 
of grape products. 
maintenance of high prices 
She also concedes that the 
level of 'interference' can be ascribed to the 
importance of agriculture in general, and 
viticulture in particular, to the economy of the 
Western Cape. Whilst labour relations and 
conditions are confined to a brief appendix, the 
predominant emphasis throughout the thesis is 
on the legislative and structural conditions 
facilitating accumulation for grape farmers. 
The framework she has chosen, however, imposes 
limitations on the scope of her inquiry. It does 
not, for instance, allow for an exploration of 
the concept of liquor as a commodity, the 
ambivalence of liquor, and its role in the 
ideological repertoire of the ruling class. Her 
study does not concern itself with the role of 
liquor in shaping and containing classes through 
legal or illegal distribution. Nor is it interested 
in the conflict between fractions of capital over 
liquor and the relation 
the State. Moreover, she 
complicity within narrow 
of those fractions to 
only contemplates State 
confines. Lastly, her 
10 
study only examines consumption in the abstract, 
as a statistical entity, not as a response to a 
stimulus or a form of recreation. 
Those studies into illicit distribution which have 
been conducted under the auspices of the Human Sciences 
Research Co unci 1 (and its predecessor) 18 also face 
serious shortcomings. They were commissioned by the 
Institute on Non-European 
whose ideological role in 
difficult to overlook. The 
empirical and descriptive, 
of the location of illicit 
Affairs Administrators }9 
liquor distribution is 
studies on the whole are 
lack a thorough analysis 
distributors within the 
wider matrix of production, distribution and 
consumption, and most of them are predictably silent 
on the politics of liquor. Those that do refer to 
its political connotations, do so fleetingly and 
superficially .20 Their theoretical base precludes these 
authors liquor distribution in terms from viewing 
formation and of class 
unable to 






convincingly, for example, why 
areas are to be legalised, whilst 
'Coloured' areas are to remain illegal. 
to relate shebeen 
uprisings of 1976 and 
requirements of liquor 
They are, similarly, unable 
legalisation to working class 
1980 or to the accumulation 
capital. They would thus see no correlation between 
shebeen legalisation, the greater centralisation 
of power and ownership in the liquor industry, State 
withdrawal out of liquor production and distribution, 
and the changing nature of township financing. Illicit 
distribution to them remains tied within the 
economistic-recreational axis and extends no further. 
11 
A class:...based analysis provides, in my opinion, 
a more comprehensive theoretical base from which 
to understand the development of liquor production, 
distribution and consumption. The work of Gramsci 
has contributed substantially to my understanding 
of the forces and processes which constitute the 
. bl f 1 f . 21 h 1 1 . d cruc1 e o c ass ormat1on. I ave a so re 1e 
on writers such as Hall 
of Gramscian Theory with 
O'Meara's Volkskapitalisme 
in its Gramscian analysis 
a 
Afrikaner Nationalism. The 
for an interpretation 
22 
criminological focus. 
has been invaluable 
of the development of 
history of Western 
Cape Liquor capital is inextricably interwoven 
with the growth of Afrikaner Nationalism, as chapter 
2 will demonstrate. 
I have also drawn heavily on O'Meara's skillful 
exposition of the importance of ideology in the 
shaping of classes. It is my contention in this 
thesis that liquor, at various times and places 
has constituted one of the important constituents 
of an ideology having a specific impact on the 
working class that it has not only contributed 
to shaping economic possibilities for some, but 
has also affected the way in which classes have 
conceptualised their existence and their potential 
for change (or the lack thereof). 
O'Meara argues that " .... an analysis of ideology 
must begin with the historical development of 
capitalist production relations the concrete 
processes of class formation and class struggle, 
and the political and ideological forms these 
took" .23 
12 
In both the pieces of 
have conducted for this 
primary research that I 
thesis I have attempted 
to locate my investigation within the parameters 
of this injunction. The material conditions of 
existence of agricultural labourers on wine farms 
(in which liquor played a role) elicited a different 
response and conceptualisation of struggle to 
conditions which shaped the trajectory of liquor 
distribution in the urban working class. 
analysis provides an explanation: 
O'Meara's 
"To begin at this level is to insist that classes 
are neither serried ranks of homogenous individuals, 
nor are they immaculately conceived. Rather, as 
heterogeneous collectivities, classes are fathered 
in struggle. Born under specific historical 
conditions, and into and as a result of particular 
struggles in concrete social formations, classes 
carry their birthmarks with them as defining 
characteristics. In the historical processes 
of class formation, the various agents of the 
same class are incorporated in varying sets of 
social relations and are subject to differing 
conditions and pressures. They undergo differential 
experiences, engage in differing struggles and 
form widely differing mental conceptions of these 
experiences. Thus, for example, the process of 
proletarianisation 'frees' producers from their 
means of production and means of labour, 
transforming them into wage labourers. But it 
does so unevenly. Peasants on the one hand and 
urban petty commodity producers on the other may 
well finally end up as members of the same (working) 
class. Yet they travel there by very different 
economic, political and ideological routes. In 
the process they are subject to very different 
economic pressures, are engaged in widely divergent 
struggles and forms of political organisation 
and form varying cultural and ideological 
conceptions of the processes involved. They carry 
with them, as an integral part of their (now 
proletarian) existence, these different (and often 
contradictory) conceptions and representations 
of their different experiences. Such conceptions 
and representations provide the cultural and 
ideological framework within which the new position 
is experienced, interpreted and mediated".24 
13 
This thesis sets out to explore some of the forms 




and for criminological purposes 
are formal and informal laws. 




facilitated others, depending on the needs of 
those in power, and the response of the powerless. 
Gusfield argues that: 
" ... (D)eviance designations have histories~ the 
public definition of behaviour as deviant is itself 
changeable. It is open to reversals of political 
power, twists of public opinion, and the development 
of social movements and moral crusades. What 
is attacked as criminal today may be seen as sick 
next year and fought over as possibly legitimate 
by the next generation" .25 




Burman 26 has 
more symbolic than 
demonstrated that much 
depends on how a law is implemented or enforced. 
The symbolic dimensions may become apparent only 
once the enforcement agencies adopt a specific 
attitude to the target population. This thesis 
explores the role of selective enforcement in 
avoiding contradictions which the State is otherwise 
incapable of resolving. 
By the same token the process of repeal of punitive 
measures can have important symbolic benefit when 
seen against the backdrop of stringent measures. 
This is particularly so when the formally abolished 
measures are substituted by a process of informal 
recriminalisation, which achieves the same 
instrumental efficacy, but through an agency other 
than the State. It is therefore far too simplistic 
14 
to look at decriminalisation as an abstract concept 
denoting a benign legislature.27 What is important 
is to analyse the interplay between the State's 
formal agencies, and informal agencies whose 
exercise of localised power can achieve the same 
effect without seeming oppressive. 28 
RESEARCH METHOD 
One of the most crucial dilemmas each researcher 
faces is the trade-off between 
authenticity/veracity/naturalness of data and 
"scientific credibility" in his/her gathering 
process. The less 'artificial' the intersection 
between researcher and host, the greater the 
likelihood of a 'natural response', and hopefully, 
a 'truthful' set of answers. The parenthesised 
words are used here 1n the full knowledge that 
they do not represent absolutes, that they are 
problematic, and that they are value-laden terms. 
Every penetration of a researcher into a class 
to which he does not ordinarily belong creates 
an artificiality which will affect the way in 
which he is treated and how information is channeled 
his way. What makes that penetration more or 
less meaningful towards the quality of information 
is the way in which the penetration takes place 
and which master role the researcher choosesl9 
Augmenting this is the quality of the relationships 
the researcher builds up with his hosts and his 
artful strategy of eliciting unsuspecting, 
spontaneous but sincere responses. The relation-
ships are of course coloured by"the access bargain : 
What is being traded for what, when the researcher 
15 
gives incentives for his hosts to allow him 
sufficient field access to explore the inner 
connections of the phenomena which interest him?" 30 
FARMS 
Having observed the vulnerability of farm labourers 
to victimisation, and having been exposed to the 
attitudes of some wine farmers while I was living 
and intermittently working on wine farms between 
1976 and 1979, I decided on my research strategy. 
Aware of the sensi ti vi ty of most farmers in the 
area to 'meddlers in their internal affairs', 
as well as a nearly obsessive protectiveness towards 
their labourers from outside interferences, and 
a touchy response to enquiries about the tot system, 
I decided that an 'up-front' approach would produce 
• largely tailored information. The divisions and 
conflicts amongst the labourers, and encouragements 
by the farmers to sustain those divisions, together 
with their vulnerability, also rendered 'straight' 
research techniques suspect. As I intended gathering 
information which both 'host-groups' considered 
sensitive, the best method, in my opinion, was 
not to identify myself as a researcher , but to 
use my intermediate status on the farm as a point 
of entry. My duties during the grape harvest 
(which last approximately two to three months 
a year) gave me a 






drivers. There I 
as well as their tractor /truck-
would talk shop with them and 
the information would be recorded at the end of 
the day or in between truckloads. Occasional 
16 
socialising with some farmers/managers also provided 
an opportunity to talk farming and labour, which 
sometimes lead to farmers exchanging stories about 
their specific problems and methods of dealing 
with them. 
To the labourers on four farms I became (over 
a period of four years) a source of emergency 
-aid (hospitalisation, police, first-aid), a 
spectator at their sporting events, family 
photographer, legal adviser, and to some, taxi 
and friend. Apart from the latter two roles, the 
others were only an irritation, not a threat to 
the surrounding farmers. My friends were very 
carefully chosen and meetings confined to times 
and places that remained largely undetected or 
happened on 1 legitimate 1 occasions. In the course 
of all these interactions I conducted informal 
open-ended conversations with the labourers, their 
families and friends, generating, whenever the 
situation allowed, comparisons among the 
participants of their different situations. T!1is 
led to informative exchanges of facts without 
my having to pose direct questions. By degrees 
the circle of informants widened and my knowledge 
of their material conditions and their 
conceptualisation of their condition deepened. 
Data was cardexed after interactions. 
Information gathered by this method was, whenever 
possible, cross-checked with other informants. 
Personal observation over a long period also helped 
to take the edge off exaggerations. Although 
this method was painfully slow, at least I was 
assured of as untainted a body of information 
17 
as my relation to the various actors allowed. 
At no stage was I inclined to 'go for a kill' 
and fire a barrage of questions to any informant 
so as to arouse suspicion about my motives. I 
sustained the attitude of one who was interested 
and concerned about the totality of interactions 
and attitudes. 
Outlining some general principles of field research 
Butters insists that an open and reciprocal 
relationship to the host needs to be negotiated 
"in which the researcher will give some account 
of his identity and purposes"~1 My response to 
this injunction is that under the specific 
conditions of my fieldwork, identifying my purposes 
would have been detrimental to the credibility 
of the data. I would also have exposed the 
labourers to victimisation. 
The information I have gathered is, therefore, 
uneven. I received daily information about events 
on two of the farms whose entire labour force 
I knew very well. About two other farms, both 
adjoining the first two, I received information 
on a weekly basis from friends and informants 
there. In time I got to know most of the labourers 
there, but was unable to develop as detailed a 
body of information about events and processes 
as I had on farms one and two. Yet the information 
was sufficient to broaden the basis of my knowledge 
gained on the first two farms, and compare the 
four farms with each other. Five other farms 
housed labourers who became informants and friends. 
The information about developments on their farms 
reached me intermittently whenever we could safely 
18 
get together, usually about once a month over 
a period of three years. The other nine farms 
each presented two informants a labourer/driver 
and a farmer/manager. I only had access to them 
at harvest time over a period of six years. 
harvest we chatted about developments that 
Each 
had 
taken place during the previous year. Waiting 
for our loads to be processed by the cooperative 
we often had thorough discussions before one or 
the other had to attend to his vehicle. Some 
labourers and farmers were more forthcoming than 
others, which is 
information. All of 










At the wineries I was able to speak fairly regularly 
to the assistant managers during harvest time. 
Occasionally I was able to talk to the winery 
managers at two wineries. During harvest the 
scale operator fed me daily with data and second-
hand information about the members of the 
cooperative. 
I have, to sum up, interviewed 18 farmers/managers 
and 17 of their drivers. On the farms I have 
interviewed eighty labourers, male and female, 
and forty eight children of school-going age. 
(25 Males and 23 females). 
None of them were told that I was doing research, 
although most of them knew that I worked at a 
university. But the context in which I met and 
talked to them rendered that fact less important. 
To the farmers and drivers I was merely a harvest 
19 
driver who had another job during the rest of 
the year. To the people on the farm I was someone 
who rented a house on one of the winef arms, and, 
as in their case, the house was tied to the job 
of driving during harvest time (drywe ry). What 
was curious however, was that I was not a 'normal' 
Boer (in this context a white man), and actually 
became a friend of some of the labourers. 
The times I spent with the interviewees varied 
substantially. I spent between twenty minutes 
and one hundred hours with them. Because of the 
clandestine nature of the information-gathering 
process a three-hour visit often only elicited 
information which, under 'normal' interview 
conditions, could have been extracted in thirty 
minutes, or even less. Similarly, the situation 
often dictated that I 
had intended to within 
was unable to ask 
the single visit. 
interviewees were thus visited at least twice. 
all I 
Most 
Apart from talking to the various hosts, I spent 
a large amount of time just being there, watching 
and listening. At the winery I spent between fifteen 
minutes to an hour at least 
eight weeks a year over a 
The greater portion of 







listening, watching and learning - with both drivers 
and farmers. Likewise on the farms, as 
circumstances allowed I'd spend whole afternoons 
over weekends in and among the cottages listening, 
talking, watching, and taking photographs. The 




My access to the street gang, the Born Free Kids 
(BFK), was facilitated by one of my close contacts 
a farm labourer and friend. Only after 'working' 
with him on farm-related research for two years 
did I discover that he was a 'Pumulanga' , a high-
ranking leader of the gang. He had also spent 
eight years in prison where he became a 26-gang 
member. He had stopped his 'operational' gang 
activities and reverted to being a farm labourer. 
Nevertheless, he was still highly esteemed among 
gangsters and exercised substantial authority 
when he chose to. Gangsters and ex-prison-inmates 
who had 'bounced back' onto the farms from the 
city or prison often visited him to pay him their 
respects. 
He had been 'screening' me for two years already 
and had made up his mind about my trustworthiness, 
when he instructed a 'lai tie' to become my 
protector, guide, and informant. The 'laitie', 
son of a farm labourer, was a member of one of 
the BFK cells in Elsies River. He led me there 
and cleared away many obstacles I would otherwise 
have encountered. 
the cell, which 
forms the pivot 
It took a while 
I became a tolerated presence in 
was attached to the shebeen that 
of the case study in chapter 4. 
for the gangsters to 'relax' with me, if that 
is ever possible under the circumstances. I had 
to learn gang slang which is a mixture of English, 
Gamtaal (lower working class Afrikaans), Zulu 
and Xhosa - plus a whole array of terms not related 
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to any of them. 
As far as they knew I was a 'cat' (a modern with 
it, fashionable, independent groover) who was 
into 'moving' . ('Moving' is a compendium of 
meanings which can include (a) physically cruising 
about an area, either on foot or by car, {b) 
listening to the latest Reggae or disco or beat 
music, {c) procuring and consuming the latest 
drugs in a fashionable style, (d) generally being 
young, free, and independent). I also happened 
to work at University and was interested in shebeen 
legislation. But apart from that, I had a car, 
a white face, sometimes money, and had been an 
'agent' (lawyer). All of these attributes increased 
my usefulness to them. 
I spent an intensive four months with them, between 
October 1981 and January 1982, during which I 
talked, watched and listened. They introduced 
me to the shebeen owner, for whom some of them 
worked. I spent between two and four days a week 
with the gang. The remaining days and evenings 
during that time were spent at the shebeen. I 
did not spend any nights in Elsies River and only 
experienced one Friday and one Saturday evening 
there. 
My guide and protector also led me to one of the 
Manenberg cells of the gang, the Macassar cell 
and the Garden Village (Somerset West) cell. Another 
valuable source of information were the girl-
friends (gooste) of the gangsters. I was 
specifically interested in their perceptions of 
events which the gang members described with 
22 
characteristic exaggeration. Some of them and 
their mothers visited various gangsters in prison 
from time to time. By transporting them there 
I had an opportunity of gaining information about 
their perceptions and attitudes. In all four 
girlfriends, accompanied by their mothers were 
interviewed in this manner. The information was 
cardexed at the earliest possible opportunity. 
During those four months I interviewed a social 
worker in Elsies River, Thea De Vrouw. She had 
liquor 
I also 
a considerable knowledge of illicit 
distribution and its attendant problems. 
interviewed the managers, or part-owners of four 
of the five retail liquor outlets in Elsies River 
at the time. The manager of the fifth refused 
to be interviewed. 
Three members of SANCA, the South African National 
Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, were 
for their perceptions on the area. approached 
They were Emerich Neuhoff, Emily Brown and Andy 
Rutgers. In all the above cases I committed the 
contents of the interviews or interactions to 
cardexes at the earliest possible opportunity. 
Some of my visits to the gang, and some individual 
interactions were recorded on audio tape. 
In January I interviewed four employees of the 





Consumer Relations Manager 
Black Market Manageress 
Ex Low Price Wine Manager 
Low Price Manager at the time 
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These interviews, as well as an additional interview 
with an ex-employee of Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, 
were all recorded on audio-tape and condensed 
into cardexes. 
Telephone interviews were conducted with Gary 
May of South African Breweries; and Sue Birch 
(12.10.1983) to update information obtained in 
the earlier interview. 
For the nine months February to October 1982 I 
had to suspend my gang participant observation 
because of the imprisonment of my guide and 
protector. On his release I visited the gang and 
the shebeen with decreasing frequency until in 
May 1983 the impending internal squabbles made 
any further visits too hazardous. The breakdown 




The contradictions characterising the distribution 
of liquor to the working class, which form the focus 
of the major part of this study, can be traced back 
to the beginning of colonial occupation at the Cape. 
This section will explore the origins and development 
of the contradictions. It will not attempt to be 
a comprehensive history of labour relations or the 
relationships between various fractions of capital. 
Instead it will explore these where they specifically 
effect the distribution of liquor. The historical 
importance of the wine industry and its central 
role in the development of the whole liquor industry, 
identifies it as a suitable focus for the background 
to this thesis. 
The major themes that will be explored are firstly 
the continual efforts on the part of wine producers 
to expand the market for their production in the 
face of exclusion from rna jor foreign markets. This 
was coupled with an inability to sell the major 
portion of each crop to any but the least quality-
conscious consumers on the local market. 
On the other hand market expansion for liquor 
producers became a problem to producers of other 
commodities, whose labour force was detrimentally 
affected by excessive liquor consumption. 
Secondly, this section examines the constant need 
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to recruit, control and retain labour at highly 
exploitative rates, in which process the use of 
liquor could serve the interests of wine producers 
in particular. 
B PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION UNDER V 0 C RULE 
The settlement at the Cape was initially established 
by the Dutch East India Company (V 0 C) for the 
purpose of supplying company ships with fresh produce. 
Production 
functions. 
and marketing were therefore company 
The permission to individuals to farm 
in their own right 
with it the right 
early as 1684 2 the 
as "free burghers" did not carry 
to do their own marketing .1 As 
free burghers made their first 
attempt to organise and fix prices, but the fact 
that the "patriot movement" which emerged in 17803 was 
founded with fundarnentaJ.ly the same purpose, serves 
as some indication that the earlier attempts had 
not been notably successful. 
The marketing problems of the free burghers were 
not solely attributable to the action of the Company, 
they were also partly related to the notoriously 
poor quality of the wine produced. Since the rna jor 
potential market was overseas and the bad wine 
deteriorated during long journeys through the Tropics, 
the product which was marketed in the end was almost 
undrinkable. 4 
Nevertheless liquor production increased steadily 
throughout the 18th century. In 1720 there were 
more than two rni llion vines in the Colony, in 17 52 
the figure had risen to three point nine million, 
by 1790 to about nine rnillion.5 The 1732 crop 
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produced 2 050 leaguers~ of which 642 (31%) were 
exported to Batavia alone. Total wine exports in 
1749 were 764 leaguers. On a rough calculation 
the exports (in 17 4 9) could have constituted nearly 
40% of the total crop. 
The farmers problems in relation to marketing were 
to an extent compensated for by the system of slavery 
which implied low production costs. Labour was also 
available from the indigenous Khoi-Khoi inhabitants 
in conditions which were hardly distinguishable 







although it was a 





of the sort most commonly produced. There is evidence 
that rations of wine were given to slaves in 
agricultural areas and that urban slaves were 
sometimes given pocket money with which to buy 
wine.8 The fact that slaves are not normally paid 
any wages intlicates that this practice could not 
have had any direct economic advantage. It can 
therefore be assumed that its purpose lay in reducing 
the potential for resistance among the slave community 
and thereby increasing control. 
C FROM BRITISH ANNEXATION TO THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY 
The annexation of the Cape Colony in 1806 brought 
with it imminent disaster for the farmers with the 
outlawing of the slave trade in 1807. 9 The fact 
that this gesture to the interests and sensibilities 
of the British population was not a long term threat 
to the Cape farmers became clear, however, in 
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1809. In that year the Caledon Code 10 established 
a pass system which meant that every Khoi who did 
not own land 11 was bound to be employed by a colonist 
and had no legal freedom of movement without the 
permission 
terminated 
of his employer. 
a few days grace 
purpose of finding a new 
contract by the servant was 
If a contract was 
was granted for the 
12 employer. Breach of 
criminalised. Three 
years later the Khoi were further immobilised, and 
their bondage to labour strengthened by Cradock's 
apprenticeship legislation by which 
Khoi labourers were incorporated into 




eighteenth year, provided they had been maintained 
and fed by their parents' employer during their 
f . . h 13 1rst e1g t years. 
Both of these enactments contained clauses aimed 
at limiting the degree of exploitation and immobility 
of the Khoi labourers. Caledon's Code stipulated 
the registration of contracts longer than one month's 
duration and limited the employer's right to hold 
the labourer in his service longer than the contract 
stipulations, even if 
h f 14 h. to t e armer. T 1s 
the labourer was indebted 
was an important concession 
to the servants who, it must be remembered, 
predominantly received only food, housing and clothing 
as remuneration for their labour!5 
There were also legislative changes, 
Britain, collectively referred to as 
imposed by 
the Slave 
Amelioration Acts. These laws, passed in the 1820's 
and 1830's extended the rights of slaves and generally 
provided for 
argues that 
more humane conditions for them. Rayner 
the British Government was attempting 
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to create conditions that would, firstly, ensure 
the physical reproduction of the Cape slaves, which 
was necessarily a priority due to the closure of 
the slave trade in 1806/7. The second motive was 
less discernible, but aimed, it seemed, at 
"reproducing a particular set of social relations, 
involving continued subordination of the worker, 
while gradually eliminating the category of 'chattel 
slave' within bourgeois law"}6 
The acceptability of the new regime established 
by its handling of the labour issue in its early 
years was confirmed by the advantages brought in 
terms of international trade. The Cape status as 
part of the British empire coupled with considerations 
relating to Napoleonic wars in Europe led in 1813 
to a special tariff for Cape wines one third the 
f h f E . 17 h 1. rate o t at or uropean compet1 tors. T e qua 1 ty 
of the Cape wines had not improved significantly 
since the previous century. Consequently the 
reduction in tariffs was essential for Cape wines 
to be able to compete. This export dispensation 
led to a boom in the Cape wine industry which lasted 
into the second half of the century. 
The increased market opportunities created potential 
for capital accumulation on a scale that had never 
been available to the farmers before. It was 
important that the labour necessary to realise this 
potential should remain constantly available. In 
this respect the start made by the Caledon Code 
and the apprenticeship legislation was not fully 
maintained. In the early 1820's the Slave Amelioration 
Acts 18 increased the costs of keeping slaves and 
reduced the master's power of control and right 
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to punish them. By Ordinance 50 of 1828, the pass 
system was abolished, the apprenticeship system 
was made subject to parental approval and the right 
to inflict corporal punishment was limited. The 
ultimate set back for the wine farmers occurred 
in 1834 with the abolition of slavery .19 
D ABOLITION OF SLAVERY TO CALEDON TREATIES 
The changing labour dispensation which led up to 
the abolition of slavery put the farmers in a position 
in which they were forced to resort to less formal 
methods of securing their labour supply. One of 
these was debt peanage which was officially outlawed 
in the early part of the British period. This meant 
that officially farmers were prohibited from detaining 
employees on the grounds of debt incurred for liquor 
purchases. The farmers were not, however, prevented 
from supplying liquor to their labourers as part 
of their real wages .20 
This practice became increasingly important after 
the emancipation. Liquor, Marais observes, provided 
that edge which would persuade a labourer to join 
one master instead of anotherl1 Farmers competed 
with each other by offering more liquor than their 
rivals. The customary practice was giving labourers 
five tots a day, and then a bottle each at night, 
constituting what a Paarl magistrate described as 
two quarts of wine per day .22 The practice usually 
carried over to weekends when a lesser amount, only 
one bottle a day was given to each labourer. 
Farm labourers were thus regularly given, as part 
of their wages, considerable quantities of liquor. 
This liquor was 
production which 
of its inferior 
that portion of each 
he was least able to sell 





inevitably results in a proportion of 'reject' wine 
and it was {and is) largely this that the labourers 
were given. The Tot institution was from this point 
of view an economic benefit to the farmers, as it 
rendered totted labour cheaper than labour paid 
for in other currency. It also, no doubt, kept 
the labourers in a perpetual state of anticipation 
of liquor. In effect, it institutionalised liquor 
dependence amongst the labour force which had the 
desired effect of rendering farm labourers spatially 
less mobile and probably more docile in their demands. 
But liquor consumption inevitably produces 




having the desired 
labourers. 
effect of 
procuring and retaining labourers, the Tot system 
certainly did not make them good, dependable workers. 
Their productivity must have been relatively low, 
and their learning processes slowed down considerably, 
to say nothing about their morale and 
conscientiousness as workers?3 Furthermore, in the 
case of a considerable proportion of labourers the 
likelihood that the tot v.Jine was augmented by weekend 
purchases at the country canteen was high. After 
1846 the licensing system was relaxed to allow for 
an increase in the number of canteens .24 Drinking 
can be seen as one of the primary approved 
recreational habits of farm labour, and generations 
of labourers were reared on the concept of regular 
liberal quantities of liquor. The only factor which 
countered the impression that overconsumption was 
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generally approved of was the farmer's attitudes 
to drunkeness. It must, indeed, have been a querulous 
contradiction, even to inebriated minds, that the 
very farmers who supplied liberal quantities of 
wine to labourers daily were the ones who punished 
the labourers for the effects which that liquor 
had on them. But then, one of the salient effects 
consumption on humans is of high liquor 
seems to make contradictions, even 
that it 
flagrant, 
fundamental contradictions, less problematic, provided 
the level of inebriation is kept high! 
Liquor 
labour 
had become an important means of procuring 
after emancipation, but its contradictory 
effects on the labour force necessitated a stronger 
degree of control and punishment. The farmers 
therefore began to organise a pressure group to 
influence legislation in the colony. This resulted 
in the passing of the Masters and Servants Ordinance 
in 1841 ~ 5 
This Ordinance was, however, enacted as a temporary 
measure and was considered too lenient by the 
26 farmers. The impasse was solved after the franchise 
was extended to male farmers in the colony after 
the constitution of 1853.27 In 1856 a new and 
"improved" Master's and Servant's Act was 
28 This restored class relations and passed. measure 
a degree of control over labour which was very close 
to the conditions that had existed prior to the 
abolition of slavery!9 
The intensification of criminalisation of 'breaches 
of contract', that would otherwise have resulted 
in civil action, predominantly dismissal of the 
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servant, was the most important change introduced 
by the 1856 Act. It was a criminal act, as well 
as a breach of contract of employment, to show 
"insubordination, neglect, and insulting behaviour" 
to a master~0 It was a criminal offence to refuse 
to do work, to be 
brawling. Desertion 
drunk, or to be involved 
was also criminalised 31 as 
in 
was 
absence from work without the master's permission. 
Disobedience and unauthorised use of the master's 
property also qualified for criminal penalties which 
the 1856 Act had increased over the 1841 Ordinance. 
According to Venturas, no wage claims nor increases 
were allowed to be negotiated on a collective basis 
in terms of the Act}2 
This Act entrenched a set of attitudes and relations 
which was to characterise farm labour right through 
to the present day. 
E THE CALEDON TREATIES TO THE UNION 
The wine farmer's bubble burst in 1861 when by the 
Caledon Treaty with France the British government 
dropped punitive tariffs against French and other 
wines P Cape wines, which had not been substantially 
improved in the intervening years no longer found 
the ready market they had en joyed. Exports to the 
UK dropped from 1 002 449 gallons in 1859 valued 
at £153 379 to 30 679 gallons valued at £5 213 in 
18 64 ~4 
Cape wine farming, the most important economic 
agricultural activity and prime export, was within 
a few years reduced to a 









wine industry cannot be overestimated, since 
reserves of capital built up between 1813 and 
in wine farming now found their traditional 
opportunity for accumulation blocked. 
Combining the depressed state of the market was 
a brandy excise, passed in 1878. At a time when 
there was no general income tax to finance projects 
such as railway construction and frontier wars, 
and at a time when eastern farmers were suffering 
the effects of their black labourers' excessive 
brandy consumption, the brandy excise made a lot 
of sense to a cabinet dominated by easterners!6 
The response of the Cape wine farmers was to organise 
themselves politically in an attempt to solve their 
economic problems. To this end "Die Wijnbouwers 
Vereeniging" was formed in 1877 '!7 Within a few years 
this organisation was joined by other Afrikaner 
national and cultural interests in the foundation 
of the Afrikaner Bond~8 
This political alliance was unable to reverse the 
exclusion of Cape wines from overseas markets, 
although efforts were made at improving the quantity 
of the produce. In the 1880's overseas viticultural 
experts were brought in to advise Cape farmers on 
quality improvement techniques '!9 This effort was 
hampered by an outbreak of Phylloxera 1isease which 
destroyed a large percentage of vines throughout 
the winelands from 1886 to the mid 1890's. 
Despite the lack of success in the export field 
farmers continued to expand production. The number 
of vines throughout the Colony increased from 55, 3 
34 
million to 70 million in the decade ending in 1875. 
From these vines the production of wine and brandy 
was as follows: Wine production increased from 
3, 2 million gallons in 18 65 to 4, 5 million gallons 
in 1875, whereas brandy production rose from 434 000 
gallons to one million gallons over the same 
' d 40 Th' ' 1 d 1 1 f h per1o . 1s expans1on resu te arge y rom t e 
increased penetration into the working class market. 
Consumption increased among the local labour force 
both in the towns and in the countryside. Most 
importantly it increased among the Africans in the 
Colony and its "native territories" notably Transkei?1 
A major problem with market expansion such as this 
is that increased consumption of liquor faces 
limitations the moment the target population consumes 
it in such quantities that it negatively affects 
the interests of producers of other commodities. 
The discovery of diamonds and subsequently the 
discovery of gold, created new and powerful interest 
groups which were potentially negatively affected 
by alcohol dependence and the resultant low 
productivity of their work force. The consequence 
of this was a series of moves designed to limit 
the distribution of liquor: 
a) The institution of the Compound System controlling 
labour on the diamond mines in 1885~2 
b) The closing of country canteens in 1883 in the 
c) 
Orange Free State to enforce an earlier 
h . b. . 43 pro 1 1t1on act. 




Licensing Act of 1883 which 
sales to Blacks in proclaimed 
35 
d) The imposition of high tariffs on spirits imported 
into the Transvaal~ 
In the face of rising production shrinking legal 
markets and an acquired taste for spirits amongst 
a large sector of the population, illicit distribution 
took on astonishing proportions. Wherever prohibition 
territory adjoined non-prohibition territory canteen-
keepers were happy to do business, whether legal 
or illegal. Smugglers, of course, thrived under 
the circumstances, and Bor argues that despite 
prohibition, liquor turnover in some Black territories 
hardly diminished. It simply became illegal. His 
argument is based on the evidence submitted to a 
Select Committee of the Cape House of Assembly in 
1884, which looked into the workings of the Licencing 
Act~6 This situation created an important and long 
standing precedent. To the present day, grape 
producers rely to a significant extent on illegal 
distribution to retain their market. 
In one sense the expansion of liquor consumption 
did not conflict with the interests of other 
producers. The supply of labour to the increasing 
number of potential employers following the economic 
boom of the diamond era was dependent on the ability 
of employers to attract Black labourers into the 
wage earning sector. Under conditions where Blacks 
could often do better working on their own behalf 
the use of liquor as an incentive to enter the wage 
sector was an asset to employers. For this reason 
one of the overriding features of the Prohibition 
Bills were that they outlawed only sales to Blacks. 
They did not preclude farmers or other employers 
from dispensing liquor to their labourers as part 
36 
of their wages. Legal access to liquor, was dependent 
on the Black labourer being employed .47 The explicit 
intention of these measures is characterised by 
a submission to the 1893 Labour Commission on the 
subject of liquor consumption by Blacks. 
farmer, since 
property, and 
I do not want 
same time those 
to take to work 
(It) "Is not detrimental to the 
otherwise all natives would acquire 
no servants could be had •....... 
them to take to drink, but at the 
who spend their money in drink have 
again." (sic) 48 
The Twentieth Century 
coalition in the Cape 
opened 
trying to 
with a political 
expand the export 
market of the wine industry while the internal market 
relied almost entirely on distribution to workers 
through their employers or through illegal outlets. 
The roles of liquor as: 
a) the basis of accumulation for a powerful political 
group 
b) a means of labour recruitment 
c) a mechanism for social control had already been 
established. On the other hand the opposition 
to liquor distribution because of its debilitating 
effect on the workforce had also found vocal 
proponents. 
F UNION AND AFTER 
The formation of Union in 1910 and the institution 
of self government which accompanied it created 









which was touched on in the previous section assumed 
a major importance. 
The first reason for this was its contra! of capital 
accumulated during the period 1813 to 1861. This 
was effectively the only indigenous capital which 
was not linked to international finance as was most 
of the mining capital. It had been used in an early 
attempt to establish a bank in 1882 with partial 
success. Addi tiona! amounts 
capital had been invested in 
of this indigenous 
gold mining .49 This 
capital was now available for investment. 
The second reason that the wine farmer-based Bond 
was well placed to fulfill a major role was that 
the relations of production in the 
sector had developed directly from 




transition, as opposed to an intervening period 
of share-cropping or tenant farming which occurred 
in other agricultural sectors made the acceptance 
of capitalism easy for Cape farmers. 50 
The small numbers involved in the old Bond meant 
that they were unable to take political action by 
themselves. 
Their interests as indigenous 
competition with the interests 
capitalists were in 
of imperial capital. 
At the same time, as wine producers they needed 
access to imperial markets. They were therefore 
not prepared to join the Nationalist Party in 1913 
because they could not accept its anti-imperialist 
position. Instead they formed their own Cape 
Nationalist Party which, because it had their capital 
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backing, was able to absorb the existing Nationalist 
Party. Between 1914 1917 they established Die 
Nasionale Pers, Sanlam, Santam and Volkskas.Sl This 
was followed in 1918 by the establishment of the 
KWV, the wine farmers 
organisation broadened 
producer co-operative. 







profitably involved in 
creating opportunities for 
individuals to become 
wine farming. A further 
crucial function of the organisation was to set 
up a pressure group to campaign against prohibition 
as one method of coping with the increasing wine 
surplus. 
The real power of this organisation was only realised 
after the Wine and Spirits Control Act of 1924. 
This Act was passed by the international mining 
capital based Pact government of General Jan Smuts. 
It was part of a policy to support capitalist 
agriculture which was forced upon the Pact government 
by a coalition of interests between National capital 
and the white working class following the strike 
of 1922. 
In effect, the producer co-operative, established 
barely six years earlier, was given monopoly control 
over the disposal and price of distilling wine. 
All distributors were forced to purchase distilling 
wine from or through the KWV, and all wine-farmers, 
whether members of the KWV or not, were obliged 
to dispose of the distilling portion of their 
production through the KWv?2 This aid was of enormous 
significance to winefarmers. It enabled them to 
expand production, at fixed guaranteed minimum prices 
without regard to demand for their product. Between 
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1918 and 1921 wine production had expanded by 33% 
in response to fixed prices, and in the face of 
mounting unsold surplusses. The legislative 
intervention was designed to arrest the normal course 
of market forces, which would have dropped prices 
and precipitated cut-backs in production. Instead 
the opposite became the case: 28% of wine, grapes 
and brandy produced between 1921 and 1923 were 
destroyed by the KWV~3 
Although the KWV managed to find some takers for 
exports 
Imperial 
in the twenties particularly after the 
Conference~4 the volumes exported did 
1926 
not 
approach a solution to the 
problems. What co-operation 
was to allow sufficient 
growing over-production 
had achieved, however, 
income to accrue to 
winefarmers by virtue of the pricing mechanisms, 
even though they had to supply a proportion of their 
crops free of charge. Rather than imposing tonnage 
limitations on farmers, the policy of proportional 
guaranteed pricing gave farmers ample reason for 
expanding their production.55 
The tenuousness of the alliance that led to the 
1924 Act was shown by the promulgation of the Liquor 
Act of 1928 which was guided by Tielman Roos, the 
leader of the Transvaal Nationalist Party~6 This 
Act reflected the ideological position of the petty 
bourgeois Afrikaner nationalists of the Transvaal 
as well as the material interests of most non-wine 
producing sections of capital. It effectively combined 
all previous production Acts by criminalising the 
sale to, the possession of and consumption of liquor 
by Blacks. It limited Coloureds to the purchase 
of two bottles of liquor each at any one time and 
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place.57 The consequence of this Act was that once 
again the bulk of all liquor produced had to be 
distributed through illegal channels. 
Illicit distribution notwithstanding, the Cape liquor 
industry still produced far more in the thirties 
than it could dispose of. The legacy of fixed prices 
and guaranteed markets (for at least a portion of 
the production) stimulated production and new 
plantings to unprecedented levels, despite the ravages 
of the depression .58 The drought conditions that were 
the final straw in the proletarianisation of many 
Northern farmers, did not not affect the water-
rich Western Cape as critically as the rest of the 
country. 59 
The political alliance which had stood to benefit 
the West from the 1924 Act was re-established in 
1933 when the Gesuiwerde Nationaliste Party split 
away from the new United South Africa Party which 
formed the "fusion" government .
60 
Once again the 
combination of national finance and agricultural 
capitalism with the broadbased petty-bourgeois support 
of the northern nationalists was able to put pressure 
on the Smuts government to support capitalist 
agriculture. 
The Wine Commission of Inquiry was appointed in 
1935 to investigate how the position of wine farmers 
could be improved. The findings of the Commission 
were that the 1924 Act had established a structure 
that would inevitably cause barriers to accumulation. 
An emphasis on quantity rather than quality and 
every incentive to produce ever-increasing quantities 
was threatening profit-levels of the entire industry. 
Production had increased between 1924 and 1935 by 
92% whereas local consumption had risen by only 
30%. The KWV was not successful in exporting or 
otherwise profitably disposing of the difference 61 so 
that surplusses of maturing wine grew from 472 139 
hectolitres in 1924 to 920 815 hectolitres in 1935. 
In addition substantial quantities of distilling 
wine and spirits were destroyed during the depression 
(366 744 hectolitres). 
Falling prices of "good" wine during the depression 
encouraged farmers to increase plantings so that 
the absolute amount of distilling wine they could 
dispose of at guaranteed prices rose. Total vintage 
rose from 762 102 He in 1924 to 1 322 131 He in 
1935. Annual surpluses consequently also escalated 
( from 51 9 61 He in 1 9 2 4 to 3 9 8 3 7 1 He in 1 9 3 5 ) so 
that it became necessary to consider production 
quotas to limit the degree of unsellable stock~2 The 
The Cornrni ttee' s recommendations were largely adopted 
in the Wine and Spirits Control Amendment Act, No 
23 of 1940~3 It vested the KWV with statutory 
monopolistic control over the wine industry, 
augmenting the 1924 Act which had accorded that 
status to the KWV in respect 
introduced a package that was 
of brandy. The Act 
aimed at stabilising 
the perennial overproduction as well as guaranteeing 
the winefarmer a profitable business. 
The Cape Nationalists who subsequently formed the 
core leadership of the first nationalist government 
had managed to achieve a production dispensation 
highly favourable 
they took power 
distribution was 
to liquor producers 
in 1948. Althouqh 






laws the level of enforcement of these laws was 
not sufficient to constitute a major problem to 
liquor producers. These two situations coupled with 
the labour relations in primary production which 
had been established in the previous century have 
formed the basis for the liquor industry to the 
present day. 
The specific developments on the themes dealt with 
in this section will be picked up in the following 
sections of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORKING CLASS 
A INTRODUCTION 
The historical section has briefly explored the 
development of liquor capital in relation to the 
broad development of South African capitalism. Its 
development, as we have seen, has progressively 
led to monopolisation. In the case of the liquor 
industry, the path towards monopolisation was 
conflict-ridden. I have dwelt at some length on 
the specific manner in which liquor capital developed 
in order to explain the peculiar relationship it 
enjoyed vis-a-vis those in control of part of the 
state apparatus. 
Liquor producers have had sufficient access to the 
state to have secured legislation which reproduced 
the artificial situation of over-production without 
financial ruin. Market forces were impeded through 
the operation of guaranteed minimum prices sanctioned 
by the producer co-operative equipped with statutory 
powers. But the ambivalent moral attitude towards 
liquor as a commodity, not least on the part of 
those sections of capital who required a stable 
and skilled work force, led to pressures which the 
state could not ignore. Liquor distribution was 
limited through restrictive licencing legislation, 
which constituted a continuing impediment to the growth 
of liquor capital. 
This contradictory situation was constantly 
re-created. The monopoly, created with state 
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assistance, was unable to grow profitably because 
of state-imposed marketing limitations. Under the 
circumstances it was predictable that liquor capital 
would use every possible device at its disposal 
to improve its accumulation potential. Profitability 
could be increased by various means: 'rationalising' 
production and distribution procedures, diminishing 
competition, keeping labour disorganised and 
underpaid, expanding the range of products, and 
pressurising the state to extend the legal 
distribution dispensation, or distributing via illegal 
channels. All these methods characterise the history 
of the South African liquor industry. 
At the same time the ideological impact of liquor 
distribution and consumption must not be lost from 
sight. The manner in which liquor reaches the working 
class consumer will substantially affect not only 
the ideological transparency of ruling class control, 
but also the class position of those persons 
distributing it. For example, if liquor is legally 
distributed only through state-owned outlets, as 
has been the case in Black townships, then its 
position within the ideological repertoire of the 
ruling class is far more blatant than if it were 
distributed by free-enterprise. Moreover, the 
person/s with the right to distribute in working 
class areas are likely to affect their class position, 
and consequently their individual and organisationa 1 
response to their material position. 
It is clear that the manner of granting distribution 
rights in working-class areas is at the discretion 
of the state. At particular conjunctures therefore, 
the liquor distribution dispensation can become 
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part of a process of class-manipulation and 
class-control by the State. The particular form 
that the process takes will depend on the political 
requirements at that time. 
It is within this matrix that I shall analyse the 
extension of distribution rights in working class 
areas at various historical junctures. 
The first example traces the supply of liquor to 
Blacks in urban townships, both legal and illegal. 
Again, the position of the liquor industry's expansion 
needs constitutes a major component of the historical 
process. But equally if not more important is the 
State's complicity in both production and distribution 
to Blacks in a manner by which the Black working 
class carries a substantial part of the cost of 
its own reproduction through liquor consumption. 
The decriminalisation of liquor distribution by 
Black shebeeners will be contextualised within the 
State's varied responses to the 1976 uprisings. 
In this context the restructuring of the liquor 
industry into its current monopolistic state is 
seen as part of the process of drawing closer links 
between capital and the state. The theme of class-
manipulation is, of course, also of central importance 
when shebeen decriminalisation is discussed. 
B LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION TO URBAN BLACKS 
The supply of liquor to Blacks, both urban and rural, 
has been the subject of considerable conflict from 
the late 19th Century to the present. 
The major area of conflict is connected with the 
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process of labour 
productivity. This 
procurement and the concept of 
was usually a conflict between 
liquor producers on the one side and other fractions 
of capital on the other! These latter producers 
were experiencing 
and productivity 
problems with labour procurement 
as a result of liberal liquor 
distribution to, and liberal consumption by, their 
potential or incumbent labour force. 
Characteristically these conflicts were fought at 
the level of the State, each faction attempting 






Cape ,2 the 
scale~ 
to liquor 
Union such battles were fought 
Transvaal3 and after Union on a 
The many legislative enactments 
have to be seen as outcomes of 
such battles, and the quality of the legislation 
as well as the degree to which it has been enforced 
should reflect the relative power of the contending 
forces. 
A second area of conflict involves the role of 
the State in 
cheaply and 
reproducing an urban Black labour force 
peacefully. Liquor production and 
distribution by the State has an important function 
to fulfill in this regard. The State's monopolisation 
of the customary processes of domestic brewing amongst 
Black families has led to resistance such as the 
1929 beer hall riots in Durban; the 1959 Cato Manor 
Riots,6 and played a part in the destruction of over 
250 State-owned bottle stores and beerhalls during 
the 1976 Soweto uprisings? 
These two sets of conflict cannot, however, be seen 
in isolation from each other. They interact in 
a complex manner, and in their totality must always 
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be contextualised within 
capitalist development and 




is the purpose of this Chapter to demonstrate: 
i) That the manner in which liquor reached urban 
Blacks in this century made them shoulder 
the major costs of their own reproduction. 
This was a direct strategy on the part of 
the State to minimise the contradiction arising 
out of the need, or desire of capital, on 
the one hand to pay below subsistence wages, 
while on the other hand also paying very low 
taxes. 
ii) That the low level of township facilities 
(collective consumption items) were partially 
attributable to this policy and 
iii) That the restructuring of the liquor industry 
after the Soweto uprisings and the changing 
methods of liquor supply to urban Blacks is 
part of a co-operative strategy and that the 
decriminalisation of shebeens in Black townships 
is an attempt to foster a Black petit 
bourgeoisie whose material interests will 
align them with the current ruling class in 
opposition to the working class, their clients. 
This is seen as a part of a broader State 
strategy which includes the granting of 
leasehold rights to a small section of the 
Black population. The strategy is thought 
to be a response to the contradiction arising 
out of the need of a substantial section of 




By the second decade of this Century the agglomeration 
of Blacks in the growing industrial and mining centres 
of the Witwatersrand had become a problem to the 
ruling class. Their proliferation within the cities 
constituted a potential threat to the security of 
the white elite~ The strategy for coping with the 
problem grew out of the Transvaal Local Government 
Commission of 1921. The principles it propounded 
carne to be known as the Stallard Doctrine, after 
its chairperson .9 They dominated the process of 
"management-reproduction" of urban 
the time of the Soweto uprisings .10 The 
of the doctrine as outlined by Black 
were: 11 
Blacks up to 
central tenets 
and Wilkinson, 
"1) Control of influx into the 
from the countryside, and a 
labour allocation. 
towns and influx 
linked system of 
2) The establishment and control of African 
townships by local authorities - and residential 
segregation. 
3) The self-financing of f aci li ties and arneni ties 
4) 
certain means of collective consumption 
by the inhabitants of the townships thernsel ves, 
through a separate native revenue account 







by Africans in 
curbing 12 -
the urban 
5) The refusal to grant any further political 
rights to Africans in the towns and cities, 
beyond those excercised through purely 
consultative bodies advisory boards being 
the first in this tradition in a two-tier 
system of local government. Those rights that 
there were (the Cape franchise, for example), 
were gradually whittled away and then totally 
removed" 13. 
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Although these principles cannot be seen in isolation 
from each other, it is necessary here to focus 
specifically on the self-financing concept. The 
range of income sources from the inhabitants 
themselves was very limited: 
"Fines, Pass and labour registration fees, rents 
and most important profits from •Bantu beer• 
which local authorities alone had the right to brew 
and sell.14 In effect... the poorest class in society, 
where wages barely covered subsistence, bore the 
major cost of housing")5 
The central tenet of segregated financing is that 
the Whites should not be burdened with the load 
of financing the reproduction of the urban Black 
labour force, despite the fact that it was their 
city which the Blacks served. Moreover, because of 
the very temporariness of these migrant Black 
sojourners, their low wages, and the absence of 
large-scale business sector in the townships, there 
was no conventional taxable base: no income tax, 
no assessment rates, no company tax. The reproduction 
of the Black labour force could therefore only be 
financed, if the principle was to work, out of their 
own consumption expenditure. Private beer brewing 
was therefore criminalised and the local authorities 
were granted the sole right to brew and distribute. 
Drinking sorghum beer was confined to males over 
18 years, and it had to be consumed at the site 
of the municipal beerhall}6 
This form of township financing, albeit a ver)· 
sensitive issue, became extremely important for 
local authorities. 
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"It is difficult to visualise how the development 
of housing and other services could have been provided 
without these profits"}7 
In Johannesburg alone the revenue between 1937 and 
1968/9 amounted to R64 946 769 of which the profits 
were R28, 6 million .18 
The success of the policy owing to increasing sorghum 
beer consumption by the township dwellers, was 
justified by the Deputy Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development: 
"I again want to emphasize that the profits made 
by local authorities are used for the benefit of 
the Bantu community in general ..... formerly the 
native revenue account was carried by the white 
taxpayer. Ever since the brewing of beer has been 
controlled and the supply of beer by so-called 
beer-queens has been stopped or controlled that 
money has come to the City Council and they have 
spent it in the right way. Before these beer sales 
became the monopoly of local authorities the white 
taxpayer had to provide facilities which sometimes 
had to be provided in the locations ... later we 
went still further. City Councils were allowed 
to use beer profits to defray losses incurred in 
providing housing schemes for the natives and the 
losses incurred in reducing rentals in locations, 
for general capital expenditure on housing schemes 
or works, or services in connection with native 
townships, for interest and reduction of capital. "19 








higher profit rate 
it 
and 
a faster pace of accumulation for capital in general, 
which was largely relieved of the burden of the 
reproduction of the labour force.20 
The disruption of traditional lifestyles which the 
migrant labour system inevitably brought about also 
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affected drinking norms. The traditional norms 
of constraint in consumption and ceremonial imbibing 
were substantially compromised by the recreational 
patterns that developed in the Black 
townships .21 During the prohibition, illicit 
distribution of 'white man's' liquor (liquor 
hereinafter, as opposed to sorghum beer) started 
taking on startling proportions. The acquired taste 
for strong drink had proven a lucrative source of 
income for those entrepreneurs brave enough to risk 
police harrassment. It was estimated that immediately 
prior to the lifting of the prohibition, 60% of 
all liquor which the Black working class consumed, 
reached it via the shebeens .22 
The State felt itself obliged to t;:Urtail 
overconsumption in order to maintain control over 
the population and foster a productive labour force. 
Considerable resources were devoted to policing 
the prohibition. More than a third of the police 
budget was spent bringing about some 300 000 
convictions annually 
despite such a huge 
admitted that they 
under the prohibition laws. 23 And 
input of manpower, the police 
were not 
task.~ What vexed the State 
the illicit distribution was, 









established a source of comfortable income and were 
so to speak immune from the principles of the Stallard 
Doctrine. Blacks, according to the Doctrine, were 
supposed to be urban workers for Whites or homeland 
subsistance forms. There was in principle, no room 
for informal sector operators or even formal sector 
independent Blacks. Of shebeening the Minister 
of Justice said: 
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This is an illicit trade in 
money are involved monthly, it 
profits which hold out great 
criminal" .25 
which large sums of 
involves exhorbi tant 
possibilities to the 
It is clear from this statement that those 
in 1962 did not envisage the need 




Their temporariness in the cities precluded the 
necessity for that. 
The second point that needs to be emphasised about 
the State's attitute to shebeening, is that it seemed 






monthly sums involved in liquor 
in the townships in addition to their 
monopolies. The addi tiona! funds that 
the Bantu revenue account if the State 
liquor distribution could be used 
'constructively' for the 'benefit of the Natives'. 
It is certainly likely that the above were among 
the considerations which ultimately led to the 
lifting of the prohibition. Other factors also 
lent their weight. There was, of course, the liquor 
lobby, whose problems with surplus production had 
begun in 19 57, after the blessings which the war, 
the occupation of France and the destruction of 
vineyards had showered on the winefarmers in the 
form of increased exports. 26 The historical section's 
central theme has been the peculiar relationship 
between the winefarmers, the large groupings of 
Afrikaner capital, and the incumbents in the ruling 
elite. The accumulation needs of liquor capital 
was not something that the State could therefore 
lightly ignore. 
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The response by the Black workers to what was in 
their eyes, the patently iniquitous system of denying 
them the right to purchase liquor at normal prices, 
also made its contribution to the decriminalisation 
of consumption. Twice in the two years prior to 
the Liquor Amendment Act of 1961 Black discontent 
had flared into open conflict which claimed numerous 
lives, both of the residents as well as of the police. 
In the Black ghetto of Durban, Cato Manor, "it was 
the exhaustive beer-raids of illegal stills that 
provided a flashpoint ... ", although the real reasons 
for the uprisings were more fundamental and complex _27 
By August of 1959 "unrest was rife in many of Natal's 
smaller towns as well as a large section of the 
rural areas" .28 White residents formed vigilante 
groups to protect themselves against masses of mainly 
women, the traditional brewers, who spearheaded 
the uprisings. An estimated 20 000 Black women and 
an undisclosed number of men demonstrated their 
anger and discontent~9 
Hardly seven months later, in March 1960, the 
pass-burning demonstrations in SharP=ville and Langa 
escalated into shootings, a considerably heightened 
racial tension, and a State of Emergency being 
declared. 30 A report circulated to parliamentarians 
suggested that discontent relating to the prohibition 
was a contributory cause to the demonstrations: 
"A year or two ago ..... we had a report in connection 
with the trouble at Sharpeville and Langa ..... 
It appeared from the report that one of the main 
grievances of these people was the fact that their 
own liquor was not available to them and that they 
had to pay such exhorbitant prices for the other 
types of liquor that were made available to them 









reflect some of 
the paranoia over racial tension that was rife at 
the time. Policing the prohibition had in both 
cases been an additional cause for bitterness. The 
consensus of the antiprohibi tionists on this score 
is encapsulated in Mr S J M Steyn's address in 
Parliament: 
"It is a form of racial discrimination which brings 
the police in disrepute and makes it impossible 
for them to build up the relationship with the native 
people which they would like to see built up and 
which they have built up with the other sections 
of the community. Nothing, Sir, can be unhealthier 
for the South African State than the feeling that 
prohibition applies to the native people only, a 
feeling which creates in the minds of the native 
that the police are his enemies, that the police 
are out to prosecute him and that the police are 
the representatives of a White tyrany in South 
Africa" ?2 
If it was solely the bitterness about policing that 
the anti-prohibitionists were concerned about, 
they were certainly deceiving both themselves and 
their electorate. · The influx control system which 
was policed as strenuously, 
if not more bitterness among 
was no sign of that being 
was cause for as much 
urban Blacks, and there 
scrapped .33 What most 
parliamentarians were also overlooking at the time 
were the ideological dimensions of the State providing 
liquor to the working class. The way in which it 
reached township Blacks, seen in the context of 
the full range of recreational alternatives, 
approximated to liquor being a collective consumption 
item. That a section of the Blacks would have 
preferred more constructive than distractive inputs 
by the State is demonstrated by a submission quoted 
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by one of the parliamentarians during the Bantu 
Beer Bill Debate: 
"The City Council should give us schools, not beer-
halls. Beer-halls turn our boys into loafers and 
tsotsi s (criminals). The Beer-halls should be 
removed from our townships. They have turned our 
townships into hells on earth. Under the influence 
of liquor young hooligans attack and beat us law-
abiding citizens"}4 
None of the anti-prohibitionists expected liquor 
consumption to drop if it was decriminalised. Indeed, 
they had to realise that it would definitely increase. 
All they hoped for was that the profits from the 
existing illicit distribution would become available 
to the State, that a nascent Black petit bourgeoisie, 
the shebeeners, would be deprived of its platform, 
and be forced back into wage labour. 
This was, as in the case of Western Cape 'Coloured' 
shebeeners, a massive miscalculation. Partially 
owing to the resilience of the shebeeners themselves, 
and partially owing to their filling a large gap 
between the method of State provision of recreational 
activities and the popular expectations. 
The legalised facilities were confined to bottle 
stores and beer-halls all owned by the Administration 
Boards. Nowhere could the workers go that was not 
large, impersonal and State-run, except to the 
shebeens. Considering that Soweto only had 19 legal 
outlets for liquor serving a population of ± one 
and a half million residents in 19 8 0, it was 
predictable that shebeens would f i 11 the gap. 
Compared with 
Johannesburg's 
562 legal outlets serving White 
estimated 450 000 residents at the 
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same time, these State-provided facilities seemed 
hopelessly inadequate.35 But their relatively low 
numbers do not reveal the State's awareness of the 
sensitivity of the liquor issue not only in its 
own constituency but also amongst township residents, 
liquor distribution outlets were certainly recognised 
as potential political targets.36 
Nonetheless, the State's local authorities did not 
lose out on the massive shebeen-trade altogether, 
as the law did not allow for more than nine li tres 
to be transported across township boundaries.37 Blacks 
were allowed to buy liquor at any bottle store but 
not convey more than nine litres at a time into 
the township. While specialist runners or bootleggers 
took up the daunting profession of dodging police 
roadblocks to supply township shebeens, it seemed 
only logical that the Administration Boards bottle 
stores could substantially profit from selling to 
the shebeens themselves. 
Liquor sales remained a rna jor source of income to 
the Administration Boards. Shortly before the Soweto 
uprisings the 22 Administration Boards derived more 
than half their gross income from liquor sales to 
Blacks. Of a total income of R321 million, sorghum 
beer and other liquor sales brought in Rl77 million 
of which just under R30 million was profit. 38 From 
1962 onwards liquor consumption was not only to 
provide revenue for urban amenities, but 80% of 
liquor-selling profits were devoted to homeland 
development. The labour reservoirs were thus also 
partially financed by urban liquor consumption~9 
This decision was intended to tighten influx control. 
An attempt was also made to d-evelop the homelands 
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and at the same time to neglect the urban areas 
so that Blacks would have to move there if they 
wanted to progress. The rate of provision of 
collective consumption items consequently dropped 
in the urban areas. Attempts by the Johannesburg 
City Council to stern this deterioration by using 
some of their ratepayers money to provide basic 
services in Soweto were blocked by the Nationalist 
minority in the City Council, whose adherence to 
the Stallard Doctrine seemed as f irrn as ever. Their 
rationale was that "the services provided should 
be limited to those for which the Bantu could afford 
to pay". 40 Kane-Berman argues that this process, 
which became most seriously felt in the late sixties 
and early seventies contributed to Black discontent 
which underlay the Soweto uprisings .41 
By June 1976 the set of forces were in operation 
as in 1962 when liquor consumption was decrirninalised. 
The relative importance of each of them had changed, 
however, and there was a greater urgency of Black 
discontent. 
As for liquor capital, it was still seeking increased 
distribution channels to cope with mounting surpluses 
of grape products, and extend the sustained growth 
of the breweries. In the absence of legal channels 
being extended through legislation, they resorted 
to fostering the illicit distributors. By 1976 
urban Blacks were again consuming an estimated 60% 
of all liquor consumed in the country, 80% of which 
was reaching them through the shebeens .42 From 19 7 2 
onwards liquor wholesalers fielded full-time promotion 
teams, with state blessing, to visit shebeens and 
'educate' them about their products. They supplied 
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promotional paraphernalia such as glasses, 
tablecloths, trays, T-shirts, and sometimes fridges~3 
Personal gifts were also supplied to the shebeeners 
and their personnel~4 
The State was thus allowing a de facto situation 
to be perpetuated. At that stage it was illegal, 
and the State had little intention of legalising 
it. Liquor capital was being allowed, illegally, 
to foster its major market while the token policing 
was keeping up the fa~ade of enforcing the law. 
C THE SOWETO UPRISINGS AND SHEBEEN LEGALISATION 
During the uprisings most symbols of State domination 
in the townships came under attack. The bottle 
stores and beerhalls were no exception. Some 250 
of them were damaged or destroyed~5 
In most cases, according to Kane-Berman, it seemed 
as if the motive for attacking the bottle stores 
was to destroy rather than loot, although some looting 
did take place. 
~one account reports students breaking into a liquor 
store and then not drinking the liquor but pouring 
it into the street shouting, 'less liquor, better 
education!' and 'we want more schools, not 
beerhalls! '". 
Statements to the press justifying their actions 
against bottle stores, beerhalls and shebeens 
indicated their perception of drinking a3 a deflection 
of the Black struggle, and divisive Black solidarity: 
All {that our parents) do is drink and try to forget 
the problems facing Blacks. That is why we burned 
down the bottle stores and told the shebeens to 
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close down. Most have and we will deal with those 
still operating." 
The Soweto Students' Representative Council mentioned 
in a statement in November 1976 that shebeens were: 
"A cause of unhappiness in the Black man's life. 
A number of lives have been lost because of the 
operation of these shebeens. Salaries have been 
lost because they were first opened in shebeens. 
Futures have been wrecked by the operation of these 
shebeens . . . . . . nothing good has ever come out of 
them. Hundreds of our colleagues have become 
delinquents, beggars or orphans as shebeen kings 
and queens have become capitalists. We can no longer 
tolerate seeing our father's pay packets emptied 
in shebeens." 
Once the protests spread to the Cape Peninsula 
townships, 
pressure. 
shebeens were subjected to substantial 
In October 1976 more than 100 were 
destroyed by students who also set up "pickets at 
bus stops to search adults who were bringing liquor 







State to change the 
labour force. A 
manner 
series 
of strategies emerged, 
opti ve measures which 
as total strategy.47 
combining coercive and co-
carne collectively to be known 
Central to the shift in policy was the realisation 
that most of the major principles of the Stallard 
Doctrine had to be diluted or reversed. It was 
realised that urban Blacks were a permanent feature 
of the South African social formation, and that 
a stable middle class should be fostered. That 
involved incorporating Blacks into the free enterprise 
system, giving them a greater share in municipal 
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administration and providing a degree of security 
in urban land tenure. Substantial concessions were 
made to the principle of Blacks financing the cost 
of their own reproduction. Private capital was 
drawn into an alliance with the State to finance 
and manage the proposed and actual changes brought 
about ~8 
The policy towards liquor distribution to, and 
consumption by Blacks also underwent changes. Shortly 
after the worst unrest was over, in August 1977, 
the Minister of Justice instructed the Liquor Board 
to investigate the feasibility of decriminalising 
shebeens and allowing Blacks to enter the liquor 
trade in their townships. The Board was specifically 
instructed to consider the implications such a move 
would have to already vested interests ~9 The Board 
conducted lengthy investigations causing considerable 
delays. 
Substantial behind the scenes manoeuvring was taking 
place in the liquor industry itself. The problem 
for the best part of this century, was that natural 
market expansion, and therefore continuing 
accumulation, was being stifled by restrictive 
distribution legislation. Given a limited legal 
market, the major producers and wholesalers attempted 
to get as much of the market as possible. They 
embarked on a strategy of vertical integration, 
so that they could influence consumer spending by 
retailing techniques. Moreover, they had to sustain 
an expensive policy of advertising, price cutting 
and, what is euphemistically referred to as aggressive 
marketing. 50 
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An oligopolistic situation existed, in which the 
breweries owned substantial interests in the wine 
and spirit sector~1 and one of the large wine and 
spirit companies owned a brewery ?2 Furthermore, 
the primary grape producers, represented by the 
KWV were not structurally linked to wholesale and 
retail distributors. A reorganisation of overlapping 
ownerships was engineered, reputedly by the Afrikaner 
business magnate, Dr Anton Rupert, chairman of the 
Rembrandt Group.53 The State was requested to sanction 
this reorganisation. 
The State duly agreed, and blessed what became known 
as the 1979 Agreement. Effectively, it entailed 
an exchange - SAB absorbed Intercontinental Breweries 
and became the outright beer monopoly, and forfeited 
in return some of its control of the wine and spirits 
sector. This sector in turn was organised into 
a massive conglomerate, Cape Wine and Distillers 
( CWD) in which SAB, 
30%, and the public 
Rembrandt and the KWV each held 
the remaining 10%. CWD became 
a near-monopoly in wine and spirits, controlling 
approximately 85% of that sector~4 A further proviso 
of the agreement was that vertical integration ln 
the industry be diminished gradually~5 
Ironically, the State passed the Maintenance and 
Promotion Competition Act in the same year, a law 
designed to prevent monopolisation such as the 1979 
Agreement which the State had just sanctioned. At 
the same time, when monopolisation of the industry 
was undoubtedly going to diminish competition and 
increase consumption, it also launched a national 
plan, something of a total strategy, to combat the 
over-consumption of liquor. 56 
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Once the liquor industry had been reorganised the 
State announced that in principle it was in favour 
of decriminalising shebeens in Black townships F 
An important proviso, however, was that this would 
be done when other methods of financing the townships 
had been developed .58 More so than before the 
uprisings, the State was now dependent on the shebeens 
to finance the townships. The beerhalls that had 
been destroyed during the unrest had not been rebuilt, 
so that it was mainly shebeeners' purchases from 
Administration Boards Bottle-stores - albeit illegal 
that was contributing to township finance~9 And 
while on the one side the State's Administration 
Boards were colluding in the illegality of selling 
to shebeens, the State's police were prosecuting 
the shebeeners for illegally selling liquor?O 
Another condition of the imminent decriminalisation 
was that finance capital would be allowed to 
"participate as sureties and minority shareholders 
in such Black liquor business for an interim period''ftl 
Considering that there are approximately 4 000 
sizeable full-time shebeens and an additional ± 
4 000 smaller, sometimes part-time shebeens in Soweto 
alone~2 there are lucrative prospects for finance 
capital. 
In time it is the stated intention to phase out 
all State involvement in liquor distribution in 
the townships, "when alternative sources of income 
are placed at the disposal of Administration Boards 
and/or Community Councils" .63 
From an ideological point of view the erstwhile 
criminals and owners of dens of vice and sin are 
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to become the largest single component of the newly-
accredited petit bourgeoisie. No longer will the 
White faces of State officials be seen supplying 
liquor to Blacks, but free-enterprise Black 
entrepreneurs will be profiting from that process. 
They too will have to sustain the losses which any 
future attack on liquor outlets may cause. Their 
political allegiances are therefore likely to support 
the forces which maintain a milieu in which their 
businesses can flourish. By supporting the status 
quo they will have co-operated voluntarily in the 
apparent depoli ticisation of liquor distribution 
to their customers, the Black working class.64 
A major question still 
source of funds will 
This will necessitate 
remains unanswered. What 
substitute liquor profits. 
considerable restructuring. 
It seems as if Blacks will be granted 99 year 
leasehold on which rates can be charged. The newly 
legalised shebeeners will have to pay income tax 
and sales tax, as well as purchase liquor licences 
and some of the business sites of the old beerhalls 
that will be put out to tender.65 Business districts 
within townships which are likely to be constructed 
will also provide a tax base. 
A further ideological shift is that Blacks will 
be given greater representative powers in municipal 
management. The rider to this extension of rights, 
is that the newly-elected Black Councils will also 
bear the unpopular burden of raising finance for 
the management/reproduction 
Again the White faces of 
officials will no longer 
suppressing Blacks in what 
of the urban Blacks. 
Administration Board 
appear to be overtly 
Bloch and Webster call 
"coercive management par excellence". 66 
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In this process liquor outlets are again likely 
to be a focus of conflict. A report in the Sunday 
Times in March 1984 already bears evidence of such 
conflict having begun. Essentially it involved 
a private businessman buying a bottle store from 
the Ficksburg, Orange Free State, Administration 
Board for Rl90 000. 
"But the members of the Meqheleng Community Council 
are equally adamant that Mr Moalosi should not 
get the bottle store. They want to retain the 
business and plough its profits back into the 
community" ~7 
Shebeens, too are likely to be a continuing source 
of conflict, as only a limited number of the 8 000 
odd Soweto shebeens are likely to be legalised~8 
The organised shebeen fraternity, the National 
Taverners Association, which has local affiliates 
from each township but only represents the sizeable 
shebeens, is likely to insist on the police protecting 
their market. Illicit distribution by small-timers 
is still likely to continue.69 
D CONCLUSION 
The manner in which liquor has reached urban Blacks 
in this Century has thus profoundly effected the 
shaping of that section of the South African working 
class, both directly and indirectly. 
The direct, immediate impact of liquor consumption 
relates to the proportion of earnings a household 
spends on liquor compared with other consumption 
items. This crucially influences the level of mental 
and emotional support which is generated within 
that unit, which can profoundly shape the trajectories 
of the individual family members into the future. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION AND ITS IMPACT ON 
THE CAPE URBAN WORKING CLASS 
A INTRODUCTION 











of the state to a variety of contradictions over 
a period of time. The use of liquor distribution 
as a means of cheaply financing collective consumption 
has been well documented as has the move towards 
the creation of a middle class. 
On the other hand, the position in 
does not initially appear either to 
Coloured areas 
be so easily 
response to explained in terms of State 
contradictions, or to throw so much light on more 
general social issues. Possibly for this reason 
there is far less documentation on the subject. 
The first part of 
legal distribution 
a Coloured middle 
this chapter, which deals with 
shows that the process of creating 
class, started much earlier than 
the same process for Blacks. Since Coloureds were 
already accepted as permanent members of the urban 
community and as candidates for relatively skilled 
jobs, this is easily explainable. 
The second part of the chapter seeks to explain 
why this process has not been taken to its logical 
conclusion with the full "normalisation" of the 
liquor trade in capitalist terms. It also explores 
other facets of the interaction between the state 
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and the working class showing how the distribution 
of liquor is issued to serve the purpose of system 
maintenance. 
This section, unlike those going before is not based 
on secondary sources but relies on empirical research 
interpreted through the theoretical framework 
established in the previous chapters. 
B LEGAL LIQUOR DISTRIBUTION IN 'COLOURED' AREAS 
Prior to the passing of the Group Areas Act in 1950, 
the concept of 'Coloured' areas had a different 
connotation. In fact, there were no such legally 
defined racially homogenous areas in Cape Town. 
The working class lived wherever cheap accommodation 
was available, whether in District Six, Schotsche 
Kloof, or any other convenient area. If no 
accommodation was available, in shanty-towns such 
as Windemere, Vrygrond, Elsies River and other parts 
of the Western Cape. The more affluent members 
mingled with Whites in Suburban Cape Town. 
Liquor distribution preceded from White-owned bottle 
stores, bars and winegardens that were situated 
in District Six and the suburbs. 
The 1945 Cape Coloured Liquor Commission of Inquiry 
reveals that the most prevalent alcohol consumption 
was that of 'canteen wine', containing 16.6% alcohol 
by volume. It was judged to be of very low quality 
and aimed exclusively at the working class. In 
fact 97% of all wine consumed was canteen wine, 
most of which was consumed in the year of vintage. 
The fortification was necessary to keep it from 
fermenting .I 
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The Western Cape winefarmers relied heavily on the 
working class which consumed by volume, the largest 
portion of their production.2 Yet to the winefarmers 
this was not enough. They maintained that the 
restrictions on distribution in terms of numbers 
of outlets and their opening times were insufficient 
to allow them normal market growth. Throughout 
the Cape 'Coloureds' were also restricted in the 
amount of liquor they were allowed to buy per visit 
to a bottle store (two bottles of wine), and in 
some areas the Liquor Board had stipulated the closure 
of bottle stores on Friday afternoons in order to 
limit overindulgence.3 While the farmers were 





winefarmers) were forced 
into employment because of 
the low productivity that liquor consumption had 
occasioned among Coloureds. 
"In the Western Province, too, contractors have 
to rely on native labour because the Coloureds are 
too enfeebled to do the hard work required. Even 
on the farms, where the Coloured labourer had been 
employed for many generations the native is also 
making his appearance. Farmers admit that if the 
Italian prisoners of war had not been made available 
they would have been in a predicament and it would 
appear that if the Coloured people are allowed to 
degenerate further it will mean not only the physical 
and moral deterioration of themselves but a serious 
economic loss to South Africa as well" .4 
Throughout the 1930's and forties there seemed to 
be no clear policy about the reproduction of the 
'Coloured' segment of the working class. Three 
commissions looked into the matter and made their 
recommendations .5 Common to all three was the alarming 
degree to which liquor had rendered the population 
unproductive, 'demoralised' and disorganised. The 
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Cape Coloured Commission of 1937 came close to 
recommending the abolition of the tot system? the 
Meaker Commission of 1945 strongly urged the 
government to do so, but the winegrowers carried 
enough clout to ride these criticisms of their labour 
control methods? 
What did emerge from the recommendations particularly 
from the 1937 Cape Coloured Commission was a version 




towards separatism, group areas, 
schemes and training schemes 




Following the National Party victory the move towards 
separatism was intensified. 
The separatist notion was translated into reality 
with the entrenchment of National Party power. While 
'reshaping' the method of 'Coloured' representa t.ion, 
at the site of reproduction i.n separate group areas, 
the ruling bloc also attempted to encourage the 
growth of a small 'Coloured' elite. This group 
would hopefully provide some leadership to the rest 
of the 'Coloured' population, and the state had 
to ensure that they were materially well enough 
catered for to be satisfied with their lot. 
"What clearly was required, was the impetus of a 
Coloured (at least aspirant) bourgeoisie which could 
give sectionist 'leadership' to the Coloured colour-
caste, while necessarily remaining bound to the 
alliance with its ruling class creators" .9 
This was the rationale which necessitated a series 
of derestrictions of 
opportunities. In terms 
formerly blocked 
of the new policy 
income 
private 
free enterprise was to be encouraged among the 
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Coloured population. In response to the Malan 
Commission which recommended that Coloureds be allowed 
to own their outlets, as well as hotels in their 
own areas , 10 Coloureds were allowed to become 
shareholders in bottle stores to be erected in 
'Coloured' areas. In order to spread the benefit 
of these potentially vast accumulation avenues to 
as many aspirant entrepreneurs as possible, there 
had to be at least ten shareholders in the company 
applying for liquor licences. Later this number 
was increased to 20 .ll To this end also the Coloured 
Development Corporation was formed in 1962!2 The 
function of the Coloured Development Corporation 
was to provide capital loans at favourable interest 
rates to aspirant entrepreneurs whose ventures looked 
feasible. In addition it launched some of its own 
protests in the 'Coloured' areas which provided 
an infrastructural backup to the retailing and light 
manufacturing which the private entrepreneurs 
launched. 
The type of private ventures it supported were 
undertakers, cinemas, bookkeeping practices, building 
contractors, panelbeaters and spraypainters, 
hairdressers, hotels, restaurants/liquor outlets, 
retailers commercial buildings, and manufacturers. 
The three categories that involved liquor distribution 
hotels, restaurants/liquor outlets received a 
high proportion of total funds allocated. In 1978/9 
they accounted for 26.8% (an amount of R856 350,00) 
and in 1979/80 they accounted for 22% (R923 015,00) 
of funds (R3 196 905,00 and R4 029 103,00 
respectively) 
those years .13 
allocated to private applicants in 
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By 1982 there were approximately 30 outlets in Coloured 
Group Areas in greater Cape Town. Some of these, 
particularly in the poorer areas were geared 
predominantly to the shebeen-trade catering for bulk 
purchases. 14 others were not interested in selling to 
shebeeners. One of these latter bottle store managers 
whom I interviewed, in Elsies River, claimed to be 
in favour of responsible consumption and aimed his 
retailing strategy at the more affluent members of 
the Elsies River Community. He was not prepared to 
make the advances to the police which a large 
shebeen-trade rendered essential.15 Nor was he prepared 
to collude in the illegality of entering a series 
of diverse names and addresses in the sales register 
which would obscure bulk purchases by shebeeners. 
The process of supplying shebeens 
decision which the management of 
outlets in 'Coloured' (and White) 
is thus a conscious 
the legal retail 
areas make before 
they embark on the necessary strategies which safeguard 
trouble-free purchases. It is patent deception to 
claim, as some of the largest shebeen-suppliers that 
I interviewed do, that they do not know whether their 
customers are shebeeners or not. They have accumulated 
capital by being co-opted into State strategy under 
the umbrella of free enterprise and are simply 
attempting to conceal their complicity. At the same 
time they are, knowingly or not, attempting to sustain 
the fiction that the free-enterprise liquor distribution 
process is a-political. 
Thirty-odd legal outlets for a population of close 
to one million people in greater Cape Town spells 
inefficient marketing in distribution parlance. 
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It will become clear from the section on shebeens 
in 'Coloured' areas below why they are unlikely 
to be legalised in the foreseeable future. The 
course that events are most likely to follow according 
to liquor industry sources, is an increase in licence 
allocations on the existing basis.16 
C ILLEGAL DISTRIBUTION IN 'COLOURED' AREAS 
The previous section has demonstrated how sparsely 
the legal retail outlets were distributed after 
1962. A substantial 'inefficiency existed in the 
liquor marketing network, and there was considerable 
scope for income opportunities by filling the gaps. 
Moreover, legal outlets were confined to regular 
business hours, did not offer entertainment, and 
most important, did not extend credit to their 
customers. 11 Informal 11 distributors could thus offer 
potential customers a far better service than legal 
distributors could. 
It is important, before the case study of illicit 
distribution is undertaken, to locate illicit dealers 
in the South African political economy. 
Liberal theory maintains that a fairly clear-cut 
division between formal and informal sectors of 
the economy can be made. The latter represents 
the backward, traditional, low technology sector 
of the economy, characterised by marginal business 
operating from residential premises on low capital 
inputs. Moreover, the informal sector requires 
little effort of know-how to enter, and once ensconced 
the occupants often use family members as their 
labour)7 Whereas this description of the informal 
sector is fairly accurate in terms of liberal theory, 
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it does not offer a convincing 
its relationship to the formal 
posited by liberal theory is 
argument concerning 
sector. The dualism 
strenuously challenged 
by Marxist writers on the grounds that it overlooks 
both the interdependence of the two sectors, as 
well as the aetiology of informal sector. 
This omission is particularly pertinent in the context 
of racial capital ism in view of the criminalisation 
of certain formal income opportunities to Blacks 
and 'Coloureds'. Job reservation, regionally 
prescribed licencing laws and land ownership combined 
with the difficulty of obtaining capital or credit 
through conventional channels, has resulted in a 
retardation of occupational and spatial mobility 
of all but the ruling Whites}8 According to Wilkinson 
and Webster racial capitalism has resulted in a 
"failure of the process of social reproduction, 
despite the broadening and deepening of capitalist 
relations in South Africa, to produce a more broadly-
based African petty-bourgeoisie or a labour force 
stratified along lines similar to those of the labour 
forces of advanced capitalist social formations "1.9 
This development has been accompanied by the 
continuing regeneration of a sizeable relative surplus 
population having to find some means of subsistence 
in the urban ghettoes. The reproduction of the 
working class is affected not only by the level 
of wages paid to labour in the formal sector, but 
also by the level of domestic labour inputs by members 
of each family. Furthermore, the level at which 
the working class family is reproduced is affected 
by the provision of collective consumption items 
(supplied by the State) and finally, by the intensity 
of informal sector activity. 20 
The range of activities falling within the description 
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of the illegal informal sector is fairly wide: from 
production (eg. liquor brewing) to services (receiving 
stolen goods, drug-pushing, prostitution, protection 
rackets), and transfers (theft, pickpocketing, 
robbery, confidence trickery)~1 
The illicit liquor distributors that are our concern 
here would fall into the category of what Wilkinson 
and Webster call "'outworkers' of commercial capital, 
distributing its commodities to those corners of 
the market that remain inaccessible to conventional 
outlets". They supply "products and services which 
bourgeois morality has prevented the latter from 
commodi tising openly" .22 They supply liquor under 
conditions which commercial capital is prevented 
(by legislation) from distributing. The two most 
important conditions are credit and indefinite selling 
times. 
But apart from these two factors there are two other 
important considerations which contribute to the 
wide prolification of shebeens in 'Coloured' areas 
of the Western Cape: firstly personal safety, and 
secondly the dependency on the shebeener which is 
reproduced by the method of illicit distribution?3 
Shebeens are of course, not the only form of informal 
sector activity. Some of the income opportunities 
in ghettos rely on direct predation on their 
residents. A whole range of methods exist starting 
from pickpocketing and bagsnatching through increasing 
application of threatened or actual violence to 
outright robbery. These are practised by the 
'Roebane', the robbers, who operate either 
individually, or more often in gangs ~ 4 The constant 
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threat of personal attack, particularly at night 
and especially over weekends, substantially affects 
any resident's decision whether to buy liquor a 
kilometer away from his house at a legal outlet 
or just around the corner, at a shebeen where everyone 
knows him and he is relatively safe!5 
All the above factors have to be seen in the context 
of the importance of shebeens both to liquor capital, 
and to the State. Although these are largely 
interdependent interests, they each adopt different 
dynamics and are troubled by different sets of 
contradictions. 
Liquor capital needs to circumvent the legal 
limitations on wider distribution to avert ever-
increasing surplus-production problems. The 
officially admitted surplus figure for the 1982 
grape harvest was 34.7%!6 the Financial Mail mentioned 
figures such as 400 million litres, constituting 
50% of the 1980 harvest as being unsold!7 Thus illicit 
distribution takes on a central role for the entire 
liquor industry, and determines their attempts to 
either secure 'selective' and symbolic enforcement 
of the liquor law, or to press for decriminalisation 
of shebeens. At an ideological level liquor capital 
attempts show the negative image of illicit 
distribution is ill-founded. They claim that shebeens 
contribute towards rectifying the imbalance that 
exists in collective consumption in White and Black 
areas. Specifically the substitute for recreational 
facilities, such as clubs and pubs. 
"Where and when perceived individual rights and 
legitimate aspirations (social, political and 
economic) are denied or withdrawn, individuals resort 
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by illegitimate means to regain or achieve them 
so is the case of shebeens. 'One of the basic 
institutions in British work life is the public 
house Of the social institutions that moulds 
men's lives between home and town in an industrial 
town, The pub has more buildings, holds more 
people, takes more of their time and money than 
church, cinema, dance hall and political organisations 
put together' . Surely this equally applies to the 
Shebeens" .28 
This argument is particularly salient in Black areas 
where a specialisation in informal sector activity 
is more common than in 'Coloured 1 areas. Shebeeners 
in 'Coloured' townships quite often also sell other 
drugs next to liquor, as well as stolen goods. 29 Liquor 
capital can thus hardly argue that shebeens in 
'Coloured' areas are like pubs 'back home' and deserve 
to be decriminalised. Instead their strategy is 
to attempt to secure, 'agreements' with the police 
force to 'protect' legal liquor retailers and not 
to harass shebeeners too strenuously when they 
purchase their supplies at these outlets. This may 
in turn have a long term effect of encouraging 
shebeens to specialise only in liquor sales. Once 
rid of the negative image of other drugs and stolen 
goods, liquor capital could then press for 
decriminalisation of shebeens in 'Coloured' areas 
too. At this stage, however, it is restricted to 
supporting the symbolic enforcement strategy. 
While market expansion is the 
capital, the State needs to 
main concern of liquor 
be seen to be taking 
the interests of other power/pressure groups into 




These interests are still in the 1980's 
in terms of moral, religious and 
arguments, although some recent 
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statements in Parliament recognised the ideological 
role of liquor in the "destruction of the working 
class" .30 
Conflicting opinions over liquor distribution are 
not only articulated at Parliamentary level. Within 
the state apparatus, the function of ministries 
such as Commerce and Tourism, Health, and Justice 
(to name but a few) are affected differently by 
any changes in the liquor distribution dispensation. 
In this chapter the focus will be primarily on the 
relation between liquor distribution and township 
policing in 'Coloured' areas. The more the interests 
of the police are served by 'help' from the shebeens, 
the less strenuously they will be inclined to enforce 
the laws relating to illicit distribution. 
All the above factors, the ref ore, exert their 
own peculiar influences on the existence of shebeens 
at any given stage under consideration. Acting 
together, and of course exerting contradictory 
pressures at times, they shape the extent of, and 
the peculiar nature of, illicit liquor distribution. 
It is the purpose of this section to examine, by 
means of a case study, the relationship between 
shebeens in 'Coloured' townships of the Western 
Cape and liquor capital, the police, the community, 
and the street gangs. 
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(i) BACKGROUND TO SHEBEENS IN THE WESTERN CAPE 
Throughout the duration of the prohibition of 
liquor-sales to Blacks, between 1896 and 1962, 
Whites had legal access to a virtually unlimited 
choice of products and unlimited quantities of 
liquor. Coloureds in the Western Cape had equally 
free choice in the range of products, but were 
limited to a maximum of three quarts per purchase 
per day. 31 Blacks were only allowed to purchase 
and consume sorghum beer. 
Under the circumstances the pattern of shebeening 
took on the form of Whites and Coloureds purchasing 
at legal retail outlets, and transporting the 
liquor to Black townships where it was sold 
illegally to Blacks. Another form of shebeening 
was home production, where Skokiaan kings and 
queens brewed the 'concoctions' so vilified by 
the formal liquor industry and State representatives 
as being dangerous and 'unhealthy' ~ 2 
Shebeening constituted the main source of income 
to a large number of people. It was 
that approximately 30 000 individuals in 
suggested 
the Cape 
Peninsula were making a living out of shebeening 
by 1960 !3 It was also suggested that approximately 
60% of all liquor produced reached the consumer 
through illicit channels}4 It was argued, on behalf 
of those in favour of anti-prohibition, that this 
vast informal sector would whittle away once Blacks 
had legal access to liquor?5 It turned out to 
be a weak argument. Firstly, because the gaps 
in this legal market remained formidable/6 and 
secondly, because the erstwhile shebeeners refused 
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to simply disappear. They changed their style 
of operation to suit the new dispensation. 
By the early 1980 1 s shebeening was probably still 
the main pillar of the informal sector, followed 
closely if not overtaken by drug-dealing, with 
stolen goods agencies 







sector is notoriously difficult to quantify, but 
for those to whom the 1 facts 1 constitute numbers 
rather than relationships and processes, I will 
venture a speculation. 
In 1982 Pinnock estimated the number of residents 
of greater Cape Town who "call themselves gangsters" 
as somewhere around 80 000.37 That figure needs 
to be qualified. It would be more accurate, in 
my opinion, to include ex-gangsters in that figure 
as well. Moreover, the label gangster needs to 
be stretched to those individuals who have only 
a loose affinity to gangs, a part-time sporadic 
involvement. Only then does the figure of 80 000 
seem realistic. At the same time I was involved 
in a shebeen-count in the Elsies River Clarkes 
Estate Ui tsig area of the Cape Flats. 38 The 
managers of four of the five legal retail outlets 
in those areas were interviewed and asked for 
estimates of their shebeen clients}9 Combining 
both these sources a figure of 400 for the area 
seems realistic. From relative volumes of sales 
over the whole of Cape Town~0 and from shebeen 
estimates made by my gangster connections in various 
areas, a very conservative figure of 3 000 shebeens 
for the Cape Flats area was arrived at. This 
figure excludes shebeens in Black townships of 
the area. 
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(ii) SHEBEENS AND LIQUOR CAPITAL 
If there is any error in my estimates of the 
number of shebeens, it will be on the conservative 
side. The rna jor significance of these estirna tes 
is that they expose the ratio of legal to illegal 
liquor outlets. The 3 000-odd shebeens purchase 
their liquor mainly at 50-odd legal outlets 
adjoining or situated in the Coloured 
Most of these 50 retail outlets are 
private companies consisting of at 




These bottle stores, particularly in the poorer 
areas, are geared predominantly to supplying 
bulk-purchases by shebeeners. I would confidently 
estimate that at least 70% of all liquor consumed 
by 'Coloureds' in the sreater Cape Town area 
reaches them through the shebeens. In some areas 
the shebeens are capable of selling liquor at 
lower prices than bottle stores.42 
Shebeens are thus firmly entrenched in the process 
of liquor distribution and are of extreme 
importance to the legal producers and distributors, 
particularly to the wine and spirits faction 
of the liquor industry. The bulk of wine that 
is produced in this country is low-grade, low-
priced wine aimed at the urban and rural working 
class. The Western Cape working class, nurtured 
for generations on the Tot System, consumes 
approxirna tely 7 5% of all low-grade wine produced 
in South Africa .43 Low-grade wine is in turn by 
far the largest proportion of all liquor produced 
from grapes .44 
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For the continuing accumulation of the Western 
Cape-based liquor industry, the working class 
as consumer target and the splinter-working-
class shebeens as distributing vehicle are of 
central importance. Without shebeens extending 
the limits of legality through credit-sales and 
other services liquor sales 
definitely be considerably lower 
volumes would 
than they are, 
plunging the liquor industry into even greater 
problems of overproduction. 
It is therefore obvious that the liquor industry 
is inclined to use all the influence, leverage, 
and power at its disposal to ensure that illicit 
distribution is not hampered by over-zealous 
policing. Considering the blatancy with which 
shebeeners purchase their supplies at retail 
outlets the police would have no problems in 
arresting shebeeners and confiscating their stock 
if they put t~heir minds to it. 
The reality at street level is that the police 
enforce the Liquor Law selectively. Partly 
responsible for this are the encouragements they 
receive from the liquor industry and from within 
their own hierarchy to do so. The other part 
of their decision stems from the dynamics of 
policing working class areas, to be dealt with 
below. 
The shapers of marketing strategies in the large 
liquor companies are well aware of how sensitive 
a political issue liquor distribution is.45 All 
the more sensitive, therefore, is illicit 
distribution. They are extremely conscious of 
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retaining an image at large which wi 11 show them 
to be 'responsible' distributors. This 
'responsible' attitude will sometimes be sustained 
even though it costs hundreds of thousands of 
rands in loss of profit~6 On the other hand, 
they have the problem that the rna jeri ty of the 
liquor they produce and distribute legally, reaches 
the consumer through illegal shebeens in working 
class areas. They concede that the only way 
in which retail outlets can sustain a successful 
accommodation with shebeen-clientele is by an 
the local police, but claim to have no part in 
negotiating this 
which these overt 
at that of the 
accornrnoda tion .47 







representations emanate from liquor 
at a political and/or media level~8 
producers 
In view of the strenuous competition in the liquor 
industry between grape-based liquor and beer, 
both vying for larger proportions of consumer 
spending on liquor, it seems logical that liquor 
producers/distributors should have attempted 
to liaise with shebeens in 'Coloured' areas. 
In Black areas, promotion teams have been visiting 
shebeens since 1972 with State blessing.49 The 
fact that the same pattern has not repeated itself 
in 'Coloured' townships is due to the unsavoury 
image of shebeens there. Most sizeable shebeens 
are run and protected by street gangs whose 
tendency to monopolise the most lucrative informal 
sector activities such as drugs and stolen goods 
has made them a publicity risk for liquor capital. 
Gang territoriality and mutual hostility discount 
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the possibility of shebeeners organising themselves 
into a pressure group as was the case with shebeens 
in Black areas~° Furthermore, only about 20% 
of shebeens offer any facilities for customers 
to consume the liquor on the premises. So that 
the local-pub-image would be hard to use 
legitimately. Until they could be persuaded to 
separate their other forms of business from liquor 
sales, it is doubtful that these shebeens will 
become the primary vehicle of market expansion 
in coloured areas. Liquor capital cannot afford 
to be seen in association with them. 
The shebeeners are therefore confined to only 
one contact in the liquor industry, the retailers. 
If they prove themselves to be regular, reliable 
customers, they may qualify for credit, depending 
on the policy of the local retailer. It is 
important for both parties that the purchasing 
procedure remains free from harrassment by the 
police. Retailers who can build up a reputation 
for safe purchases are amply rewarded by 
substantially increased custom. Some retailers 
have circumvented the problem by effecting 
deliveries in unmarked vehicles 
the shebeen, thereby lessening 
shebeener ~ 1 
to 
the 
the site of 
risk to the 
Apart from security, price is another important 
consideration for the shebeener. Bulk discounts 
encourage larger purchases but provide more 
incriminating evidence if he is raided. 
Beyond these few basic services and concessions, 
there seems to be very little contact between 
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shebeener and the rest of the industry. There 
exists in the Western Cape none of the extensive 
back-up in terms of fridges, glasses, table cloths 
and all the other sales promotion paraphernalia 
which shebeens in Black areas are treated to.52 
Once the shebeener has made his purchase, or, 
if he is lucky, the stocks have been delivered 
to him, it is up to his own ingenuity to create 
the necessary alliances, accommodations and 
strategies which will render the reproduction 
of his business cycle possible. Dangers abound. 
Apart from the danger of police harrassment, 
there are opposition shebeens to contend with, 
as well as the street gangs, to whom a shebeen 
is always a potential target for free booze. 
Finally, there is the community itself, which 
could possibly be pressurised not to buy from 
him, or fail to pay for credit sales, or inform 
on him to the opposition or the police. To avoid 
all of these dangers a shebeener needs help, 
powerful help. The commonest form of assistance 
which shebeeners procure is the street gangs. 
(iii) SHEBEENS AND STREET GANGS 
There are, of course, some shebeens that do not 
hire or retain gangsters to protect them. This 
would apply to the small-timers who have resorted 
to selling a little liquor because the main 
breadwinner is for any of a host of possible reasons 
no longer providing the necessary income to 
reproduce the working class family.53 Also a fairly 
common phenomenon is a family in which a number 
of individuals work in formal employment, but 
who augment their family income by selling liquor 
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over weekends. In such cases there are usually 
some friends that can be relied on to help in 
times of trouble. 
The shebeener who forms the subject of my case 
study also started off selling liquor without 
the help of a gang. I shall call him Joker in 
order to safeguard his identity.S4 
Joker began his career as a gangster, like 









thousand youngsters on 
own protection .ss He was nine years 
time, lived in Heideveld with his 
siblings in a small semi-detached 





former horne in District Six in the early sixties 
and dumped in "No-Man's Land", knowing hardly 
anyone living around them. Shops were a lor.g 
walk from their new horne, and he remembers the 
nearest police station being Athlone, some 5 krn 
away. Very few houses had telephones. To avoid 
being robbed repeatedly of the price of a loaf 
of bread on his way to the shops he joined a 
group of lads who called thernsel ves the Terrible 
Jesters ( TJ). At that stage there was no great 
stigma attached to being a member of a defence 
gang. Joker's father had told him many stories 
about the legendary Globe Gang of District Six, 
of whom he had reputedly been a member. The 
aura of the Globe was that of the gentlemen 
gangsters, with strong touches of a Robin Hood 
ethic.~ The TJ's were simply a group of 
inexperienced youngsters who hung out together 
at a particular spot, protected each other from 
attacks by the more experienced gangsters, smoked 
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a little pot together, and performed a couple 
of pranks. 
Hardly anyone who grows up in working-class areas 
of the Cape Flats is immune to exposure to big-
time gangsterism. If youngsters like Joker didn't 
actually see the big-timers operating, they 
certainly heard about them from older boys, or 
men who had more experience. Anyone who had 
done time in prison would have learnt prison 
language and had internalised some of the ideology 
and mystique of gangsterism. Even if he had 
not joined a prison gang such an individual would 
have learnt of their power both inside and out 
of prison. 57 
Joker and his TJ' s were exposed to a lot of man-
talk and gang-talk. As they grew older the defence 
dynamic changed a little. The late sixties and 
early seventies were epitomised by struggles 
for turf. Not only living territory, but also 
market delineation for informal sector activity .58 
The TJ' s defences needed to be sharpened if they 
were to survive, and that involved a modicum 
of aggression. 
As Joker and his TJ's approached school-leaving 
age, survival became an ever-stronger theme of 
their togetherness. They had long since learnt 
to 'earn' · some money by shaking up youngsters 
and relieving them of money or goods on the way 
to or from the shops. Drunks were also easy 
prey for a few coppers. And of course they kept 
their eyes open for anything left negligently 
lying around too long, or a nice shirt or pair 
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of trousers, hanging on an unattended line. They 
had also rehearsed their shoplifting techniques 
well, some members occupying 




few i terns 
and beat it. All of 
more than fun and 
activities could not 
this was, however, little 
need to sustain 
games. Their petty-crime 
sustain them, and did not 
them while they were still 
dependant on their parents and at school. 
The transition from school into some form of 
survival is at best, traumatic. It is all the 
more traumatic if, as a 14-16 year-old youngster, 
one is between two and four years behind the 
average child in terms of school performance. 
In the case of Joker's TJ's their educational 
backwardness was not necessarily a case of lower 
intelligence. According to Joker, they just 
didn't see the point of all the nonsense they 
were being taught; it did not seem to equip them 
for anything they were likely to have to cope 
with in later life. And besides, the fun they 
were having after school was far more important 
than fiddling around with homework.59Joker's parents 
did not care much about his school performance, 
and were indifferent as to whether he should 
continue or not. They left the decision up to 
him. He had his eye on the style of a big-timer 
in his area. This big-timer wore flashy clothes, 
owned a car, was respected by some and feared 
by most people in the neighbourhood. He was 
the local big-buyer60 and merchant~ 1 and the leader 
of the Total Pipe Killers in Heideveld, an awesome 
lot. 
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The Jesters as a group were under pressure at 
that time. Some members were encouraged by their 
parents to look for work, and a few of them 
actually succeeded in finding mainly labourers 
jobs, 'shit-work' . Despite their lack of 
qualification for anything better in the formal 
sector, the gangsters look down on low-paid, 
physically exa~ting tasks, particularly if it 
involves racist employers. Gang ideology imbues 
them with a sense of manhood which relies on 
sharpness of mind, dexterity with weapons, 
proficiency at fighting, shrewdness in business 
and sexual prowess. The hierarchies they 
experience in gang 
mystique and ritual, 
onto prison gangs. 
at least, rigid 
submission in the 
structures retain traces of 
particularly when projected 
Gang laws demand, in theory 
adherence and unquestioning 
interests of solidarity. In 
prison gangs this rigidity finds its reality 
whereas it is somewhat diluted in the street 
gangs. It depends on the quality of leadership 
as to how closely each gang follows the rules. 
Working for a gang (or being a member) involves, 
in the eyes of Joker, getting something of value 
beyond mere money in return for one's efforts. 
There is solidarity, friendship, protection, 
ego-boosting, power, and shared spoils. Above 
all, there is excitement, the thrill of danger 
and daring. They feel a sense of purpose, seeing 
the fruits of their own labour rather than working 
towards enriching an employer. 
By comparison, those TJ's who succumbed to parental 
pressure to find formal employment were seen 










the employer-employee relationship, 
insecurity of tenure, yes-boss-






of evil' ~ 2 His 
ambitions lay beyond working for the 'Boere •6 3 
and being their dog. He aspired to riches, power 
and respect - and that was not a package obtainable 
through unskilled employment. 
Joker's choice (his rational choice), was to 
offer his services to the Total Pipe Killers 
( TPK' s). The respect which his father commanded 
as an ex-Globeite smoothed the transition from 
one gang into another. Joker was not the only 
TJ to do so. Those who had not found, or chose 
not to look for formal employment were also 
absorbed as 'Lai ties' 64into the TPK' s. They were 
initiated, tattoed and taught the TPK 'book', 
the unwritten laws which circumscribe TPK ethics. 
They swore their allegiances to the leader and 
obedience to the book. They had made their career 
choice. 
Ten years later Joker had served several prison 
terms, usually of fairly short duration (none 
exceeding 3 years) for theft, housebreaking and 
robbery. In prison he became a 'man of the 
number' , a member of the 26 Prison Gang~5 That 
membership entrenched him in a very large family 
of men who undertake to be of assistance to each 
other both inside prison, and also after their 
release. In prison he was a dealer, buying and 
selling whatever the confinement of men in an 
unnatural environment turns into cornmodi ties .66 
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On his release from prison, he collected the 
spoils of his last 1 job 1 from a friend who had 
kept the R300 for him. With this opening capital 
Joker started off his own, independent shebeen 
venture, assisted only by his wife. The scale 
of their business was of necessity small, as 
they could not be seen to be competing with the 
TPK 1 s in Heideveld, who by that stage (1980) 
had grown to be a considerable force, as Joker 
claimed, of 800 men. Furthermore, they were 
working from his parents 1 semi-detached house 
he had grown up in which constituted a further 
restraint to successful business expansion. 
Only once he had somehow (he does not divulge 
how) obtained a semi-detached house for himself 
and his wife in a different area, could he start 
building up his empire. 
There were many problems to contend with. Firstly, 
the other shebeens in the vicinity, to whom he 
constituted unwelcome competition. Not 
were the bigger operators protected by 
but they had also made the necessary deals 
the police and traffic police who allowed 
to exist. Finally, they had demarcated 
market areas and had their clientele sewn 








would have to offer his customers a better deal 
than the opposition, either in terms of better 
prices, longer credit terms, more comfortable 
or safer drinking environment, friendlier service. 
Then there were also the police to contend with. 
His strategy was to build up the liquor side 
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slowly. He concentrated initially on 'braking' 
(buying and selling) groceries, vegetables, 
cigarettes and sweets, buying at local 
supermarkets, and then selling in small quantities 67 
mainly on short-term credit until payday, usually 
Fridays. This process was, of course, also illegal 
as he did not possess the necessary licence~8 
Needless to say, although he was charging his 
customers sales tax, he kept it for himself, 
and would not have dreamt of paying income tax. 
Throughout these sales of household necessities, 
his customers were constantly made aware of the 
availability of liquor on credit as well. 
Within six months liquor volumes had overtaken 
the other commodities, and Joker's business became 
more noticeably a shebeen 





never settle all their debts with him, were so 
to speak dependent on his continued business. 
His business had reached a scale at which further 
expansion could, under the circumstances, only 
take place with the help of protectors, bouncers, 
informers and debt-collectors, in short a private 
police force. 
The local defence gang happened to be a group 
of youngsters, between the ages of 11 and 18, 
who called themselves the Dobermans (DBM in tatoo 
language). They were an unusually sizeable crew 
with a core of 15-odd 
2 0 peripheral lai ties .69 
bunch of necessity, 
members and approximately 
They were a rough, tough 
for Elsies river is one 
of the most dangerous areas to survive in ?O Some 
of them had acquired the hard-earned title of 
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'Doberman Dog' ?1 an 
fearless attitude. 
title a gangster 
accolade denoting a breakneck, 
In order to qualify for that 
has to perform some rather 
gruesome deeds, including eradicating 





























of intensity, prison gang ethics and structures 
are emulated. It is not unusual for a DBM to 
also wear the BFK tatoos and when he gets older, 
into his twenties, to also acquire an MG, or 
MG$. Two of the fifteen core members originally 
wore BFK tattoos and, during the four years of 
my association with them, graduated into "Full-
Force Born Free Kids" ( FF BFK), bearing the same 
distinction as the "Doberman Dogs". 
At least ten of the fifteen had graduated from 
the reformatories; six of them had simply run 
away, whereas the others had spent a minimum 
of being 73 The tougher two years ' reformed' . 
members, who at that stage of their lives had 
no intention of 'making it' in the formal sector, 
had tattood even their faces with a variety of 
words and symbols. 74 
This crew seemed to have the necessary 
job-qualifications that Joker was looking for. 
They were familiar with gang-lore, and were 
juveniles in the eyes of the courts and the law, 
all of which was to Joker's advantage, although 
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their age rendered them less experienced at 
business and hard-time gangsterism. From that 
point of view they were less of a physical and 
business threat to him. Moreover, they were likely 
to be financially more dependent on him if they 
got into trouble, so that he could trade bail-
money and legal fees for loyalty and obedience. 
Of course he would also pay them a wage, but 
that only constituted the equivalent of a 
labourer's wage (R45,00 a week at that time, 
Oct 1981). Outside of 'employment' hours, they 
were free to earn their 'perks' in the customary 
gang fashion. 
In the case of a conviction on any charge, the 
likelihood of juveniles receiving.whippings rather 
than prison terms is fairly high.75 For Joker 
that meant that he was seldom deprived of a full 
labour contingent for long periods. Besides, 
the reserve army of other Dobermans/BFK's/Mongrels 
in the area would be there to fill any vacancies. 
Joker's position as an ex-TPK member, however, 
caused him some problems in controlling his labour 
force. He had hired six of them to start off 
with: two per eight hour shift in this 24-hour-
a-day-operation. The rest of the gangsters had 
agreed to be on standby in case of trouble. But 
TPK' s and DBM' s are not the happiest combination 
of gangs. Although they both belong to the same 
prison-gang alliance, which theoretically should 
supercede street-gang differences, that rule 
did not yet operate effectively amongst the DBM' s 
who had not experienced prison. Although Joker 
tried hard to 'pull' them he only had limited 
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success. 'Pulling' (om die manskappe te trek) 
refers to that process of ideological reinforcement 
which a gang-leader treats his underlings to 
from time to time, to teach/reaffirm the ethics 
and rules of gang existence. In his case it 
was necessary to mystify the 
employer-employee relationship 
gang ethic onto it. 
nakedness of the 
by superimposing 
Although he succeeded to a limited degree, which 
allowed business to improve to the extent that 
he was in a position to purchase a second-hand 
car within a short while ,76 it was still a 
relationship fraught with tension and conflict. 
The DBM' s could often not account for the 
mysterious disappearance of small quantities 
of liquor or money, to which they had helped 
themselves, and on one occasion while Joker was 
out augmenting supplies,77 his house was raided 
by the rest of the DBM' s/BFK' s, who cleared out 
what liquor there was. This raid was attributed 
to the opposition gang/shebeen by his employees 
on his return. 
The tensions and conflicts found their solution 
in the release from 
ex-26-brothers, whom I 
was a 'Pumulanga', a 
the BFK's to whom 
prison of one of Joker's 
shall call Scarface?8 He 
high-ranking leader, of 
Joker's private police 
theoretically owed 
became a partner in 
structural allegiance. 






the gangsters far more successfully 
was able to, lending far greater 
to what was basically an exploitive 
relationship. 
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With tighter command over their forces than had 
previously existed, they were now in a position 
to muscle their way into a greater market share 
in the area. 
That involved a three-pronged attack. They needed 
to break the power of the big buyer who was their 
main opposition, and push the smaller fries, 
who were a lesser problem, out of business. 
Secondly there were the police to contend with, 
and thirdly, the consumers of their wares needed 
to realise that it was in their best interests 
to buy from Joker and Co. 
They mobilised all the manpower at their disposal, 
including the reserve army of laities. They 
began by spreading false rumours in the 
neighbourhood about an imminent police clan1pdown 
on shebeensl9 Their intention here was to force 
the other shebeens to either go easy for a while 
by buying smaller, less incriminating quanti ties 
of liquor, or not to buy at all for a while. 
Joker and Scarface, however, bought larger 
quantities than usual, so that when the others 
ran out of supplies, their customers would possibly 
buy from Joker's shebeen. At the same time their 
gang was given instructions to harrass clients 
using the opposition shebeens, preferably very 
late at night or when the clients were drunk, 
so that identification of the gangsters would 
be more difficult. To this end the ballaclava, 
which forms part of the gang 'uniform' came into 
its own. It can be converted into a face cover 
and reconverted into a hat within seconds. Their 
instructions were to harrass the clients as close 
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to the site of the opposition shebeens as possible, 
so that they would acquire the reputation of 





these tactics, actual raids were 
the small-timers, smashing bottles 
them off, beating up the shebeener, 
or harrassing the women and girls, 
smashing windows and furniture. 
Throughout all these operations, Joker and Scarface 
kept a low profile, adopting a business-as-usual 
attitude, in fact letting it be known that business 
was picking up due to the safety of their shebeen. 
They attempted not to allow the link between 
the raids and their instruction to leak out. 
To this end the six rotating guards who were 
in constant attendance were not involved in the 
raids. On the face of it, therefore, the raids 
and harrassment could have been interpreted as 
the work of the 'independent' gang in the area. 
Their attack on the big buyer and his gang was 
more subtle. He was protected by a group of 
Sicilian Kids and remnant stragglers of the Cisko 
Yakkies, who belong to the opposing gang alliance, 
Cape Town Scorpions ( CT$) who all link up with 
the 28 prison gang. Joker and Scarface elicited 
the help of the police to do their dirty work. 
The drug squad, which is a separate, specialised 
unit of the police, was repeatedly informed by 
anonymous phone calls from callers imitating 
indignant female voices, that this particular 
shebeen was turning all their innocent youngsters 
into criminals and rapists from all the drugs 
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procured there. Information was divulged to 
the drug squad about the times of the week at 
which 'things were worst'. Having set the wheels 
of 'justice' in motion on that front, Joker and 
Scarface made their overtures to the local police 
and traffic police. 
As a result of their efforts, police surveillance, 
road-blocks and raids for both liquor and drugs 
as well as other crimes reported at the police 
station, increased at the opposition 
shebeener /merchant. The pressure was on him and 
he either had to increase his handouts and services 
to the accessible branches of the police, or 
slow down his operations a little. He did both, 
partly out of necessity, as some of his gangster 
guards had been caught in possession of drugs, 
and partly to lie low for a while to create a 
good impression of being a 'manageable' shebeener 
for his police-contacts. 80 
Joker and Scarface exploited this lull in trading 
by branching out into buying and selling dagga. 
Nine more lai ties were deployed at five 'peste' 
(outposts) where they "off-loaded" their 
"zols" (sticks) to the public. They did not sell 
or keep drugs on the premises. The connection 
between the laities manning the 'peste' and their 
employers were kept as secrets from anyone 
enquiring who the supplier happened to be. To 
this end Scarface was able to invoke the sanctity 
of the brotherhood oath, so that betrayal could 
be met with the severest of penalties. 
Initially, most dagga sales were on a cash basis, 
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but in time reliable liquor customers were allowed 
to buy drugs on credit as well. 
Hardly three weeks after 
dagga-dealing they found 
mandrax tablets (buttons) 
the commencement of 
a reliable source of 
which were then also 
'off-loaded' at the outposts. 
This rapid expansion of their product range, 
and the higher mark-ups on dagga and mandrax 
had a dramatic effect on the style of their 
business dealings. On the one hand, they were 
making considerably more money than when they 
sold merely liquor. The greater liquidity 
facilitated the expansion into moneylending at 
vastly usurious rates of 30% a week! Despite 
the high return on money by comparison with the 
going formal sector interest rates at the time 
(12-14% per annum), Joker explained this as merely 
a service to the community. In his opinion he 
could treble his money within a week if he invested 
it in either dagga or mandrax, so that his 
moneylending rate was a relative loss. What 
Joker did not verbalise, however, was that the 
moneylending side of his business increased his 
control of and power over the members of the 
community .81 
Once Joker and Scarface had started lending money, 
it was a question of time before they augmented 
the credit with durables such as transistor radios, 
tape recorders, TV sets and other household i terns 
which other specialists in the informal sector, 
the housebreakers and car-thieves, need outlets 
for~2 In this case they did not 'stock' the items 
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themselves but merely served as a channel for 
ordering, advertising, or viewing the i terns, 
which were kept at a variety of locations. Joker 
and Scarface only supplied the credit on their 
own terms and earned a commission from the 'owners' 
of the goods. 
On the other hand the extended product range 
imposed increased dangers on their business 
enterprise, from the police, the community, their 
own gang and opposition gangs. The reproduction 
of their means of survival 
broadening of the alliances and 
necessitated a 
a simultaneous 
strengthening of coercive controls over those 
who threatened them. 83 
Their own gang, by this stage numbering fifteen 
men in full-time employment, was at once one of 
their most important assets as well as a potential 
threat to their livelihood. 
The gang needed to be kept in training as to 
how best to perform its functions ie. where to 
hide the drugs, whom to sell to and whom to avoid, 
how to avoid arrest, how to deflect police 
attention from Joker's house, the stronghold 
of the enterprise, how to keep secrets, how to 
strategise attacks and assaults on their enemies, 
whom to harrass, and whom to leave in peace. 
Scarface was best equipped to impart this kind 
of information, relying strongly on his 
hierarchical seniority, which carries an aura 
of wisdom derived from even higher realms in 
the gang hierarchy. He continually inculcated 
them with those attributes which would perpetuate 
100 
the existence of the shebeen: loyalty, obedience, 
discipline, fearlessness, a sense of gang pride 
(akin to a team spirit, but very much stronger) . 
These "pulls" were held frequently either to 
the whole group of employees or to individuals, 
whenever Scarface felt it necessary. They were 
often accompanied by a mutual indulgence in a 
pipe, either green (dagga and tobacco only) or 
white (a mixture of dagga, mandrax and cigarette 
tobacco) ~4 
The pipe constituted a broken off bottleneck 
into which a 'diamond' (rolled up aluminium foil 
from a cigarette packet) was inserted to prevent 
the burning mixture from being inhaled. Sharing 
a pipe constitutes an important moment in the 
existence of a gang. On the one hand it is a 
unifying process by which all share equally in 
this intoxicating source of pleasure, while at 
the same time implicitly rejecting the mainstream 
middle-class values against which gangsterism 
is a partial responseft5 With each pipe smoked 
the gang anchors itself to the things that bind 
its individuals together. On the other hand the 
quasi -ri tuali ty of the process reaffirms the 
hierarchies of gansterism. The Pumulanga may 
decide as a special favour or as a token reward, 
who is to have the privilege of preparing the 
pipe, and even greater honour, who is to take 
the first draw. Then, too, the white pipe smoking 
process separates the men from the boys, giving 
those who can handle the burning throat and 
spinning head, a feeling of worth and achievement. 
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Petty competitiveness develops around the pipe-
smoking. Toughness is attributed in 
ever-increasing stages to those gangsters who 
can suck a pipe so hot that firstly, their hands 
burn dark brown from it, and secondly, the seeds 
in the dagga are made to 1 pop 1 , and thirdly they 
crack the bottleneck from the intense heat. 
Once the pipe has travelled around the circle, 
and the intoxicants start taking effect86(some 
gangsters ease the burning 
wine or 1 burns 1 (spirits)) 
throats with beer, 
the competitiveness 
usually escalates. At those occasions when I 
was present, some 15 times during the three-
month period, the gangsters would exhibit 
increasing bravado by recounting memorable fights, 
stabbings, break-ins, rapes, deals, escapes from 
potential arrest. In short, they would try to 
impress each other as to how good they were at 
their job. They also at these occasions 
continuously issued challenges to each other 
to perform some outrageously daring act, which, 
given the increasing level of 1 Stonedness 1 and 
mutual incitement, would sometimes result in 
otherwise subdued antipathies between some of 
the members surfacing. Small scuffles would 
then erupt which had the surface appearance of 
mock-fights but bore out the lack of consensus 
and absolute brotherhood amongst these supposed 
blood-brothers.~ 
Scarface suppressed the mutual bickering without 
much ado most of the time. He was constantly 
conscious, as he would tell me after these smoking 
sessions, of building unity and obedience amongst 
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his gangsters by a process which involved their 
consent. The 'nice times', a term that comes 
across as a gross understatement in its English 
usage here, were essential stages for Joker and 
Scarface towards masking what was an otherwise 
exploitative relationship in which the laities 
were worse-off. 
The lai ties after all, constituted the frontline 
of the shebeen, as its most visible, vulnerable 
and low-ranking 'employees' . They were the ones 
vulnerable to police predation. They could be 
beaten up, arrested, and once processed through 
the Justice machine, imprisoned or whipped. They 
also formed the frontline against other gangs 
in the area. Clashes with other gangs could 
result in more severe injuries and degredation 
than police action, particularly if they happened 
to be on the losing side. Yet such clashes were 
seen by the participants as preferable to crossing 
swords with the police. Lastly, the conduct of 
the laities also epitomised the worst excesses 
of the informal sector to the members of .the 
community, some of whom were caught in the 
contradictory trap of needing the gang for its 
goods and services, yet being dominated by it. 
All of these negative attributes of the lai ties' 
job coupled with their low monetary remuneration, 
needed to be counterbalanced by the 'nice times' 
and other perks by Joker and Scarface. Among 
these was an understanding that the shebeen would 
support employees who got into trouble with the 
law. The first stage of this support involved 
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encouraging all the 
luck charm from the 
lai ties to purchase 
local Doekom~8 Not 
a good-
only the 
laities, but Joker and Scarface, on commensurately 
different scales, paid this seer-cum-mystic-
cum-spiritualist, (a well-known persona in working-
class areas,) a regular fee for protection against 
evil. In the case of the lai ties protection took 
the form of a medicine bottle containing what 
looked like salt, which they purchased for Rl,OO 
each week. This they carried on them all the 
time, believing it would go 
keeping the Boere off their 
some way towards 
backs. Joker and 
Scarface never revealed to me the amount they 
paid, nor the form which their protection took. 
They were reluctant to talk much about the Doekom 
except to illustrate that whenever one of them 
got into trouble with the law, they first consulted 
the Doekorn as to procedure and strategy before 
deciding whether to consult attorneys or not~9 
In the event of the lai ties being charged with 
an offence, they usually procured the services 
of a Doekom only (it was cheaper than an attorney) 
but in more serious cases they employed both. 
The Doekom 'worked' from his home only and made 
no public appearances. The second stage, then, 
was formal legal services. Apart from this type 
of assistance Joker and Scarface allowed the 
gangsters, during times when they were not on 
duty, to earn their own perks provided that it 
did not interfere with the interests of the 
business. 
These activities were a little more serious than 
Joker's when he was a Terrible Jester.~ They 
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exploited whatever opportunities people gave 
them in the neighbourhood: a window left open 
and unguarded enabled the gangsters to slip in 
and help themselves to whatever was useful at 
the time. Transistor radios and portable tape 
decks (preferably stereo) were favourite items 
on their shopping list. Car radios (and CB radios) 
were also easy to sell quickly. On Fridays they 
hung out on the routes that people used returning 
from station or busses, robbing them of their 
paypackets. More often than not, these robberies 
did not involve overt force. Most people whom 
they accosted knew that it was wiser to hand 
over whatever they had without a fight. The 
gangsters were armed, mainly with knives, but 
sometimes one or two of them carried guns. On 
a lucrative Friday at the beginning of December 
1981, the BFK's in a group of seven laities 
succeeded in robbing 18 people of their paypackets. 
Their haul was worth R400,00, which was divided, 
squabbling, equally after considerable 
them.91 Only three victims resisted and 
them was stabbed for his efforts. 
amongst 
one of 
When their extraneous activities did clash with 
the shebeen's interests, it was up to Scarface 
to pressurise and cajole them into toeing the 
line. This was the case when, in February 1982, 
they robbed one of the regular customers of the 
shebeen, who subsequently complained to Joker. 
Such incidents jeopardised the shebeens clientele 
and elicited strong reprimands from Scarface. 
The client's money was returned to him, and he 
received free liquor for himself for a whole 
weekend as compensation, paid for by the gangsters. 
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Throughout the duration of my three-month intensive 
observation there was a constant undertone of 
tension between Joker and Scarface on the one 
hand and the gangsters/guards on the other, 
although Scarface kept a fairly tight grip over 











could physically overpower the two shebeen partners 
had the necessity arisen. A factor which 
considerably increased the tension was Joker's 




traffic police. Those meetings and visits 
rise to suspicion amongst the gangsters 
Joker was doing a 'big five' act on them. 
This term originates from the name of a prison 
gang which acts in collaboration with the 
authorities. Whenever a gangster was arrested, 
one of the suspicions which the rest of them 
harboured was that he had been sold ( 'pimped' 
in gang slang) to the Boere by Joker. 
Privately the two partners expressed quite some 
concern about the conflict but considered it 
inevitable. They were both conscious of the 
inequality pervading in the relationship between 
them and the gangsters, yet knew that without 
it, they could not accumulate money or goods 
at the fast pace they were. In answer to questions 
about how previous big-timers they had worked 
with or for had operated, they both reaffirmed 
a hierarchical modus operandi. 
there was no possibility for a 
structure, where both spoils 
In their opinion, 
more egalitarian 
and profits were 
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shared more equally between them as gang-leaders, 
and the gangsters as underlings. They believed 
in firm leadership, spiced with gang ethic and 
ideology to justify the hierarchical structures 
in terms of which they were being enriched at 
the expense of the laities. They both had 
experienced various attempts at co-operative 
gangsterism, that had always broken down because 
of feuding over payout proportions and leadership 
problems. 
The structural differences between the partners 
and their gang were compounded by an age gap 
of at least 15 years. Not only did that place 
them in different 'generations' of gangsterism, 
but it also reflected their different styles 
of action arising out of the stages in their 
respective developmental cycles. Both Joker 
and Scarface had established themselves as 'men' 
within the system of values in which they aspired 
to succeed; now they desired to settle down 
to good 'business' and enjoy life. They took 
fewer drugs than those of the laities, smoking 
more for relaxation (afkoel) than for hyped-
up kicks. The high level of drug-intake among 
their gangsters was simultaneously a source of 
distrust and a cause for guarded contempt. 
They had family commitments to their wives (neither 
of them had any children), and despite the fact 
that Joker's wife worked at the shebeen and would 
probably continue to do so for as long as she 
could, he desired a 'normal' housewife's life 
for her. 
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The laities'2 by comparison, were still at the 
already early stages of their careers, 
passed through their corner - kid 
having 
and defence 
gang phases. 93 In a very competitive manner they 
were bent on being 'in' - accepted and respected, 
hopefully even feared - in their gang environment. 
They were continuously attempting to establish 
their manhood as fighters, 94 playboys-cum-studs, 95 
'shrewdies', and wheeler-dealer confidence 
tricksters. They hadn't yet 'made it' and displayed 
an urgent drive to do so. 
Towards Joker and Scarface they showed ambivalent 
attitudes. On the positive side, they acknowledged 
that the shebeen provided them with an enterprise, 
'fixed' jobs and a modicum of security in times 
of hardship or trouble. It also provided a 
springboard from which other activities within 
their survival strategies could be 
robbing etc) as well as the fence 
pilfered or stolen goods could 
launched ( eg. 
through which 
be marketed. 
Belonging to a rapidly growing successful operation 
filled them with a sense of power and relative 
impunity. 
On the negative side they distrusted Joker, firstly 
for the lack of formal 'relation' to them but 
more importantly because of his dubious 
relationship with the 'Boere' which jeopardised 
them, the frontliners, most of all. They regarded 
the deals he made with the police as a sell-
out tactic, realising however that it was most 
probably an unavoidable strategy. But in their 
view it tainted him as a true gangster, having 
lost the stoic purity of values and action which 
the BFK book demands of all good members. 
Their attitude was compositely 








Plastic. He was 
for real, an imitation. 
a plastic gangster, not 
Their attitude to Joker was the cause of a lot 
of secessionist talk amongst them. They had 
the advantage of knowing the area and its 
inhabitants 'intimately'. What they lacked, 
however, was capital and the support infrastructure 
which keeps every shebeen in business. To secede 
successfully they would have to taint themselves 
by making advances to the Boere, a thought which 
was still very distasteful to them. The other 
restraint to secession was their relation to 
Scarface: as their mentor and leader he commanded 
considerable respect. He was a good strategist 
and enjoyed their trust in the execution of their 
duties. He constituted their structural link 
to the rest of the vast brotherhood of men, both 
inside and outside of prison. That, in itself, 
was like a passport to a certain style of survival. 
They detected a little of their own attitude 
towards Joker in Scarf ace, which drew the bonds 
between them closer. Scarface epitomised the 
role model to which all but three aspired. Even 
if it entailed having to spend several years 
behind bars, they would have been prepared for 
that by all the prison-talk. 
On balance the gangsters thus continued to work 
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for and support Joker's and Scarface's shebeen 
enterprise. But it was not an unquestioning 
support, it was overlaid by a distrust and partial 
contempt for one of their two leaders. 
Reduced to its essentials, the relationship between 
shebeen owners and gangsters was one of wage 
labour in the context of gang membership. 
Notwithstanding the 
form of employment 
the gangsters than 
dangers involved it was a 
which was far preferable to 
anything the formal sector 
could have offered them with their qualifications. 
Considering their background and future 
aspirations, it was their rational choice to 
survive by illicit means. Such employment promised 
them far greater material rewards and 'job 
satisfaction' than their contemporaries in the 
formal sector were experiencing. In this sense 
it can be said that they were more ambitious 
in the short term than their formal sector 
counterparts. 
In the early eighties this 'rational' choice 
to survive by illicit means had been made by 
a considerable number 
Flats. Competition 







on the Cape 
territory as 
At all levels 
of gangsterism a considerable amount of energy 
was spent working out covert and overt strategies 
of attack and defence to secure individual gang 
living and market space. 96 Joker's gang had the 




Breakers of Elsies River to contend 
was against the 
energies were 





26 alliance was handled more amicably by market 
territorial delineation. Needless to say, Joker 
and Scarface's successful expansion during the 
six months following October 1981 was not tolerated 
passively by the businesses whose livelihood 
they had threatened or temporarily destroyed. 
The small-timers 
disposal with which to strike back. 
aware of any approaches they made to 
big-timer, but Joker surmised that he 
have been interested in such temporary 
for opportunities when Joker 
the 
and Scarface became 
more vulnerable. In meantime, according 
they pursued the 
the police about the 
to Joker's police contacts, 
policy of complaining to 
shebeen. 
The big-buyer's strategy was far more aggressive. 
He attempted to pursue the same tactics as Joker 
had in launching his composite assaults on him. 
The local police and the drug squad were thus 
continually receiving gratuitous potential evidence 
about the two biggest shebeen operations in a 
small enclave of Elsies River. This information 
was of course of immense value to the police 
in deciding which operation to support and which 
to 1 bust 1 • 
Other tactics involved repeated testing of the 










Joker's customers was of course also part of 
the repertoire. 
A low-scale ongoing guerilla war was thus the 
constant reality of both she been operations, 
both sides simultaneously wooing the police to 
take their side and tip the balance. 
(iv) SHEBEENS AND THE COMMUNITY 
It is, of course, no mere coincidence that Elsies 
River has, probably, the highest density of 
shebeens in the Cape Peninsula~7 The profile 
that Pinnock draws of the area demonstrates that 
it was inhabited by families of whom 49.6% were 
sustained, if one can call it that, by heads 
of households earning under RlOO,OO a month in 
197 8 •98 
Escalating costs 
the inability of 
of construction, combined 
the residents to shoulder 
with 
the 
increased interest rates on Government loans 
which the developing authority the Divisional 
Council - had procured, forced the DC to reconsider 
its 'development' strategy. Rather than commit 
itself to additional loans it decided, in 1978, 
not to provide some of the planned amenities 
that would have made the area more 'livable'. 
So plans for the following amenities found 
themselves scrapped in Elsies River: 11 6 community 
centres, 6 libraries, the swimming pool, the 
fire station, several old age houses, creches 
and schools, and a landscaping project to beautify 
the area 11 • 99 
112 
By 1980 the 'development' of Elsies River was still 
way behind the projected schedule. Only 5 783 
families of the projected 15 000 families had 
been re-housed by 1978.100 By the end of 1981 
thousands of people were still living in the 
overcrowded shanty yards (described by Pinnock) 
in Epping Forest, Clarke's Estate and Louw's 
Bush areas!01 Next to these the four storey flats 
were being constructed and people sardined into 
them on completion. It was an area experiencing 
a considerable degree of flux in which many new 
families had not yet set up the formal and informal 
reciprocal and mutual support structures which 
tend to cushion periods of hardship and calamity}02 
Given the low level of earnings and the high 
unemployment rate, 103 competition for income 
opportunities in the formal sector was intense. 
The most lucrative opportunities were colonised 
by the likes of Joker and Scarf ace, which left 
the less rewarding opportunities to the rest 
of the aspirant army of self-employed survivalists)04 
Elsies River was characterised further by a high 
percentage of its population originating from 
the rural areas~05 where the intake of considerable 
quanti ties of liquor 





coping with scarce income opportunities in an 
urban ghetto setting did little to reduce people's 
tendency to resort to liquor for a temporary 
escape. One of the lasting legacies of the Tot 
System is that it provided a precedent of 
generations of rural labourers in whose value 
system high volumes of liquor intake were perfectly 
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normal, indeed even structurally approved of 
and encouraged. As Chapter Five will demonstrate, 
drinking constituted the major recreational 
activity on farms in the Stellenbosch rural areas 
on up to 80% of all farms. Coupled to the drinking 
habit, was the role expectation that once drunk, 
a person is not accountable for his/her actions, 
an attitude approximating to condoning anti-
social drunken behaviour .107 
Another factor doubtlessly contributing to high 
alcohol consumption was the danger of open spaces 
and the streets. This ethnograhic account of 
the manner in 
'ruled' their 
which Joker and Scarface's shebeen 
beat will reveal how dangerous 
Elsies River was to pedestrians. Given the absence 
of alternative recreational facilities supplied 
by the State, the residents were literally forced 
to spend considerably more time indoors than 
they would have, had the streets been safer. 
The likelihood of these factors contributing 
to high alcohol consumption, I would argue, is 
considerable. No wonder, then, that a survey 
of 1971 revealed that "more than 60% of the people 
in Elsies River had no recreation at all apart 
from drinking" ~ 08 
Some of these were among the 600 - 1 000 residents 
who fell within the 'jurisdiction' of the shebeen 
run by Joker, Scarface and their gang. Not all 
the residents in their beat were serious drinkers, 
however, nor were they all from the poorest of 
the residents in Elsies River. Those families 
that had more than one breadwinner in regular 
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employment, and whose 





circumstances permitted were less likely to spend 
a considerable percentage of their income at 
Joker's shebeen. There was clearly a body of 
residents whose response to their predicament 
in Elsies River in 1980 did not entail escape 
into liquor and other drugs. Their response 
or that of their chil.dren was more aggressive 
in challenging the State to 
collective consumption items 
schooling, and to provide them 
would not reproduce 'Coloured' 





in a way that 
and Black pupils 





and then the bus boycotts clearly 
that different groupings in the 
different strategies of coping 
situation.llO The school-children 
challenged the State to meet their demands by 
organised, restrained political action, whereas 
the gangs exploited the momentary inability of 
the police to cope with any contingencies in 
a glut of opportunistic materialism. 
When I questioned them 
Joker and his 
about their role in the 
unrest, entire gang gleefully 
responded that "Wanner die studente poli tiek 
maak, dan doen Gam free shopping" .1 11 They had 
. 'worked' very hard during the nights of the worst 
confusion, carting trolley loads of cigarettes, 
sweets and other groceries out of the damaged 
shops. In principle they agreed with the process 
of slamming the State a very powerful theme 
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permeating gang ethic is striking back, in a 
material sense, at the haves of society and the 
bearers of power regardless of colour. But they 
did not in the early eighties envisage such an 
abstract, long term form of retaliation as 
boycotting or work stoppages. They were, of 
course, in no structural 
any case. Politics was 
position to do so in 
then still considered 
'dirty' and 'really criminal' as opposed to their 
'honest' property crimes and illicit dealings. 
Some of them had internalised Government propaganda 
that labelled all political dissent as Comrnunistic. 112 
The gang was thus more preoccupied, in a 'business' 
sense, with that sector of the Elsies River 
community which had not chosen to challenge the 
State overtly and through organised action. It 
was usually, but not always, the poorer sector 
of the community that found the goods and services 
that Joker's shebeen offered as a crutch to 
survival. The crutch was mainly procured on 
credit. Whenever cash resources had been depleted, 
and whenever the nearest grocer refused to sell 
more goods "on the book" (if he/she sold on credit 
at all) Joker's shebeen became the last resort 
for groceries, 
select durables. 
liquor, drugs, money-loans, or 
The price to be paid for extending consumption 
beyond their available means, however, entailed 
more than mere repayment in currency, it involved 
becoming subject to Joker's rule. In this sense 
the gang literally became the police, albeit 
the private police, of the area. 
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Most obviously, when credit payments became due, 
Joker either summoned the debtor to the shebeen 
by sending a gangster to fetch him/her or 
instructed the gangster to collect the money. 
Failure to pay 
measures ranging 
the withdrawal of 
invited a whole repertoire of 
from subtle threats regarding 
protection offered by the shebeen 
enterprise through to direct or indirect violence. 
The maintenance and reproduction of the shebeen' s 
market necessitated the physical protection of 
its clientele and their families from the more 
predatory and hedonistic exploits of the off-
duty gangsters. To the families most prone to 
victimisation of the gangs by virtue of poor 
defences 11 ~ eg. non-assertive characters, strongest 
member working night shift or returning from 
distant work-place late at night, insufficient 
reciprocal support networks with neighbours and 
friends, physically exposed living quarters) this 
constituted a very real incentive to becoming 
regular customers, and once established to remain 
so. 
The few memorable examples of 'debt collection' 
which marked the shebeen's rise to power and 
credibility were vivid enough, and fearsome enough 
to ensure a low rate of debt default. Scarface 
and his men had struck on four occasions during 
my observation period: the mildest example 
involved breaking down the door of the flat, 
shattering all the windows, confiscating or 
appropriating a few chairs, beating up the debtor 
and threatening his woman and seven year old 
daughter with rape. The more serious incident 
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resulted in the debtor being hospitalised suffering 
from several stab-wounds and head-injuries, all 
three females in the house raped, two other males, 
aged 13 and 39 badly beaten up, and their furniture 
smashed. No-one was reckless enough to lay ci1arges 
against Scarface and his crew. 
The second element of Joker's rule was his 
continuous attempt to enlarge his sales volume. 
Existing customers were constantly encouraged 
to buy more of the same, or a wider variety of 
goods from the shebeen. Although I was not aware 
of any overt pressure I detected a strong 
undercurrent in Joker's selling technique, that 
it would be advisable, or better for the customer 
to purchase more from his shebeen. He created 
the understanding that better customers were 
'looked after' better than casual buyers of small 
quantities. 
Closely related to this element, but containing 
a larger modicum of threatened violence, was 
the injunction to existing customers not to 
purchase from any other shebeen marketing the 
same goods and services. The gang had instructions 
to keep community members' purchasing habits 
under surveillance and report to their leaders 
about buying patterns not in the interest of 
the shebeen. I have already referred to the 
gang members having greater licence to attack 
residents not buying from the shebeen and those 
buying from the opposition.114 
This low-key civil war 
basis at the fringes 
happened on a reciprocal 
of the delineated market 
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areas. Both shebeens in the area attempted to 
push their sphere of influence beyond their 
existing borders. The residents of these zones 
were subjected to the uncertainty of not knowing 
whose power extended over them and whom to buy 
from without inviting retaliation. For the 
duration of my observation, the borders were 
never static, nor were any agreements reached 
between Joker's she been and its opposition. 
Joker's power and sphere of influence was slowly 
but surely expanding throughout 1982, and only 
began to suffer serious encroachments towards 
mid 1983.115 
The remaining two elements of Joker's rule relate 
to the strategies the shebeen was forced to adopt 
in order to survive under conditions of illegality. 
Both relate to information, in police parlance, 
- evidence. 
The community within which the shebeen operated 











to use force 
organisation 
with its private police 
of survival, the rules 
disobeyed at its peril. 
most residents in the 
force generated a style 
of which the community 
Their rules, known to 
area, enjoyed legitimacy 
at the level of consent only to those who became 
economically dependent on them. To the rest 
of the residents their rule was sustained by 
force or its continuous threat. In opposition 
to this was the value system imposed by the State 
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whose most visible representatives relating to 
enforcement were the police. They too, as could 
be expected at that time, enjoyed only limited 
legitimacy in Elsies River. Theoretically 
speaking, at least they had the greater power 
of the State backing them, although I noted 
continuously at the time.) that the residents were 
not sure of which of the two forces actually 
ruled their beat. 
Of vital importance to the shebeen enterprise 
in its eternal battle for survival was a strong 
grip, if not a near monopoly, on the amount of 
information/evidence, about both the shebeen 
operation and other activities in the area, 
reaching the police. The residents soon learnt 
that 'pimping' (informing) about the shebeen's 
illicit dealings and the gang's exploits was 
dealt with far more ruthlessly than debtor 
defaults. Information about the gang's rules 
and edicts were mostly conveyed through the street 
kids, all those non-gangsters, aspirant gangsters 
and others who spend most of their daytime on 
the streets. They would then inform the adults 
later in the evenings when they were confined 
indoors due to the danger of the streets at night. 
Logistically speaking it was impossible for the 
gang to identify all sources of betrayal, even 
if that source was within their area, for it 
did not have its informers deployed everywhere, 
but the youngster network was relatively efficient, 
far more efficient than any network the police 
had built up. 
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As the next section will demonstrate, the conflict 
in value systems, as epitomised by the police 
and the gang, did not lead the one to attempt 
to suppress the other entirely. Instead they 
coexisted in an uneasy alliance, bartering with 
their assets to achieve their respective goals. 116 
The intimate knowledge of their confined beat, 
the extensive network of informants, their hold 
on many of the occupants, and their ability to 
'squeeze' information out of chosen victims by 









resort to violence, according to Scarface, because 
of the knowledge amongst potential victims that 
it would be extracted anyway, so that it was 
sufficient in most cases to put up a fearsome 
threat and a 'light squeeze' to extract at least 
enough information to start building on. 
These, then, were the elements which the shebeen's 
rule exerted over its customers. In a sense 
they are the consequences of the 'formal' 
relationship between the two parties under the 
circumstances. At the height of their power towards 
the end of 1982 the two shebeeners estimated 
that roughly 65% of the residents in their beat 
were customers. 
Towards their non-customers their attitude was 
one of wary surveillance. They were 
families who were slightly better off 
















whose attitude towards shebeening was not 
supportive and who regarded themselves a cut 
above the shebeeners and their clients, if not 
materially, then morally. This was Joker 1 s 
interpretation of their stance. He in turn, 
to my surprise, expressed less contempt for them 
than for his customers. Ironically, he despised 
his customers for their dependance on all the 
intoxicants he marketed, for their lack of business 
enterprise, their submissiveness to ruling class 
authority, their stupidity. They had sold out 
to the system ( "hulle het gevriet verkoop"), 
was an oft-repeated saying of his. He felt 
perfectly entitled to use them for his own 
enrichment and power. If he did not, someone 
else would - that is how he saw it. 
The moral charge towards his lifestyle issued 
by the non-customers did have some, if only minor, 
impact on Joker. More than reacting on a moral 
level, he resented their smug righteousness 
emanating from the 1 safe 1 position of law-abiding 
citizens. It created in him, who constantly 
had to be on his guard and could seldom relax, 
an urge to smash that holy complacency. He often 
rationalised their disapproval as envy, for he 
and Scarface were probably, at the peak of their 
power, by far the wealthiest men in their beat. 
What Joker resented the most, however was his 
inability to bring them within the ambit of his 
power through any process of negotiation. The 
only means open to him was actual or threatened 
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coercion. 
An even greater source of discomfort to him were 
those residents and their offspring who were 
involved in the budding community organisations 
which took up the impetus of the 1980 school 
boycotts. Their cause was one against which Joker 
had little objection, he himself expressed anti-
State sentiments and maintained that Blacks in 
this country were getting a rough deal. His 
response to his position as a 'Coloured' was, 
however, expressed at 
group level of street 
an individual, 
gangs. But he 
or small 
failed to 
mention that it was mainly his fellow-'Coloureds', 
not the State, who were the target of his dirty 
games. Moreover, his collusion with the police, 
which for him was a necessary compromise towards 
survival, certainly did not dovetail with the 
aims of grassroots 
after all part of 
civic organisations. He was 
a distribution chain which 
facilitated people's individualistic inward escape 
into an induced selfish consciousness. The emerging 
civics were intent on achieving exactly the 
opposite response an outward, organised mass 
consciousness which challenged the State. 
During my three month period in and around the 
shebeen the degree of Joker's discomfort on this 
score was still relatively insignificant. 
Organisation was still at an early phase and 
popular consciousness had not been generated 
enough to constitute a major problem for him 
and his crew. But he already realised at that 
stage that successful mobilisation of popular 
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consciousness would in time diminish people's 
dependence on his most lucrative wares, liquor 
and drugs. After all, none of the civic organisers 
and families of politically conscious students 
were 
his 
customers of his. His 
regulars were likely to 
gut feeling was that 
remain more attached 
to intoxicants than organised ideology; and even 
if there was a shift, it would be extremely 
gradual, sufficiently gradual that it would not 
endanger his livelihood. Yet this did not dispel 
a feeling of ambivalence about civic organisations 
at the time .117 I was not aware of any instructions 
that he gave to the gangsters to keep a particular 
eye on the politicos or even harrass them. The 
surveillance exercised over them was simply part 
of the routine information gathering ensuring 
survival of the shebeen business. Nor was I 
aware of Joker 'selling' any of the politicos 
to the police. He maintained a waiting and watching 
stance. 
The 'formal' relationship between the shebeen 
and both its customers and non-customers of the 
beat arising out of the necessary strategies 
of reproducing an illicit business was, however, 
not the only relationship impacting on the 
community. Outside of their employment by the 
shebeeners, the gangsters enjoyed relative autonomy, 
provided it did not damage the shebeen's survival 
chances. 
Apart from their power to 'squeeze', 'lean on', 
and in a sense police people by virtue of their 
shebeen functions, the gangsters established 
their own kind of rule, predominantly at night 
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and over weekends. It was not solely confined 
to the 'recreational side of their lives, it 
embraced the whole ambit of activities and values 
inherent in gang ideology. Certainly it contained 
strong overtones of 'nice times', 'lux lewe' 
or 'afkoel' as they referred to it. 118 
These would j nvolve primarily the communal 
indulgence in a single or several white pipes 
if they could afford the 'button' (the opening 
price varied between R7, 50 and Rl5, 00 per tablet 
at that time), green pipes if they couldn't. 
(Described on p. 100-102 above). Depending on 
their morale or idiosyncratic inclination of 
the moment, the pipe-smoking, or desire for more 
pipes often motivated small forays into some 
mischief to buy more dope. Depending on the 
opportunities that presented 
moment, the quest for cash 







a conned 'loan' from a sucker whom they happened 
to come across, or a host of possible non-violent 
means of getting some cash quickly .1 19 Failing 
that, the laities manning the outposts were often 
approached to take some dope on credit themselves, 
having its cost docked off their pay at the end 
of the week. Then, of course they were also 
prone to using varying degrees of coercion, 
depending on how each potential victim responded:20 
Once doped and excited an air of highly charged 
volatility developed through the taunting and 
boasting and dizzy competitiveness . 121 Several 
the observation period these taunts 




in order to save face. Thus he/they would attempt 
to settle an old grudge against some community 
member by insulting or assaulting either him 
or someone close to him, or damaging their 
belongings, and at the same time helping themselves 
to money, weapons (if any) and easily convertible 
items. Much of this aggression was also aimed 
at the gangs adjoining their territory but no 
major spontaneous forays were conducted during 
the observation period. Occasionally an individual 
opposition member was caught and 'cleaned up•~2 
but no unsanctioned attacks were directed outside 
of Joker's and Scarface's orders. 
Apart from indi viqual harrassment related to 
group drug-taking the gangsters had established 
sufficient precedent of attacks and molestation 
to establish a common sense rule: Whoever is 
out on the streets after dark is considered 
legitimate prey to their whims. The rule firmed 
into an absolute law over weekends. They 
controlled the streets quite literally by roaming 





18 or thereabouts were 
'asked for it' or 
quasi-consented to sexual predation if they were 
h ' h 
123 M d . h k d caug t out at n1g t. ost pe estr1ans were c ec e 
out as to who they were, what right they had 
to be there, what their status was vis-a-vis 
the shebeen, and whether they were likely to 
be fruitful targets of a frisking. 
On weekends the gang frequently attended discos 
if they were held not too far outside of safe 
territory. Here again a whole web of relations 
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and expectations were common knowledge to most 
occupants of the hall and surrounding terri tory. 
Only part of the purpose of attending was actually 
to dance. For the rest it was an attempt to 
establish relative power of rival gangs who 
colonised certain areas of the hall, on the one 
hand, and to establish their style and power 
to the other teenagers attending the disco on 
the other. A perennial theme of their togetherness 
was the symbolic and actual demonstration of 
their power to the community and their rivals.l24 
For the most part though these public 
demonstrations were usually clandestine, under 
cover of darkness, or to victims who where 
substantially outnumbered. They did not in any 
way overtly challenge organisations and 
institutions other than that of their own calibre 
or level}25 
While their grouping as a gang signalled a 
differentiation from the rest of the community 
in terms of survival strategies and the 
consciousness which represented their unity, 
it must not be forgotten that they are 
theoretically cast within the informal sector 
in this study. Wilkinson and Webster emphasize 
that the unit of reproduction and ccnsumption 
should be conceived of as the working class family, 
or household and that it should therefore be 
"located conceptually within the web of kinship re-
lations, social networks, voluntary associations 
and community and class relations which condition 
its role as the basic unit of individual 
consumption and reproduction in capitalist society~~ 
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In this context an examination of the gangsters • 
relation to their own family as well as their 
surrogate family (the gangr2~eems apposite. 
Pinnock has argued that the majority of gangsters 
are from families whose conventional structure 
has been interfered with in the process of shaping 
the working class to the needs of monopoly 
capital ~28 In the cell of BFK' s/Dobermans of Elsies 
River that I observed, fourteen of the fifteen 
core gangsters belonged to households/families 
that did not feature a 'normal' makeup of 
relationships; four gangsters' households had 
no father-figure at all; six had a 'sat' or 
'pap' (ie. weak or spent) father-figure, and 
a commensurately poor relationship with him. 
The predominant comments were that he was not 
a man, a 'pop' (literally doll but with female, 
whorish, sell- out, traitor connotations) )29 Four 
others had fathers who had been gangsters in 
their time but had cooled off and taken up 
employment if they could find it. The relation 
to these fathers were not spoken of very 
the enthusiastically among 
old generation, while 
surrounding 'old Cape 
considered rather lame 





a certain mystique 
around them, were 
or tame by the youngsters 
single exception who had 
was doubly exceptional 
only full-time female 
the gang _130Her father had 
a strong father-figure 
because she was the 
'accredited' member of 
been the leader of the Sly Corners gang of Elsies 
when it was still a sea of shanty yards _131 He 
was still highly respected, and his children 
were allowed safe passage in the beat. He now 
worked as a temporary cook on commercial 
vessels and spent intermittent periods of 




By comparison, two of the fifteen had no mother 
figure, seven of the mother-figures were in full-
time employment and six stayed at horne or worked 
in temporary jobs only. In the rnajori ty of cases 
(nine) the mother-figure was considered the 
dominant household member by the gangsters, despite 
all the chauvinistic attitudes and prejudices 
they harboured. Eight of the gangsters maintained 
that their parents knew about their gang 
membership, while the rest, including the girl, 
claimed that their parents didn't know that they 
were fully-fledged members they simply thought 
132 that they hung around with 'bad company'. As 
can be expected, those whose parents didn't know 
about their membership were supposed to be looking 
for work and contributing to the household income. 
Nine of the gangsters actually did contribute 
fairly regularly, but when they did, it was a 
far lower proportion of their earnings than 
children in formal employment were expected to. 
At that level of family subsistence children 
up to their 21st year (and quite often beyond) 
are expected to hand over their full wages to 
the family (usually the mother-figure) and are 
given pocket-money in return. None of the 
contributing gangsters f orf ei ted more than R2 0, 0 0 
a week to the household although they were 
averaging, perks included, at least R70,00 a 
week, which was relatively high for that 
neighbourhood}33 Their contributions were normally 
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Rl 0, 0 0 to RlS, 0 0 and only given when they were 
nagged for it. 
Occasionally they brought home durables such 
as gas cookers and kitchen utensils, spoils from 
'jobs' they had pulled. In the families that 
were ignorant of gang membership, the origins 
of these gifts were disguised .134 If contributions 
to the family/household were less than the desired 
amount, then contributions to their own offspring 
and mothers of their offspring were negligible. 
The gangsters regarded their non-support or 
abysmally meagre support of their offspring as 
both a signal of power over 
(literally children, but here 
mothers of their children), 
their 'kinders' 
referring to the 
reinforcing their 
playboy, carefree studdish image of themselves, 
and a defiant stand not to comply with the law 
of the Boere. They regarded the fact that the 
girl had benefited by their power, aura, protection 
and stud-services ( 'sy het volgeraak' - literally 
she was filled up) as being sufficient reward 
. 135 . . 136 
w1thout need1ng regular mater1al support. 
This low level of financial involvement in the 
family was paralleled by a generally low commitment 
to the other aspects of family life. With the 
exception of the girl member of the gang, and 
to a lesser extent the others whose parents didn't 
know, they did not attend meals regularly - only 
when it suited them. Their rendering of emotional 
and material support to various members of the 
family was too erratic to contain any discernable 
trends. They usually simply used the household 
as a place to sleep and keep their clothes and 
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They continuously other meagre 
presented the 
belongings. 
family with an erroneous version 
of their survival methods and gang activities, 
and kept stringing insistent parent 
with promises about changing for 
figures along 
the better and 
attempting to look for work. If the pressure 
increased, they either pandered to the parents 
for a while by bringing home larger weekly 
contributions, or 
a week or more, 
alternatively 
staying with a 
if that was possible. 
By contrast their involvement in 
a surrogate family evidenced a far 
of commitment. They spent as much 
could wrest from their household 
withdrew for 
gang-brother, 
the gang as 
higher level 
time as they 
with their 
brothers and the aspirant gangsters and hangers-
on as described above. 
(v) SHEBEENS AND THE POLICE 
The attitude of the police and their 'management' 
procedures 
strategies 
towards shebeens crucially shape the 
which shebeeners have to adopt in 
order to survive. Neither of these elements 
are static phenomena, nor do they necessarily 
follow uncontradictory patterns. The manner 
in which liquor is distributed to the working 
class is the outcome of a host of converging 
and sometimes contradictory motivations of people 
and bodies on either side of the divide. The 
aim of this section is to demonstrate how Joker's 
shebeen served the aims and interests of a small 
group of policemen who were responsible for his 
beat, and how his cooperation with them diminished 
his credibility amongst the 
community to such an extent 
broke his business. 
Some of the facets that 
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gangsters and the 
that it ultimately 
demonstrate the 
interactional milieu between Joker, the community, 
the gang and the police have already been covered 
above in the previous two sections and will only 
warrant a mention here. Moreover, this section 
needs to be read in conjunction with Pinnock's 
analysis 'Policing the Apartheid City' in the 
South African historical context1•37 Without it 
the following interactional account loses its 
broader relevance or validity for further 
generalisation. 
By the time he had moved 
gathered enough experience 
and in prison to know that 
was a fine art that achieved 
to this handling technique, 
to Elsies, Joker had 
both on the street 
'playing' the 'Boere' 
good results. Central 
he assured me, was 
the ability to get what you wanted by making 
the Boere believe he was deciding things for 







If his gang's activities or the fra~as surrounding 
the shebeen attracted too much attention, the 
police would have felt obliged to demonstrate 
their power by closing him down for a little 
while. Manageability was the key consideration 
which influenced the police decision as to which 
shebeen to back, and which to close down. 
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There were two branches of the police whose 
blessing he needed in order to operate safely. 
The traffic police, and the local beat-men. 
Initially the traffic police weren't a problem, 
as his supplies were procured by hired taxi, 
whose driver had made his own deals with the 
traffic police. But once he drove his first 
second-hand car, questions such as the validity 
of his drivers licence and his registration papers 
needed some interpretative contortions before 
they were satisfactory, and to this end it became 
necessary for the traffic police to consider it 
advisable not to prosecute him. Gifts, goods, 
promises of good behaviour and low-key operations 
did the trick and they chose to overlook the 
questionable roadworthiness of his station-wagon 
into the deal. In turn it became the task of 
the two patrol-men concerned to somehow convince 
their colleagues that any problems with Joker 
would be dealt with by them, or should be referred 
to them. 
The other branch of the police, perhaps more 
important, were the local patrol-men. At the 
time he set up business, the nearest station 
was some 2 km away from his home, but one of 
the 'Coloured' constables inhabited a council 
semi-detached house not far away from Joker's 
home. He was logically Joker's first acquaintance, 
and required a bolder approach than a white 
policeman would have necessitated. Initial offers 
of a case of favourite drink were followed by 
'long-term loans at favourable interest rates', 
augmented with offers of information about 
'trouble' in the area. This contact led to the 
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patrol-man notifying the local detectives about 
this potential source of valuable information. 
A meeting took place in August 1981 at which 
Joker undertook to act as an information channel 
for crimes in his area. At the same time the 
police tacitly allowed his shebeen to continue 
provided it remained low-profile. This deal was 
not reported to Joker's underlings, it remained 
his personal trump-card. He made a regular habit 
of getting the latest news about people in his 
locality both from the gangsters and his customers. 
He developed a special habit of extracting more 
than usual information from customers who were 
behind in their payments to him, and were obviously 
keen to ingratiate him with information rather 
than money. This knowledge in turn reinforced 
their dependence on his goodwill, which could 
always be fostered by buying more goods and liquor 
from him. 
Joker built up a very useful store of information 
about people, relationships, secrets, crimes 
in the area within a fairly short time. By the 
end of 1981 he was meeting with the CID Officer 
on a weekly basis, exchanging information for 
protection and sometimes for money in more serious 
cases. To him it was a method of extending his 
power over his 'jurisdictional' area. People 
who were a threat, nuisance, or a source of 
disloyalty to him were easier to 'sell' to the 
police than residents on whose custom he relied 
for his profitable existence. He obviously chose 
his victims carefully so that it did not interfere 
with the business. 
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Three developments complicated this straightforward 
relationship. Firstly, Scarface's arrival towards 
mid-November 1981 and their branching out into 
dope dealing. Scarface was 
in terms of gang ideology 
a far greater purist 
than Joker, and was 
considered more dangerous and less manageable 
by the police. This compromised Joker a little 
but he assured them that he would attempt to 
keep Scarface under control. Scarface on the 
other hand got to know about the police liaison 
and was very wary of it. 
Secondly the dope dealing exposed them to a third 
branch of the police force, which they considered 
inaccessible from the point of view of 'deals' 
the Drug Squad. Joker's police contact found 
out about it through opposition gang informants 
and expressed great irritation about it to him, 
because the Drug Squad often don't even inform 
either the patrolmen or CID of an impending raid 
allowing no time for tip-offs.138 His irritation 
was probably motivated by the Drug Squad's 
interference in his information networks and 
carefully nurtured relationships all of which 
would have to be rebuilt after a successful drug-
raid. As it happened, the Drug Squad did not 
strike until late August 1983, despite probably 
receiving information about Joker's shebeen from 
the opposition shebeeners. 
Thirdly, the expansion of the 
the street-presence of the 
shebeen heightened 
gangsters in its 
service, as well as the off-duty activities of 
the laities. Furthermore, the attempts at 
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weakening the opposition shebeens created 
sufficient public show of violence to warrant 
police interference. The local police stepped . 
up their daytime mobile patrols of the area in 
an attempt to convince the residents that they 
still ruled that part of Elsies. Whenever they 
came across some of the laities, they'd be stopped 
and frisked for drugs and weapons. Flashy looking 
jackets or watches were an immediate cause for 
suspicion and the lai ties were expected to prove 
the legitimate sources of such items. Most of 
them did not wear watches for this reason and 
usually bought their clothes at one or few places 
only, so that shop assistants would recognise 
them when they were brought into the shop for 
merchandise identification and confirmation of 
a legitimate sale. 
This increased policing did not diminish the 
shebeen's turnover. It did, however, place a 
larger burden on Joker to ingratiate himself 
and his crew to the police by offering more 
concessions or services. 
One of these was cooperating with the police 
in identifying opposition gang-members. Some 
of the laities told me how Joker instructed them 
to travel with the police in the patrol vehicles 
(with their balaclavas disguising their identities) 
out and identifying members of the pointing 
Cisko Yakkies and Sicilian Kids to the police. 
This service, they said, earned them a short-
term respite from the continuous frisking and 
police harrassment. 
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The second was far more dangerous to Joker. It 
was the source of potential rebellion against 
his leadership, and ultimately led to the break-
up with Scarface as a partner. It was the process 
of 'selling' select laities to the police, 
particularly for crimes committed independently 
of the shebeen • s range of activities. These were 
usually cases of housebreaking or robberies 
involving larger amounts than usual. Joker was, 
however, shrewd enough to divulge the information 
in such a way that neither Scarface nor the laities 
were absolutely sure that it came from him. Three 
factors sustained this uncertainty. Firstly, Joker 
was adamant that he did not sell his own brothers 






acted extremely hurt 









outbursts that I 
witnessed were excellent displays of acting (if 
he was feigning). Secondly, he insisted that 













police on the pretext 
on that format~39 To my 
of his divulging the 
to anyone although he 
spoke frequently about his style of 
handling/placating the 
manage to 'rescue' some 
police. 
of the 
Thirdly, he did 
laities from time 
to time when they were picked up for suspected 
crime. What is commonly referred to in gang slang 
as "om die saak te tol" (to trick oneself or one's 
friends off a charge or case) was Joker • s method 
of demonstrating his power over the police to 
drop charges or pursue a different suspect. Whether 
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these rescue demonstrations were set up right 
from the outset by arrangement with the police, 
remained uncertain. No-one could say so definitely, 
but both Scarface and the lai ties suspected very 
strongly that at least some of the rescues were 
rigged. During the three months of my close contact 
with the gang altogether nine successful rescue 
b . d d 140 . h . d 1 1 s were rna e. Dur1ng t e same per1o e even 
additional laities 






by a process involving 
Doekom, Attorney and "om die saak te tol" (in this 
context: 'cooking' the evidence). The others 
received a range of punishments from lashes to 
prison sentences. 
Joker thus managed to walk the tightrope between 
credibility with the police and the gang by keeping 
both parties supplied with partial information, 
and partial demonstrations of this usefulness 
to each side. 
The police, in turn, reciprocated by giving Joker 
tip-offs; whether these which were given by Joker's 
contact patrol-men (fairly low-ranking policemen), 
were supplied with the knowledge of their superiors 
is difficult to say. It is possible that the 
raids were conducted in good faith by some members 
of the raiding contingent without their being 
aware of the tip-off. Two such raids were conducted 
between October 81 and January 82, but in both 
cases they were unsuccessful in finding 
incriminating evidence. Both times Joker 




to manoevre his way out of trouble. Of course 
the contact men were handsomely rewarded for their 
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tip-offs. 
How much contact existed between the local police 
and the Drug Squad is again impossible to assess 
with certainty. But it is strange that Joker's 
shebeen was allowed to exist for nearly two years 
before it was raided by the Drug Squad for the 
first time in May 1983. Prior to that they must 
have been receiving repeated leads from opposition 
shebeens about both dagga and mandrax dealings. 
It is indeed puzzling as to why they responded 
so slowly considering the speed with which they 
reacted to Joker's orchestrated complaints when 
he launched his campaign against the opposition 
big buyer!42 One possible explanation is that they 
were requested by the patrol-police and detective 
branch not to destroy their source of information 
(and unofficially, 'perks' ) :43 
If one compares the police harrassment of the 
shebeen itself with non-shebeen policing, then 













police, his financial muscle, and his usefulness 
as a source of information. It was influenced 
also by the function of the laities in the shebeen 
business and their extraneous activities. They 
were the most visible manifestation of the business 
through their guarding functions, manning of 
outposts, squeezing debt defaulters, fighting 
opposition members, smashing opposition shebeens 
and extracting information by unorthodox techniques. 
These activities were still tolerated by the 
community, or so it seemed, as quasi-official 
139 
functions relating to the shebeen. They affected 
predominantly the community members who were in 
the business, or customers of the business. They 
were understood to constitute the hazards of 
choosing to be a customer of a trader in the shebeen 
game. Consequently the level of complaint to 
the police about this range of activities was 
far lower than about extra-shebeen exploits such 
as housebreaking, theft, robbery and assault. 
This was partially attributable to Joker's power 
and partially due to the potential complainant's 
complicity in illegal dealings. But the extra-
shebeen activities were not a logical concomitant 
of shebeening. There was therefore a greater 
feeling of being outraged and wronged on the part 
of the victims of such crimes ~ 44 As Joker was not 
directly accountable for these deeds and didn't 
take it upon himself to restrain the laities (except 
when it affected his customers), the only power 
group residents could resort to were the police. 
The exception to this trend were the rape-victims, 
who more often than not had no-one to turn to 
other than their immediate family .1 45 
In this sense, the gang's extra she been crimes 
contributed towards legitimising the police in 
a community that had little reason otherwise to 
the police its 146 Processing see as protectors. 
laities through the justice machine (police, courts, 
reformatory or prison) kept up the facade of 
maintaining both law and order. It also contributed 
towards the police being seen as exercising a 
modicum of power over that community, making up 
the more formal component of what was considered 
township rule. The informal component was exercised 
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by the likes of Joker in this uneasy alliance 
of power. 
The gang's predation on the community was an 
important source of bargaining strength to Joker 
in his dealings with the police. Not only did 




lai ties, he 
him with a lever of power over 
could trade information about 
their break-ins and robberies, etc. for protection 







community a service J47 The 
power is highlighted by the 
himself was able to exercise 
in deciding which of his laities to 'sell' to 
the justice machine. After receiving complaints 
or charges from residents, the police developed 
the habit of consulting Joker regarding the case. 
He was thus in a position to exert some inf 1 uence 
over the course of the investigation through his 
recommendations, protestations, or 'advice'. 
He was obviously loathe to lose good guards or 
gangsters, and was more inclined to make a special 
effort to 'rescue' those whom he and Scarface 
needed most. On the other hand the less 
controllable laities and those most hostile to 
his poor gang relation to them were more dispensible. 
These gangsters were more likely (than Joker's 
faithfuls) to face complete processing through 
the justice machine with his blessing.l~ 
The shebeen's continued expansion was predicated 
on a level of sacrifice of information and manpower 
which contained the kernel of its demise. The 
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growth continued, albeit at a slower pace, after 
January 1982, until major feuds started developing 
by May 1983 over Joker's pimping. By that stage 
I was no longer intensively observing developments 
and it became too dangerous for me to return to 
the shebeen}49 My information about this phase 
of developments is derived from my main contact, 
guide and protector - one of the laities (19 years 
of age in May 1983). 
Increasing circumstantial evidence about his pimping 
resulted in a loss of allegiance from the gangsters. 
Twice} 50 when Scarface was absent 15k secessionist 
group of the laities cleaned out the shebeen, 
held Joker at gunpoint, robbed him of all his 
loose cash and threatened to kill him and rape 
his wife. Scarface's leadership was substantially 
compromised by Joker's actions and he withdrew 
from the partnership after the second raid. Joker 
was left with some of the more dependent stragglers 
of the gang as guards. Scarface had taken with 
him three of his most trusted 'brothers' when 
he left. Joker's sales must have dropped 
substantially after the split. His diminishing 
usefulness as an informant and source of perks 
to the police 
the timing of 
could have something to do with 
a drug-squad raid for dagga and 
mandrax in August 1983. Although, according to 
my informant, they found sufficient quantities 












about the disincentives to 
prosecution that he might have offered. 
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Shortly after the raid Joker deemed it advisable 
to move out of the dangers he had landed himself 
in, both in terms of the gangs and the police. 
He found a house to rent in Garden Village, Somerset 
West }52 where he commanded his, by now familiar 
cycle of setting up business as a 'broker'. By 
May 1984 the small community had mustered enough 
support against him and his shebeen to have him 
' t d 153 H' d ' . ev1c e . 1s est1nat1on, as was the case with 
so many gangsters from many Cape Flats Townships, 
was Mitchell's Plain, where I am told, he has 
started up his shebeen yet again .154 
This case study of Joker's shebeen reveals a style 
of illicit distribution that is by no means unusual 
in the Western Cape. Evidence led in the gang-
murder case of S v Lionel Foster and six others, 
augmented by taped interviews I was able to do 
with three of the accused in the court cells, 
demonstrate substantially similar relationships 
and processes happening on the opposite side of 
the Cape Flats. This case seemed to be 'engineered' 
by a shebeener, and reputed gangleader, Daniel 
Jacobs, whose gang nickname is "Kaffir Des". What 
is distinctive about his style of operation, is 
that he operates on a far larger scale than Joker 
did (he has three houses, selling from two of 
them, 'employing' over forty gangster-guards), 
and recruits his guards from the reformatories, 
both Porter and Ottery ( shool of industries). He 
is the reputed leader of the BFK's in the country, 
and has, according to the interviewees, a similarly 
contradictory relationship to the police. The 
fact that the accused were tried at all was 
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attributable to Des's 'selling' six of them, all 
former or current employees of his shebeen, to 
the detective branch and offering his three henchmen 
as State witnesses to complete the deal. The 
main purpose of the 'sale' seems to have been 
an attempt by Des to implicate an opposition 
shebeener, accused No 1, in murder and thereby 
diminish competition. An indication of the size 
of his business was given by the three BFK's I 
interviewed. One hundred four-and-a-half litre 
cans of wine and one hundred cases of quarts of 
beer constitute the average sales volume at one 
of his two outlets each Friday night. 
From Grassy Park (the location of Des's shebeen) 
to Elsies River and Mitchell's Plain, the style 
of shebeening, above a certain scale, in 'Coloured' 
townships of the Western Cape is substantially 
the same as that described in the case study above. 
The control methods adopted by the police are 
thus likely to be replicated in their material 
characteristics, allowing for nuances of stylistic 
differences arising out of personality factors. 
Thus, when we talk about policing illicit liquor 
distribution in 1 Coloured 1 areas, the pattern 
is generalisable from this single case study .156 
D CONCLUSION 
The style of liquor distribution (peculiar) to 
the population inhabiting the 'Coloured' townships 
of the Western Cape has been shaped by the 
interaction of four major forces, each experiencing 
conflict in its own terms and in its own sphere. 
They are: firstly, the economically and politically 
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important representatives of liquor capital, both 
primary (the grape-farmers, hop growers, grain 
growers, etc), secondary (wine makers, distillers 
and breweries), and tertiary (the distributors), 
all intent, though at times by contradictory 
methods, on securing continued accumulation. 
Secondly, there are those groupings who, for 
religious or moral-cum-philanthropic reasons, 
oppose unlimited distribution, and are joined 
by fractions of non-liquor capital from time to 
time when their own accumulation is being threatened 
by the effects of too liberal a distribution 
dispensation. Thirdly, there is the State, having 
to negotiate its way through the process of shaping 
the working class to the sometimes conflicting 
demands of capital in general, while constantly 
ensuring that its range of coopti ve and coercive 
measures enables it to sustain control over the 
regionally variable manifestations 
class resistance. Fourthly, there is 
population itself, by no means an 
entity, (since the 
respond to their 












Legal liquor distribution in 'Coloured' townships 
came to be vested in 'Coloured' hands as part 
of the State's cooptive strategy to foster a 
'Coloured' middle class following the Sharpeville 
and Langa disturbances in 1960. However, the 
number of legal retail outlets in 'Coloured' areas 
which were ultimately allowed, and the regulations 
applying to opening hours, credit, etc. which 
were applied, 
given to the 
was such that 
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after due consideration having been 
vociferous anti-distribution lobby, 
the existing illicit distributors 
were left with considerable scope for lucrative 
income opportunities. Since these opportunities 
provided one of the few and certainly most lucrative 
possible ways of making a living for the large 
number of unemployed people who constituted the 
reserve army of labour, considerable competition 
developed for control of them. 
Beyond all but the most insignificant scale of 
distribution shebeening could only function by 
means of organised groups - the street gangs. Only 
they were adequately equipped in terms of manpower, 
fighting strength, and negotiating shrewdness 
to sustain illicit distribution under conditions 
of stiff competition. 
The manner in which these gangster-shebeeners 
conducted their businesses took on a form by which 
their henchmen, their gangster-guards, became 









townships. The nature of this power was such that 
it favoured frequenters of the shebeens with 
physical protection whereas it exposed non-customers 
to physical and material predation. This coercive 
control substantially inhibited mobility within 
the township and probably contributed to a 
retardation of organisational activity of a 
political and recreational nature that would 
otherwise have occurred. By confining residents 
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to their dwellings to a greater extent
1 
the gang-
rule limited their recreational options and probably 
contributed to a higher reliance on intoxicants, 
both liquor and other drugs which the shebeens 
purveyed. Slightly less coercive in nature was 
the method of locking customers into a perpetual 
cycle of financial dependence by means of credit 
sales. Shebeeners often consciously encourage 
customers to over-purchase at the shebeen so that 
they acquire greater power over them which can 





functions which shebeeners' gangs 
course of reproducing the shebeen 
business overlap with 
in keeping township 
the interests of the State 
residents under control and 
disorganised. It is therefore not surprising 
that the police do not attempt to eradicate shebeens 
wholly, but enter into uneasy alliances with them 
in terms of which they cooperate on matters of 
common interest. Central to this cooperation 
is the understanding that in exchange for 
information, 'manageability' and perks, the police 
will allow illicit liquor dealings to take place. 
By this process of selective enforcement, liquor 
distribution to the working class acquires a status 
of quasi-legitimacy. The liquor law relating 
to distribution in working class areas adopts 
the character of symbolic legislation only~ 57 
This alliance between shebeens and the police, 
however, functions in a contradictory manner. On 
the one hand it entrenches the power and influence 
of the shebeener, because he becomes an important 
source of information to the police abou-t crimes 
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committed in the area and the activities of 
opposition shebeeners. The discretion he exercises 
in the course of choosing suspects is obviously 
to his benefit, as he is hardly likely to report 
people who are important to him. Indirectly 
therefore he uses the police to prosecute people 
who are a nuisance to him and his business. On 
the other hand, most large shebeens also deal 
in other drugs, which fall under the responsibility 
of a less accessibly bribeable unit of the police 
force the Drug Squad. Although I suspected 
some liaison between the police and the Drug Squad 
in the case of the shebeener in the case study, 
it was impossible to verify. The conflicting 
methods of arriving at their specific goals often 
results in the Drug Squad destroying painstakingly 
nurtured 
police. 
alliances between shebeeners and the 
The criminal activities of the street gangs outside 
of the immediate shebeen-sphere are a source of 
major conflict between shebeener and the gang. 
It is these crimes such as housebreaking, robbery 
and assault which the police pursue with the 
greatest seriousness in order to gain legitimacy 
within townships where their image is tainted, 
to say the least, by their invidious position 
as the most immediate manifestation of the apartheid 
state. It is for information about these crimes, 
not for illicit distribution, that they exert 
their greatest pressure on the shebeener. It 
is for these crimes that he sacrifices one or 
more of his henchmen from time to time in order 
to ensure the perpetuation of the shebeen. But 
it is this very betrayal which, if it becomes 
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apparent to the gangsters, is potentially disastrous 
for him and his shebeen. It runs counter to the 
fundamental tenet of gang ideology: solidarity. 
Yet it is the platform of shebeen survival. 
Illicit liquor distribution therefore takes place 
in a manner which is not only divisive of the 
working class itself, but of the gangs that are 
its major vehicles. 
by the methods the 
These divisions are encouraged 
police employ in controlling 
the 'Coloured' working class. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE REPRODUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOUR 
AND THE TOT SYSTEM 
A INTRODUCTION 
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The winefarmers of the Western Cape have, since the 
beginning of wine production some 330 years ago, 
obtained and controlled their labour by means that 
can only be described as coercive. 1 
Despite the effective abolition of slavery in 1838, 
winefarmers have prevailed successfully on the 
incumbents of State power for a set of legal controls 
by which their labour force would remain occupationally 
and spatially immobile, unorgani sed, underemployed, 
dependant, underskilled, and poor. Numerous historians 
have commented that little change seems to have taken 
place in the conditions under which the labour force 
has worked for the last 150 years~ While this remains 
a truism for the majority of farmers in the area under 
consideration, Stellenbosch-Somerset-West a growing 
minority (roughly 20% in 1984) have realised that 
co-optive methods have their merits. 
Coercive control is exercised through a host of 
structures and practices, some facilitated by 
legislation, others by practices the farmers themselves 
have developed. One of the main practises f aci li ta ted 
by legislation and applied electively by the farmers, 
is the provision of liquor on a regular daily basis 
to the labour force. The tot system is notably absent 
among farmers who have chosen the cooptive methods 
of maintaining and reproducing their labour force. 
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The tot system's major advantage to farmers has 
customarily been interpreted as facilitating spatial 
immobility of the labour force countering the lure 
of the towns. The institutionalised alcohol dependence 
of the labourers has also provided the means of 
motivating labourers to work. "They won't work without 
their dop", is a common retort of the farmers. 
The prospect of locking cheap labour onto the farms 
also motivated farmers outside the winegrowing area 
of the Cape to utilise this cheap, convenient method 
of control. The apple-growing area, Elgin, as well 
as the wheat-growing areas around Caledon have a 
sprinkling of farms that "goei dop" 3 
The same rationale was used by Transvaal farmers 
experiencing labour supply problems in the late 1920's. 
They urged the select committee investigating liquor 
legislation to recommend the extension of the tot 
system to other provinces. However, they could not 
muster enough support for their stance. Consequently 
the potential application of the tot system was 
curtailed in the ensuing legislation, the Liquor Act 
(No 30) of 1928~ 
Again in 1951-2 a select committee was instructed 
to investigate the extension of the tot system to 
northern farmers. 5 In 1957 more than 100 Transvaal 
farmers admitted at a conference of the Transvaal 
Agricultural Union to have defied the law and introduced 
the tot system there. "The sooner native farm labourers 
were supplied with liquor, the sooner would there 
be a stable labour force on the farms" was the gist 
of their argument.6 
The ensuing legislation, the 1961 Liquor Amendment 
Act (No 72) contained an artful avoidance of the issue 
of paying labour with wine. On the face of it, the 
tot system was outlawed as part of the wage, but there 
was no prohibition on the free dispensation of liq~or. 
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The drafters thus satisfied both the abolitionists 
and the farmers. 
The tot system's effect, however, reaches far beyond 
mere procurement, 
It influences the 
retention, and motivation of labour. 
skilling process of both the totted 
labourer and his whole family, and it constitutes 
one of the important ideological pillars on which 
labour control rests. In short, it is a key element 
in both general and extended reproduction of 
agricultural labour. Herein lies part of the explanation 
of its efficacy even into the eighties. 
One needs to be reminded that there are several 
substantial differences between the reproduction of 
rural as opposed to urbanised labour. In an urban 
environment it is usually the State that is called 
on by capital to bear the major cost of supplying 
collective consumption items, such as housing. In 
the rural con text, where the site of production and 
reproduction is the same farm, the farmer as employer 
carries a far larger burden of reproduction than his 
urban counterparts. Not only does he have to house 
the labourers and their families (unless they are 
migrants), he has to educate them on the job. Even 
the education of the children is subject to greater 
farmer control through the farm schools. 7 
Any demands the urban working class may have against 
the ruling class are usually fragmented into different 
organisational channels such as trade unions, student's 
representative councils, and grassroots civic 
organisations. They address the employers, National 
Government's Education authorities, and localauthorities 
respectively. The struggles are thus dispersed. But 
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in the farming context all these struggles are usually 
compacted into one single polarity between capitalist, 
farmers and labour. 
Farming capital, having to carry a comparatively heavy 
burden, has prevailed on the State to equip it with 
control mechanisms by which the individual farmer 
and his family can keep the many labourers and their 
families docile, and disorganised, and dependent. The 
way in which the tot sytem operates contributes to 
the success of all three of these attributes. For 
those farmers to whom coercive control is the only 
perceived option the tot system has been and still 
is essential. For them it is the ideological device 
by which coercive measures are concealed behind the 
labourer's own addiction. It is they who have 
manoeuvred and lobbied to keep the system in operation 
against all the mounting opposition. 
The opposition to the tot goes back a long way. The 
Temperance agitation under the auspices of missionaries 
and templars in the 1840's was energetic and met with 
some success in curtailing distribution in general, 
but had no success against the tot system~ For the 
ensuing years agitation against the tot seems to have 
always been only a spin-off of a larger debate - the 
prohibition of liquor consumption by Blacks. By 1915 
the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church recommended 
that the tot system be curtailed by limiting the 
quantities 
Committee of 
of wine paid to labourers. The Baxter 
1918, investigating drunkenness in the 
western districts, 





came close to recommending the 
wages, but could not achieve the 
The Liquor Act of 1928 limited 
wine as wage to one and a half 
pints (approx. 852 cc)? 
The Cape Coloured 




of 1937 recommended its 
10 Meaker Report. The 1960 
Malan Commission's tenor was toward the deregulation 
of the tot. Farmers should be free to decide for 
themselves whether to administer the tot, and if so, 
how much. 11 Since then the Erika Theron Commission 
recommended that no liquor be supplied to labourers 
before or during work days.12 
Even certain sectors of the liquor industry are opposed 
to the tot. Predictably they are those fractions 
whose livelihood does not directly depend on it, namely 
the Breweries, and those who are in the low-price 
wine market, to whom the tot acts as considerable 
competition .13 
During its unillustrious existence the Coloured Persons 
Representative Council made continued efforts in its 
liaison with the Cape Agricultural Union to recommend 
the cessation of administering tot to farm labour!
4 
All these efforts have had some impact on most of 
the farmers in the area under consideration. In 1976 
when I first commenced making superficial inquiries 
amongst the labourers on 16 farms, it was still fairly 
common to find farmers administering five dops a day 
plus a bottle at night. The dop frequency was then 
'invaldop' at clock-in time (varying seasonally from 
6 am to 7 am), 'brekfisdop' at 8.00 am; 'teetyd' 
dop at 11.00 am: 'smiddagsdop' at lunchtime: 1 vieruur 1 
dop at 4 pm, and 1 tshailadop 1 whenever they knocked 
off (between 6 pm and 7.30 pm). On weekends each 
labourer was given a dop and a bottle on Saturday. 
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All overtime and special favours, as well as regular 
weekend work was paid for by dop, but since this work 
fell outside of the normal working contract, it was 
considered immune from the 1961 Liquor Amendment Act's 
prohibition on payment in liquor. Most farmers 
customarily classified overtime as voluntary work 
for which the free gift of liquor was volunteered 
in return! 
Women were, in 1976 still fairly frequent recipients 
of the tot. Whenever they worked full days they 
received two tots during work and a half -bottle at 
night. Children under sixteen were not, to my knowledge, 
given any wine as payment, but stories abound of how 
some farmers, as a joke, give wine to the children 
(between seven and sixteen) 
see them floundering about. 
occasionally, just to 
These 1976 quantities already signal a substantial 
reduction in the quantity of liquor given to labourers. 
Interviews with old labourers indicate that in the 
1940's, particularly if the farmer still made his 
own wine and brandy on the farm ( ie. he had not yet 
joined the cooperative movement) far higher quanti ties 
were administered. Firstly the size of each tot was 
larger. The pilchard-tin, today's standard measure, 
was then represented on five of nine farms by the 
'beeshoringdop' literally the ox-horn. Secondly, 
apart from males getting their regular five, and women 
a regular three, the tshai ladop was usually not only 
a single beeshoringdop, but several, depending on 
how well-disposed or generous the farmer felt. The 
labourers talk about staggering home at night drunk, 
still armed with their full bottles. 
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By 1984 dop quantities have diminished considerably. 
Only one in eighteen farms surveyed administers five-
a-day plus bottle. Six give three, six give two, 
three give one dop a day plus the nightly bottle 
containing 750 me. The remaining three only 
a bottle at night. It is interesting to note 
all those giving more than one tot and a bottle 
exceeding the legal limit of 820 me. None of 





The reduction in dop-amounts needs to be contextualised 
within the broader social and economic forces operating 
in the Western Cape over the last decade. 
B LABOUR SUPPLY, MOBILITY AND THE TOT 
It is too simplistic to analyse the dop-labour supply 
dynamic in terms of more dop more labour and 
conversely less dop less labour. While the tot 
system is an important pillar of labour supply for 
'Coloureds'it must be contextualised within the totality 
of forces that have a bearing on social representation. 
Firstly the area under consideration is situated roughly 
half way between Stellenbosch and Somerset West and 
is in relatively easy commuting distance of the two. 
It is even within commuting distance of Cape 
Town, (approx. 35 km) even if that is more expensive 
and time-consuming. 
Although it is an area with a relative abundance of 
agricultural 
areas, the 
labour compared with the 
proximity to the towns 
more outlying 
and the city 





but the tensions are 




and countryside. In the value-system operating in 
the towns farm labour is regarded as dead-end, low-
pay and entails a worker-employer relationship which 
degrades the worker. In addition, "the farmers buy 
their labourers' submission with wine" •16 Young 
school-leavers who grew up on farms are reluctant 
to work there, and will usually only resign themselves 
to it if the whole family's tenure is jeopardised:7 
This trend should result in an increasing average 
age of regular 'Coloured' farm workers. The statistics, 
however, do not bear this out. But there is a cogent 
explanation for this skewing. The Theron Commission 
surveys found the average age of all 'Coloured' farm-
workers to be 36 in 1973-4. 18 My calculations done in 
1984 from four of the farms using coercive methods 
was an average of 29, 36, 34, 38 respectively, an 
average of 34.2 years. This is explained by the 
composition of the young contingent on each farm. 
At least 50% of that contingent are 'genuine' labourers 
who grew up into farm labour, and started working 
from the age of 13 to 16 years. The other half, 
roughly, are 'rejects' from the system. These are 
youngsters ranging from 18 to 30 who have either 
graduated from reformatory or prison and for a variety 
of possible reasons have chosen not to reintegrate 
into street gangs but moved out or back to their 
relatives on the farms. Quite naturally, they seem 
to help each other finding accommodation/employment, 
so that small pockets of ex-gangsters are found on 
some farms. Two of the four above farms each have 
five such individuals in their labour contingent, 
the others have four and two respectively. 
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Another attribute of the young contingent is that 
a high percentage of the 'non-genuine' labourers have 
attempted to escape from farm employment, but again 
for a host of possible reasons, have 'bounced back' 
onto the farms .19 Seen together with the ex-prisoners, 
at least half of the labourers in the research area are 
the more volatile part of the labour force. They are 
more mobile than the other half of youngsters. 
Thus, notwithstanding 
average age of the 
is a strong argument 
most farmers in the 
an apparent stability in the 
'Coloured' labour force, there 
to support the contention that 
survey area who adopt coercive 
control measures are experiencing, and will experience 
increasingly, a shortage of regular 'Coloured' labour. 
This becomes particularly apparent at peak-demand 
periods. During the 1983 wine harvest (February to 
April) six of the 18 farmers had to change their picking 
programme as a result of labour shortages. They either 
had to 'borrow' labour from their neighbours or friends 
once these had hit temporary lulls 2~r otherwise recruit 
urban labour from Macassar, Kleinvlei, Sarepta ( Kui ls 
Rivier) or Langa (Cape Town). 
By the time of the 1984 harvest nine of the farmers 
were forced to augment their picking teams with outside 
labour. This was compounded by the ever decreasing 
size of the 'picking family'. 
Each labourer contracts, when he takes on agricultural 
employment to make his family available to the farmer 
at peak periods. The norm eight years ago was an 
average picking family of five. By 1984 it had dwindled 
to three, mainly due to young males working in the 
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towns. 
The farmers have usually attempted to overcome these 
seasonal fluctuations by taking on migrant labour, 
' joiners' , for the picking season. Notwithstanding 
the fact that migrant employment contracts are for 
a minimum duration of a year, there are enough loopholes 
in the law, and enough sympathetic officials at the 
labour bureaux for a farmer to declare them redundant 
and senu them back to the homeland (in this area, 
usually to Hershel ) after the three-month harvest. 21 
Even the changing composition of the regular labour 
bears out the 'Coloured' labour shortage. The Theron 
Commission averages the number of inhabitants per 
farming unit to 58,6 'Coloured' and 2,23 Blacks, but 
that does not reflect the labourer to labourer ratio. 22 
The table below shows how great the variance can be 
between some of the farms in the survey area. The 
predominant explanation, from the farmers' point of 
view, for a high percentage of Black labourers is 
simply personal preference. 
however, aver that it is 
Labourers on those farms, 
due 
heavy-handedness and unreasonable 
to the farmer's 
demands that most 
'Coloured' 
them. 
labourers are not prepared to work for 
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TABLE A PROPORTION OF BLACK &'COLOURED' REGULAR MALE 










































































Not all Black labourers are hired merely as auxiliary 
workers during the picking seasons. It is usually only 
a small proportion of them whose contracts are prematurely 
terminated, usually the 'difficult' ones, ie. those who 
'don't know their place', and insist on their rights, 
or who work poorly. 
The tot system, although administered to the migrants, 
usually has a different impact on them than on the 
'Coloured' labourers, who were 
it. The major difference is the 
literally weaned onto 
length of time it takes 
to recede into alcohol dependence. The Blacks who are 
not 'joiners' ie. who have been working in the area for 
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more than 10 years have, with few exceptions, lapsed 
into the same state as the 'hooked' Coloured labourers. 
That entails focussing their aspirations on the short-
term gratification of experiencing oblivion through drink 
as often as time, money, circumstances, and employers 
will allow - and often even more frequently. Their drinking 
then goes beyond the bounds of the tot system. They 
procure more liquor over weekends either in the towns, 
the farm shebeens, or co-workers and in the summer 
make their own 'mos•~3 Their mobility is substantially 
impeded by their dependence on alcohol. Doubly so because 
they are, for influx control purposes, only allowed to 
work in agricultural employment within a restricted area. 
Some of these workers have their rights to work in the 
area limited to one employer only. 
The joiners, unlike their more 





the homelands, and quite often augment their remittances 
with proceeds from small scale shebeening. Although 
they do engage in drinking beyond the tot, which often 
results in brawls and squabbles over pettynesses and 
women, they usually do not, within a year's contract 
period become addicted to liquor. Their mobility is 
tinged strongly by their 'foreignness'. 
The Coloured labour force, on the contrary, experiences 
the tot, a very different dynamic. Nurtured on 
paternalism, coercive management, and narrowed horizons, 
their mobility is usually limited to m'?ving a few farms 
away to another farmer, who also administers the tot. 
For those who are hooked even that is usually far too 
ambitious a course to execute, and it lapses into being 
a well-nurtured and oft-repeated fantasy. 
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Groenewald 1 s argument seems to reflect the true position; 
viz. that labourers move into the Stellenbosch area from 
smaller towns and more outlying areas, in the possible 
hope of making it to the towns or city at some later 
stage. The places of origin of labourers interviewed 
on four farms bear out the first proposition. They were 
born, and grew up in places such as Wellington, Worcester, 
Wolesley, Ceres, Malmesbury, Moreesburg, Upington, Paarl, 
Grabouw, Caledon, Pniel, Riebeeck Kasteel, and the 
1 permanent 1 Blacks usually the Transkei. But the second 
part of their ambition seems to have 
amongst other factors, the tot sytem. 
of time worked on the same farm, 5.28 
been arrested by, 
The average length 
years belies the 
fact that the older hooked generation has been on the 
farm for upward of ten years. At the same time this 
figure does not reflect the relatively high labour turnover 
of young labourers. A breakdo~n of times lived and worked 
on a farm is given in the following Table B. 
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TABLE B. AGE, LENGTH OF RESIDENCE AND LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT 















































































ABSENCE FROM FARM 
DOING OTHER WORK 
5 years 







These data are taken from farm No 1 in Table A which 
has 16 labourers, six of whom are Black, ten of whom 
are 'Coloured'. The mobility rate, taken in July 1983 
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shows a far higher degree of stability than if it were 
taken between February and 
period of highest mobility. 
are virtually guaranteed 
March. Harvest-time is the 
Firstly because labourers 
to find employment and 
accommodation, as well as farmer's assistance in 
transporting their belongings. Secondly, the farmers 
are in a weaker position to be too choosy about the quality 
of labour taken on. Thirdly, there is usually a higher 
dismissal rate during harvest-time than during the rest 
of the year. Paradoxical as this may appear, the brawling 
rate, stabbing-and-injury rate, and the absenteeism-
• 
due-to-drunkenness rate are markedly higher during harvest-
times than at any other time of the year. Pickers work 
in teams, usually families, and are paid collectively. 
Considerable squabbling over how the bulkpayment is to 
be divided up is a common phenomenon. It is compounded 
when a labourer outside of that family-team has to be 
contracted to carry and tip that family's baskets (due 
to age or weakness of the males in the family-team). Partly 
attributable to higher liquidity from piece-work picking, 
and partly to the 'mosblik' custom, intoxication levels 
run high for those three months on most of the farms 
in the survey area. The farmers are caught in the 
difficult paradox of choosing a smaller, more disciplined 
labour force or a larger, more problematic one. 
Before the 198 3 harvest, for example, 
on an additional four labourers with 
families. The first labourer, engaged 
farm no. one took 
their women and 
on a Friday, did 
not make it to work on the Monday. His woman, who picked 
on her own (and had to pay one of the other labourers 
to carry and tip her filled baskets for her), claimed 
that he was ill. On Tuesday the farmer went to 
investigate, and found him to be inebriated, and summarily 
dismissed him and his wife. 
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The second labourer was initially an 
To make things even better he had 
excellent picker. 
a wife and three 
days that family children picking with him. On good 
alone cut four tons of grapes. The farmer was pleased 
to have made such a good 1 catch 1 
how anyone could have let that 
services. After the fourth week 
and couldn 1 t work out 
labourer leave his 
of the harvest the 
labourer was involved in a weekend argument over beer 
-purchases at the shebeen on the farm. In the ensuing 
brawl he seriously injured one of the older labourers, 
thereby ending his working caree;~ The old man 1 s son, 
who attempted to intervene was also put out of picking-
action for a week. The offender left the farm with 
his family the next morning to escape both the labour 
reprisals and arrest. 25 
The third labourer was informed on by the 1 Witvoet 1 
(the informer) of the labour contingent. He was seen, 
midway into the harvest, attempting to pay for fish-
purchases from one of the itinerant hawkers with grapes 
and butter-nuts stolen from the farm. The farmer gave 
him the choice of a beating or arrest. He chose the 
former and was given six lashes with a length of hosepipe 
and dismissed. The wi tvoet was rewarded with an extra 
half-bottle of Vaaljapie. 26 
The fourth labourer brought with him into employment 
five children ranging in age from seventeen to seven. 
The eldest worked for a building contractor in Somerset 
West - a source of irritation to the farmer. The rule 
for this farm was that no male may live on it unless 
he works for it. Being harvest-time, and needing the 
other members 
to deal with 
of the family, the farm-manager chose 
that problem after the harvest. He 
nonetheless expressed his 
male head of the family. 
displeasure about it to the 
The rest of the family pi eked 
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in a team. Three weeks into the harvest the fourteen-
year-old son, who had absconded from a Cape reformatory, 
broke into the farmer's store in which the sixteen 
Vaaljapie containers (20 litres each) were kept, and 
decanted the contents of two. His ensuing inebriation, 
and that of his friends made the identification of the 
culprits easier, duly aided by the witvoet's betrayal 
of sworn secrecy - bought with some of the stolen wine. 
The family head and errant son were summonsed to the 
farmer and severely reprimanded. The son received a 
hiding with a fan-belt, and was banned from the farm. 
As a punitive gesture the eldest son was also banned 
from the farm. The rest of the family was allowed to 
stay. The witvoet received an extra half-bottle of 
Vaaljapie. 
The stories related to me by numerous farmers and farm 
managers at the cooperatives during harvest time were 
in the same vein as the examples cited above?? 
It is clear from the above that the influence of the 
tot on horizontal mobility is mediated by a number of 
factors. It still, however, remains a valid proposition 
that the older, addicted labourer is restrained from 
moving by a combination of factors one of the strongest 
of which is his own unwillingness to move due to a dop-
induced lack of motivation in general. The second rna jor 
consideration is his age, which determines strength, 
and hence employability. The many years of exposure 
to alcohol renders most labourers 'useless' in the eyes 
of the farmers beyond the age of 4 5. 28 
It is also clear from the examples cited that some mobilitj 
is actually induced by excessive alcohol consumption, 





that 70% of 
of dismissals, I confidently 
mobility among labourers over 
the age of thirty arises out 
majority of these dismissals are 
of dismissals. The 
due to drink-related 
actions: absenteeism, violent incidents and thefts from 
the farm. 
Whether it is the pull of liquor-addiction which keeps 
labourers locked onto one single farm, or the push 
that liquor-related incidents gives them off the farm, 
the fact remains that totted labour remains locked 
into the farming cycle. Upward mobility is, for the 
great majority of farm labourers who work within the 
tot system, a near impossibility .29 
C SKILLING AND THE TOT SYSTEM 
Interpreted narrowly, the tot system entails giving 
male workers an average of one litre of wine a workday, 
and less on weekends. That alone, already carries 
strong consequences in terms of health, motivation, 
attitude to work , recreation, productivity, 
reliability, and notably, attitude to drinking. It 
also has a bearing on the type of relationship that 
is structurally reinforced by the tot, between the 
male worker (who comes home with a bottle every night) 
and his family. It virtually predetermines the level 
of mental and emotional support and guidance a man 
can give to the family. 
If that, alone, were all that the tot system implies, 
it would already constitute a searing indictment of those 
who institutionalise it. But it is not all. The tot 
system is nearly synonymous with below-subsistence 
wages coupled with coercive-management and poor housing. 
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One of its major concomitants is the received notion, 
entrenched by generations of 
that heavy drinking is an 
winefarming labourers, 
acceptible recreational 
activity. The implication of this notion is that 





themselves, but also their women, their 
and even their unborn children. It is 
impossible to talk only of skilling for 
It is rather more realistic in the farming 
context to talk about skilling for life. In short, 
general and extended reproduction of the labour force.30 
The skills needed by the common labourer are extremely 
slight. Probably the most exacting task is pruning, 
which takes up between two and three months of the 
annual cycle. But that does not take more than a 
few 
even 
hours instruction and demonstration to learn, 
for the dullest of labourers .31 For the rest of 
the tasks involved in the winefarming cycle it is 
usually strength and stamina that is required: 




pipes. Lesser tasks do not need much 
stamina: tying shoots onto trellisis, 
holes for trellising. Many tasks in the 
or 
winefarming cycle have been mechanised or substituted 
by chemical means during this century: the move from 
individual wine-making to cooperative winemaking means 
that most labourers have nothing to do with wine 
processing. Other de-skilling processes are the 
substitution of tractors and mechanised implements 
for animal-drawn contraptions, tractor-driven crop-
spraying, weeding, composting and sowing processes. 
Grafting of cultivars onto the wild root-stocks is 
nowadays performed by specialised nurseries}2 
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The average farm usually requires between one and 
four labourers who are capable of driving tractors 
and handling the implements. The rest of the labour 
force needs no skills other than the basics. The 
back-up labour force of women, and sometimes children, 
need only be able to pick grapes, bind vines onto 
trellises and and participate in weeding. 
There is little, if any 
a winefarming labourer. 
the same or lesser skills, 
scope for advancement for 
The common labourers use 
than they did twenty-odd 
years ago. There is, according to most farmers, ·little, 
or any, need for the skills that conventional schooling 
imparts, and 70% of the Coloured labourers over 30 
years are illiterate on four of the farms surveyed~3 








stage, the infrequent 
has diminished their 
For those under the age of 30 on the same four farms 
the literacy rate was substantially higher. 58% Could 
actually write out their names and haltingly read 
a little Afrikaans. However, only three percent of 
all the labourers were in a position to competently 
complete the application form for their Book of Life. 
This low literacy rate is a substantial inhibition 
on upward mobility. Fewer of the farms surveyed had 
24 labourers capable of driving tractors, and one 
of these had tractor licences entitling them to use 
the public roads; the truckdriver also had a licence. 
Of these 24 drivers the farmers only allowed 17 to 
work tractors/trucks. The remainder had at some stage 
committed some misdemeanor while driving, and grounded~~ 
Table C, spells out the figures for each farm. 
TABLE C FORMAL QUALIFICATIONS 
TRACTOR/TRUCK DRIVERS ON 
STELLENBOSCH/SOMERSET WEST AREA 
FARM NO OF LABOURERS 
NO WITH THE ABILITY 















AND ACTUAL ABILITY OF 
FOUR FARMS IN 















A further contribution to the illiteracy, is the general 
reluctance of the coercive-management type of farmer 
to support the process of formal qualifications. A 
licence renders the labourer too mobile and subject 
to more lucrative offers from other farmers (eg. those 
who produce vegetables or raise livestock). Note from 
Table C that only four out of 24 have formal 
qualifications. These farmers discourage any marked 
differentiation on the basis of skills by paying only 
marginally more for the tractor drivers (R26, 00/week 
for a common labourer; R28,00/week for a tractor 
driver; and R30,00/week for the tractor drivers with 
licences, September 1984). 
·The same absence of marked differences obtain in the 
realm of 
the four 
experience. The only distinction 






R2,00 a week less than all those above 18. A labourer 
who has worked for three years is paid the same wage 
as one who has worked twenty years. 
A typical example: a labourer, aged 55 who has been 
a regular tractor driver on the farm for 17 years, 
can drive medium duty trucks but has no licence, is 
a fairly competent bricklayer (he built the farm-
manager's garage and the pigsties), received Rl2,50 
a week in 1976 and has been given annual increments. 
In 1984 he earns R28,00. With formal qualifications 
for either of those two skills he could earn four 
times the amount in towns. The farmer has never 
to do so. He is on the tot but not encouraged him 
an alcoholic. His expenditure on liquor is a relatively 
low R6, 00 a week. He procures it either in Somerset 
West on weekends or at the shebeen on the farm at 
any time. His wife is an alcoholic and spends most 
weekends in a near-paralytic state. During the week, 
she looks after other labourer's children (for a fee) 
while the able-bodied women are out working. She 
has on average 17-25 toddlers to six year-olds to 
care for each day. She is totally dependent of the 
farm's shebeener, for whom she does odd domestic chores 
in exchange for a dop (tot). Her alcoholism has reached 
the stage where she needs only one glass to virtually 
'knock her out'. He talks incessantly of getting 
'papers', the necessary qualifications, for his skills 














the annual bonus is 
debts for groceries 
own account by the 
farm manager. Whenever the annual bonus is paid out, 
R50,00, something always prevents him from clearing 
his debt. Leaving the farm has, over the last four 
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years, become like a well-nurtured dream that will 
remain one. His weekends are spent talking, drinking 
(he does not get excessively drunk nor does he become 
violent) and playing guitar. Of their 11 children, 
six are still at home in their three-roomed house. 
Together with their children the total population 
in the house is 17, of whom seven are over 14. 
In this case alcohol dependence and the resulting 
motivationlessness, coupled with the farmer's active 
retardation of any signs towards advancement, have 
kept him locked into farming, and his static future. 
But alcohol dependence does not only retard the 
potential advancement of the labourers themselves. 
It also retards that of their children in a variety 
of ways. 
Drinking mothers run the risk of damaging the foetus 
during pregnancy and either suffering a case of 
stillbirth, or giving birth to a child suffering from 
the Foetal Alcohol Syndrome, or lesser defects. 
In a survey conducted in the Stellenbosch area during 
1983, statistics were extracted from all sectors of 
the population, both urban and rural. A comparison 
was drawn between the incidence of a variety of 
indicators reflecting poverty. The three different 
'Coloured' townships housing the labour force were 
compared to the farming areas. The still-birth rate 
for the farms was 12,7 compared with an average of 
11,5 for the 'Coloured' population of the whole survey 
area.35 The infant mortality rate for the farms was 
substantially higher ( 64,6) than the average for the 
'Coloured' population as a whole in the area ( 4 7, 94 )3.6 
By comparison, the infant mortality rate for Blacks 
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in the same area was 27,71 as opposed to 19,6 for 
whites. 
The researchers comment that 
"A high still-birth rate is associated with the low 
socio-economic status of a population. The nutritional 
status plus the associated factors such as maternal 
infections, alcohol consumption and smoking can be 
the cause for the high rate of prematurity and low 
birthweight for gestational age. This in turn has 
a direct bearing on the number of still births."37 
Although the researchers do not give an exact percentage 
they allege that a large number of farm labourers 
live far under the primary household/domestic 
subsistence level. With few exceptions, the farm 
labourers in the Stellenbosch area are still part 
of what they call the culture of poverty.38 
There is no study known to me that investigates the 
Foetal Alcohol 
In a general 
phenomenon it 
Syndrome in 
study of this 
was ascertained 
the Stellenbosch Area. 
relatively unexplored 
that the most common 
defects of the Foetal Alcohol Syndrome include "growth 
deficiency, brain dysfunction, craniofacial anomalies 
and cardiovascular and muscular-skeletal problems"~ 
The incidence of Foetal Alcohol Syndrome in South 
Africa could be extrapolated from the following table: 40 
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TABLE D PERCENTAGE OF OFFSPRING AFFECTED BY FOETAL 
ALCOHOL SYNDROME 
ALCOHOL INGESTION BY MOTHERS 
2-4 drinks per day 
4 and more per day 
10 drinks per day 
OFFSPRING AFFECTED BY 




No data were collected for this study on the drinking 
frequency of specifically pregnant mothers. but the 
drinking-rate of women on two of the farms was 
ascertained by asking their men and correlating that 
against the responses of their children. There is 
an inherent difficulty in 
firstly, farm labourers 
compiling such data because 
do not habitually quantify 
things, processes and the time-spans as much as middle 
class individuals are wont to. Therefore attempting 
to ascertain data such as age, periods of time for 
which certain habits have persisted, years in which 
salient events happened, will render sparse results. 
Such measuring processes are of little significance 
within their frames of reference. On the other hand, 
money matters are treated with meticulous detail, 
and quanti ties of liquor consumed can be deduced from 
how much was purchased. Secondly, broad references 
such as much, not so much or little, are relative 
to the quantities consumed by the respondent. An eleven-
year old girl, who answers that her mother drinks 
a lot, is not necessarily contradicting her father, 
a heavy drinker, who says she doesn't drink so much. 
The data for drinking women was collected over a 
period of three years, between 1980-1983, backed up 
by my personal observations over weekends from time 
to time. 
174 
TABLE E DRINKING PROFILES OF WOMEN ON A SELECT WINE-





































































DRINKS AT QUANTITIES CHURCH TYPE OF 
WEEKENDS OVER DRINKER 
WEEKENDS 
yes 2 bottles yes medium 
drinker 
yes 2 bottles no alcoholic 
no yes teetotaller 
yes 3 bottles yes heavy 
drinker 
3 bottles medium 41 yes no 
drinker 
yes 3 bottles no heavy 
drinker 
yes ~ bottle yes light 
drinker 
yes ~ bottle yes light 
drinker 
yes 2 bottles no alcoholic 
no yes teetotaller 
yes 2~ bottles no heavy 
drinkers 
yes ~ bottle no light 
drinker 
yes ~ bottle yes light 
drinker 
yes 3 bottles no heavy 
drinker 
It is not possible from the above data to determine 
whether the heavy drinkers and alcoholics drank during 
their pregnancies. The pattern of drinking carriers 
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seems to escalate with age. I am not aware of any 
women, or men on the farms for that matter, who could 
be classified alcoholic under the age of 30. But 
the above table does give us an idea of the quality 
of care that these drinking mothers can give their 
children,particularly on weekends, when the contact-
time is the highest. Even if the mother is not a 
drinker, the children, who usually play around the 
densely grouped labourers cottages, are on weekends 
surrounded by people who are inebriated most of the 
time. The drinking parents' ability to feed and care 
for their children is substantially impaired. One 
of the impairments is that the amount of household 
income spent on liquor, limits the amount spent on 
other household necessaries, particularly food. 







cited above found the 
of malnourished children 




malnourished children were between one and two years old, 
and 59% were below the age of two. 42 
The same survey tested a group of respondents against 
the group in which malnourished children were located. 
It was established that the malnourished group spends 
more on alcohol per month than the control group. 
Up to 42,7% of the malnourished group spend up to 
R20,00 a month on alcohol as opposed to 20% in the 
control group. The researchers also express the opinion 
that the actual amounts spent are probably higher 
than those disclosed.43 1 
The farm children of drinking parents are handicapped 
in their school performances in a number of ways. 
The poor encouragement to go to school which emanates 
from the parents, the lack of interest or ability 
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(due to illiteracy) to assist the pupils all contribute 
to a high absenteeism rate. The long distances which 
children have to traverse in all weather conditions, 
more often than not on foot, and the need for them 
to augment wages during harvest time do not make for 
regular school attendance. The health study discovered 
that of 749 children at farm schools in the Stellenbosch 
area (21 schools were surveyed) 198 (26,4%) were absent. 
This is a higher absenteeism rate than that in the 
townships surrounding Stellenbosch 
17,6% and 6,4% respectively. 44 
being 11,8%, 
Another indicator of the indirect impact of alcohol 
on the children is stunted growth. Steyn's study 
demonstrates an extremely high incidence of small 
for age children. Only 9,17% of pupils between seven 
and eight years old in the survey area were normal 
height for their age. All the others were either 
malnourished but not stunted (6,12%), malnourished 
and stunted ( 31,05%) or stunted but not malnourished 
( 53 1 6 4 % ) •45 
Given all these handicaps it is not surprising that 
farm-children generally do not perform particularly 
well at school. Moreover, if their aspirations are 
limited to farm-work, there seems to them to be little 
need for school education. If they actually do 
eventually pass through primary school, the costs 
and difficulties of going to high school in the towns 
are formidable. The costs are transport and school 
uniforms, the difficulties are studying in crowded, 
poorly lit houses with little or no support from the 
family. Only one male out of 4 8 children of school-
going age on the four fanns surveyed reached high 
school. Then, tragically, an accident left him with 
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minor brain damage and a family to support and house. 
That put an end to his aspirations of escaping from 
the farming situation. He is now the only labourer 
on farm no. 1 who does not drink his dop. He takes 
the free liquor and sells it to the other labourers. 
One of the most surprising facts to emerge from the 
school-going children was that none of the boys intended 
working on farms when they grew up. The reasons offered 
for this attitude were, in order of importance: 
(a) the low wages paid to farm workers; 
(b) the farmers belittle the people ("hulle druk 
die mense af" - this also contains the connotation 
of oppression; 
(c) the work is boring; 
(d) farm labourers' compliance is bought with liquor 
("hulle word met drank omgekoop"); 
(e) there is no scope for advancement ( '"n man kan 
homself nie opwerk nie"). 
Their aspirations were all articulated in terms of 
town or city life. The type of occupations chosen 
were: policeman, traffic-policeman, building labourer, 
artisan, supermarket packer, post-office worker and 
the likes. 
The girls, by comparison, 
envisaged a higher degree of 
had less ambition and 
dependence. Their jobs 
depended, according to them, on what their families 
or men needed of them. Roughly a third of the girls 
resigned themselves to living on the farms, but hoped 
that they could be allowed to work in towns. The 
most commonly chosen occupation anticipated by the 
girls was domestic char. Only four of the 23 girls 
wanted alternate occupations ie. nursing, teaching and 
secretarial work. 
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Seven of the girls on the four farms had been taken 
out of school by their parents and 'farmed out' to 
petit-bourgeois 'Coloured' families in the more affluent 
Cape Town townships as nurse-maids-cum-chars. the 
customary practice is for the monthly salary (usually 
approx. R40-R60) to be paid to the parents, who then 
give the girl roughly RlO,OO pocket-money per month. 
As 
are 
far as the children 
disadvantaged both 
are concerned therefore, 
physically and mentally 
they 
by 
the forces impinging on their development. Notable 
among these forces is the tot system and its spill-
over into heavy drinking. It strongly influences 
not only the direct material inputs into their 
development, but also indirectly determines the quality 
of guidance and emotional support which crucially 
shapes them as individuals and members of the class. 
Ill-equipped as they are by their upbringing, it bP.comes 
extremely difficult for them to escape from the farming 
cycle and compete on equal terms with the more urbanised 
workers. That many of them do escape from the farms 
is a tribute to their determination and ambition. 
On the other 
perceptions of 
labour. 
hand,it is alsoindicative of negative 
farm labour in comparison with urban 
The process of underemployment is yet another factor 
that inhibits skilling. On the winefarms it is usually 
the women who are subjected to it. The dynamic of 
underemployment is dependent on the workload which 
the farming cycle imposes on each farming unit. 
Monocul ture grape farms have distinct peaks and slumps 
of labour demand. The availability of the women is 
guaranteed by the conditions of employment which each 
farmer stipulates when he takes on a male labourer. 
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call' to work on 





paid on a piece-rate basis. When they are not needed, 
the farmers do not pay them at all. They are usually 
allowed to subsidise their income from 'outside' work, 
either on other farms or more often in the towns. 
But they remain on call usually only 12-hours. It 
becomes extremely difficult for the women to make 
any reliable commitments for outside employment, as 
they do not know in advance except at harvest-time 
when they will be required to work on the farms. 
If a women has, for example, a char-job for each 
Wednesday in a suburban home, there is no possibility 
of ensuring regular attendance, nor any reasonable 
accessible means of communicating any change of 
availability to their urban employers. 
Any attempts at breaking out of the agreement the 
man makes with the farmer on behalf of his own family 
is likely to meet with reprisals. Firstly, the farmer 
will put pressure on the head of the household to 
dissuade the errant woman from continuing with her 
employment. Secondly, failing that, the farmer will 
use a variety of punitive measures such as pay 
deductions or withdrawal of privileges (such as 'dop' ). 
Ultimately, failing all else, he will threaten the 
entire household with eviction. No women has any 
right to live and work on a wine farm, except through 
her attachment to a male labourer who works in exchange 
for the house they occupy ( "werk virrie hys"). The 
very few exceptions to this rule are usually special 
concessions to widows of labourers who have rendered 
lengthy service to the farmer. 
The upshot of underemployment and dependency is that 
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women are precluded from skilling themselves for 
anything other than sporadic casual work, and are 
coerced into submission to male supremacy. 
The tot system and its related practices and structures, 
have, therefore, played a substantial role in creating 
an underskilled labour force one whose viability 
in competition with an urban labour force is 
considerably retarded. The tot has contributed to 
the underdevelopment of the children, the women and 
the men indeed the whole rural working class. They 
have been reproduced, with the aid of the tot, to 
suit the particular needs of winefarming capital. 
D COERCIVE MANAGEMENT, 'CRIMINALISATION' AND LABOUR'S 
RESPONSE 
i) COERCIVE MANAGEMENT 
The tot system is, on 14 of the 18 farms in the 
survey area, accompanied by coercive management. 
This is a compendium of practices and structures 
which each farmer tailors to his own 




Their control methods are based on a curious 
inversion: these farmers firmly believe that the 
persistence of the tot system is attributable 
to the inherent weakness of the labour force. 
They blame the labourers for their alcoholic 
addiction and all the attendant problems which 
result from it. These perceptions are reinforced 
in the daily 'handling' of the labourers, and, 
within the parameters of their common sense 
assumptions, are capable of empirical 
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substantiation .47 
This 'myth of social pathology' reinforces the 
racial stereotypes which 'forces' the farmers 
to adopt unusually strict methods of control. 
As La Hausse remarks, they indulge in "turning 
the harshness of economic inequality back upon 
its victims as moral condemnation" .48 
Apart from administering the tot, these farmers 
continuously attempt to reinforce the labourers' 
dependence 
'goodwi 11' . 
on them and their paternalistic 
Reinforcing this dependence is the 
attempt to limit the number of deleterious outside 






is competing with other 
shape the labourer's 
of, and hence responses to their 
material conditions. Most threatening to the farmer 
is any attempt to challenge his hegemonic control 
over his labour force. The threats that he 
perceives are firstly, that those farmers who 
do not employ coercive management techniques would 
lure their labour away; secondly, that there 
are groups or organisations which attempt to instil 
in the labourers the notion that they need to 
organise to improve their conditions; thirdly, 
the town or city which promises higher material 
rewards and greater flexibility of movement. 
Each farmer/manager attempts, in his peculiar 
way, to limit the impact of these competing 
ideologies. The concept of private property and 
its protection is involved as one of these methods. 
Trespass laws are used, frequently, even out 
of working hours, to bar people and organisations 
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from entering the property on which the labour 
force is housed. These laws enable the farmer 
to choose which individuals, organisations, clubs 
or societies, and churces are allowed to set 
foot on the property and influence the labour 
force. I have not gathered data on how frequently 
trespass legislation is made use of; but it 
is a common occurrence for labourers to report 







the farmers usually retain a monopoly 
means of long-distance communication. 
means of summoning ambulance, police, 
other than by actually walking there, 
a bus both of which are too slow 
for emergencies is by telephone. This 
communication channel is controlled by the farmer, 
and is used, in most cases, in such a way as 
to reinforce dependence on him. Most coercive 
management protagonists refuse to assist the 
labourers who are injured in weekend brawls. 
Ostensibly this is an attempt to discipline the 
workers to behave over weekends, but its effect 
is to support a situation in which people are 
inclined to resolve their problems immediately 
and forcefully. Any labourer who thinks he has 
been wronged by another, knows that neither the 
farner nor the police are likely to be of any 
assistance to him. Consequently he has to devise 
his own strategies of retaliation. 
Similarly, the means of transport are usually 
monopolised by the farmer. The Public transport 
on weekends is lirni ted to two busses in either 
direction per day after midday on Saturday. Any 
emergency cases such as 
or even maternity cases, 






resort to the 
it is only to 
phone for a taxi. On nine of the fourteen farms 
under consideration there exists a rule barring 
all labourers from even setting foot on the 'werf' 
(the farmer's yard) for anything other than work. 
'Volunteer' work is performed on Saturday mornings 
for a dop. Either cutting grass for the cows 
and calves (if there is a dairy cow on the farm), 
feeding the pigs, sweeping the werf, etc. Most 
labourers congregate at the cellar to collect 
their Saturday morning bottle in any case, so 
for an extra dop they lend a hand in doing 
something 'personal' for the farmer. Saturday 
morning work is also interpreted as 'goodwill' 
work, proving allegiance to the farmer and 
demonstrating a willingness to help. Those 
labourers who are still too drunk from the night 
before are advised not to present themselves 
for Saturday morning work, as they are usually 
punished for drunkenness. 
Prearranged maternity contingencies are usually 
the exception to the rule excluding labourers 
from the 'werf' . But even then there is 
irritation. "These people always seem to choose 
to have their babies at inconvenient times", 




related to the farmers' control 
to the property is his right to 




The two most common alternatives to drinking 
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are parties (jols which actually complement 
drinking) and sporting activities. The farmer 1 s 
permission has to be secured before an organised 
party involving outsiders can take place. Sporting 
activities involve more long-term liaison with 
the farmer. If it is a field for either soccer 
or rugby that is required, that involves putting 
land aside and all the attendant organisational 
problems. Such rna jor plans are usually initiated 
by the farmer, as the labourers are generally 
not supposed to be demanding of anything other 
than the 1 privileges' they already have. Allowing 
sporting activities to take place on the farm 
is already a major departure for the coercive 
management protagonists. It diminishes their 
control over access to the farm, and it also 
vests some initiative towards organising in the 
labourers. This is a fundamental departure from 
the state of unquestioning obedience on which 
mainstream coercive management (CM) relies. It 
is significant that the only two farms in the 
total sample of 18 that had sportsfields are 
amongst those few that do not a dept a primarily 
coercive management style. 
ii) "CRIMINALISATION" 
Unlike the city, each farm is the site of both 
production and reproduction, both of which are 
largely the responsibility of the farmer. There 
is a whole spectrum of possible 'styles' in which 
these relationships can be conducted. The struggle 
over production and the struggle over reproduction 
are compressed into one major interactional milieu 
in which the balance of power is tipped strongly 
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in favour of the farmer. Common sense would 
suggest that the balance of power under such 
circumstances should be tipped against the farmer, 
but the reality, even in 1984 when unrest in 
urban areas is reaching 1976 proportionsfl9 does 
not seem to bear that out. 
The process of keeping labour poor, disorganised 
and immobile, involves, apart from the tot system, 
the criminalisation of every response by the 
labour force that would jeopardise farmer hegemony. 
There are two sources of criminalisation: one 
is formal through the State, the other informal 
through the farmer. 







' labourer ?O I 
informal 1 law 1 
relationship 
wi 11 confine 
the r laW I 
myself here 
that really matters in the relative 
microcosm of each farm. At the outset it must 
be pointed out that there are variations in the 
degree of coercive management which depend largely 
on the farmer's own attitude to his labour force 
and his ability to control while at the same 
time extracting surplus from them. 
The farmer is usually in a position to dictate 
the terms of employment to any aspirant labourer. 
In so doing he ties the labourer and his family 
to job and house. Both can be withdrawn with 
immediate effect. "Huis leegmaak" (literally 
'house emptying' ) is one of the dreaded phrases 
that can disrupt a whole 
The time of notice can be 
family's existence. 
anything from three 
days to a month, the average being a week by 
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which time the labourer must have scouted around, 
usually on foot, to ask for work, and removal 
transport from the new employer. His bargaining 
position is substantially reduced by this lack 
of resources and time constraints.Sl 
By the employment 
is also forcing 
compliance of his 
contract's tenor, the farmer 
each labourer to ensure the 
whole family to the farmer's 
wishes. Non-compliance with this contract usually 
leads to the errant family member being 
placed under trespass, or the whole family evicted. 
In 
the 
conjunction with the employment contract 
'laws' which the farmer decrees from 
are 
time 
to time. The general tenor of these 'laws' is 
very similar to those of the old Masters and 
Servants Act?2 They deal with the 'criminalisation' 
of actions which under 'normal' conditions would 
attract only civil remedies. Disobedience, 
drunkenness, brawling, absenteeism, collective 
bargaining, using abusive language to the farmer 
or his family, using his implements or property 
without permission are all 'criminalised' by 
the farmer. These were all part of the Masters 
and Servants Act which had formally criminalised 
desertion. That is no longer possible as the 
farmer has no hold over labourers once they have 
left his services. 
Other 'laws' govern work processes and procedures, 
such as who is allowed to handle specific 
implements, chemicals, machines, etc. Then there 
is another set of 'laws' dealing with recreational 
activity. One of the largest contradictions 
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here is tacit condonement of heavy drinking on 
the one hand, but punishment of drunkenness in 
the work situation on the other. Despite this, 
the productivity of the entire work-force is 
usually reduced by between 30% and 50% on most 
Mondays. This is most measurable during the 
harvest season. On farm no. 1, 
whose daily quota is 35 tons of 
for example, 
grapes. The 
tonnages during the 1983 harvest varied 
substantially: 
On Wednesdays and Thursdays, the most productive 
days of the week the tonnages for the same grape 
variety under the same picking conditions and 
the same picking contingent were generally close 
to the quota - between 33 and 36 tons. On Mondays 
the workforce was firstly substantially depleted 
and secondly very weak. At least two labourers 
out of the 15 present could not pick up and tip 
full baskets till around midday, when they had 
regained some strength. The tonnages picked 
were, under the same conditions, around 15 and 
17. To this tonnage must be added approximately 
four tons to correct for the picked grapes left 
standing in the baskets overnight during the 
rest of the week. Realistically, therefore, 
19 and 21 tons on Mondays compares with the 3 3 
- 36 on normal days~3 
The process of 'criminalisation' is only valid 
within the parameters of the interactional milieu 
between each farmer and his labour force. In 
fact it is more accurate in this context to refer 
to the process as recrimination. 'Criminalisation' 
by definition elevates the level of interaction 
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to one of conflict. It is intrinsically punitive 
rather than conciliatory ·or cooptive. It vests 
almost dictatorial powers in the farmer who is 
at the same time the originator of the rules 
and their enforcer, in the most literal sense. 
The common feature on all the 14 farms in the 
survey is a high threshold of internal problem 
solving before handing a transgression over to 
the police. 
The punitive enforcement measures vary from farm 
to farm. Physical punishment and containment 
are commonly reported in the press ,54 and respondents 
on the four farms intensively probed in this 
survey reveal varying degrees of force. Objects 
such as sjamboks, beespiele (literally a bull-
prick - the s jambok' s little brother) hose-pipes, 
canes, fanbelts, pickaxe handles, belts and spades 
are, apart from fists the punitive weapons 
labourers claim to have been hit with. But the 
frequency of their use varies widely. The 
comparison between two of the farms, both employing 
coercive management strategies shows how one 
farm manager combines physical with structural 
coercion whereas the other relies more on 
structural. 
FARM NO 2 
The manager, an ex bank clerk and one-time amateur 
boxer is very liberal with his fists and spade 
handles in the organisation of daily duties. 
He is continuously abusive and deprecatory towards 
the labourers, and suffers from acute xenophobia. 
Of all the farmers surveyed he uses trespass 
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most to isolate outside influences from his farm. 
He is quick in temper and quite impulsive in 
terminating employment contracts with minimal 
notice. He wi tholds dop (considered in a serious 
light by the labourers), deducts from their wages 
and, the labourers claim, continuously cheats 
them at the farm store where they buy on credit. 
He has a high propensity to solve conflict and 
problems himself rather than calling the police. 
Decisions, or rather judgements are summarily 
given without much discussion or explanation 
from the labourers. Punishment is most frequently 
immediate. The labourers continuuously claim 
a high degree of inconsistency in both judgement 
and punishment. They indicate that labourers 
who are less compliant and humble towards the 
manager have the roughest time. He allows the 
NG Sendingkerk to minister to the labourers. 
He also usually allows some males of each household 
to work out but charges a R4, 00 a head per week 
rent. The right for non-farm-workers within the 
labouring families to stay on the farm was 
summarily withdrawn in August 1984 for no apparent 
reason. There is no scope whatsoever for 
collective bargaining, and any hint of organisation 
results in identification and eviction of the 
initiators of such processes. Parties are 
occasionally held, but no sport. 
The manager tacitly supports the shebeen on the 
farm, run by his domestic worker who, in return 
acts as his main informer. She, ironically, 
does not drink at all. Her standard of living 
is way above the rest of the labourers:5 
The farm has a high labour turnover (approximately 
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25% per annum) and a high 'conflict-frequency'. 
FARM NO 1 
The manager, an ex police reservist is not nearly 
as violent as his neighour (farm no. 2), yet 
adheres to the same doctrine of baasskap. He 
only beats labourers in extreme cases and when 
they violate the ban on weekend intrusions into 
his private space. His language is less abusive 
yet in his opinion the labour force is still 
in a relatively early Darwinian phase! He is 
also very protective towards the labour force 
regarding outside inf 1 uences, and does not allow 
parties or sport to take place on the farm. The 
NG Sendingkerk is allowed to minister to the 
labour force in the shed. His judgements in 
conflict cases are also summary without much 
room for discussion or explanation. Punishments 
are also executed on the spot (if physical) or 
at the end of the week (if a deduction) or at 
the end of the month (if eviction). He also 
has a high threshold of problem-solving before 
turning matters over to the police. The labourers 
also claim a high degree of inconsistency in 
attitude, which increases their insecurity. There 
is no scope whatsoever for collective bargaining, 
and any attempt at organisation results in the 
immediate identification and eviction of 
instigators. 56 There is no farm-store as such 
but the manager slaughters pigs, and his wife 
makes soaps, preserves, and knits woolens, which 
are sold to the labour force. 
The manager frowns on shebeens on the farm, but 
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has been unsuccessful in eradicating them totally. 
In the last six years he has evicted eight 
labourers for selling liquor illicitly, and 
severely punished (without evicting) another 
six for selling liquor to the labourers. He 
was equally concerned about the low productivity 
due to drunkenness, and about the enrichment 
of the shebeener outside of the parameters of 
'hard work'. Shebeening, nevertheless, still 
continues on the farm, albeit on a smaller scale 
than on farm no. 2, where it is virtually 
institutionalised. 
The farm's labour turnover is slightly lower 
(approximately 19%) than farm no. 2 and has a 
slightly lesser conflict rate. 
Given conditions such as these one would expect 
worker consciousness to be high. But a combination 
of liquor dependence coercive management and 
ideological battery inhibit organisation. 
iii) LABOUR'S RESPONSE 
The examples of organised worker response to 
the winefarming dispensation are few and far 
between, or so it seems from the literature. 
The only reported occurrences took place in the 
late 1920's and early 30's when the ANC attempted 
to spread its organisational base into the rura 1 
areas. The farmers with substantial State backing 
soon put an end to that with their violent 
response. 57 
What was notable about this situation was that 
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it was an outside, urban-based organisation taking 
up the plight of the rural workers, rather than 
the rural workers themselves organising. 
The only other occurrence I am aware of was a 
stayaway from work on one day on 16th June 1977, 
Commemoration Day of the beginnings of Soweto 
uprisings. I was unable to ascertain how many 
farms responded to the call for solidarity brought 
horne by the schoolchildren. There was definitely 
a full stayaway on farm no. 2 an act of 
immeasurable bravery considering how vulnerable 
the workers are. Judging by the speed with which 
the farmers responded with civil defence 
organisation, it must have been more widespread 
than just the one farm. But again it was urban 
organisation exerting its influence on the farms, 
not farm based consciousness rising. 
The reasons for this apparent apathy in the face 
of extremely harsh conditions lie 
dependence, 
battery. 
coercive management and 




its material conditions on wine farms is escape 
rather than confrontation. 
of escape is into liquor; 
escape off the farms. 
The primary course 
the second, physical 
Upward mobility of labour through organisation 
is impeded by the introversion and self-centredness 
that liquor dependance leads to. Drunkenness 
becomes the solution of the problems by 
di ssol uti on. It is a temporary escape that needs 
to be repeated frequently to make it seem real 
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in the long term. On the four farms under 
investigation roughly 70% of the male labourers 
are heavy drinkers, 20% are alcoholics, 8% are 
light drinkers, and 2% don 1 t drink at a11.58 Thus 
by far the commonest response is escape into 
liquor. 
The farmers/managers support this process by 
tacit condonement of shebeening in some cases, 
and encouragement of informing by offering liquor 
rewards in others. 
A very clear example of how liquor dependence 
and coercive management 
is offered by M1 s case: 
inhibit organisation 
M, an African worker, had been on the farm for 
11 years. He had taken a local 1 Coloured 1 woman 
by whom he had two children, but also had a family 
in the Transkei. A good labourer, according 
to the farmer, but both he and his woman were 
very heavy drinkers. They fought regularly over 
weekends and frequently stabbed each other with 
knives and similar objects during these fights. 
His injuries kept him out of work on many a Monday. 
The manager kept him on because he was a good 
worker. During one fight at harvest-time 1982, 
he nearly lost the use of his arm, and was out 
of action for three weeks. That seemed to shock 
him sufficiently to rethink his situation. He 
succumbed to the preachings of some Zionist group 
that he visited on another farm, and became 
converted. In a while he stopped drinking, so 
did his woman. He took it upon himself to improve 
the work-situation for himself and his fellow 
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labourers. Every day, out in the field, he would 
talk to them, not only on ..: eligion but also worker 
awareness. Slowly but surely he brought out 
attitudes in them that were ordinarily deeply 
suppressed. The attitudes spilled over into 
action. For the first time on the farm the workers 
as a group became conscious of what they considered 
to be their rights. They downed tools and went 
off for lunch at the designated times. To the 
manager this was rather puzzling and he attempted 
to find out who was behind this. He had noticed 
that M had of late become a less pliable worker. 
He had also noticed that M had become a self-
styled leader of the labourers, and would set 
the pace of their work. Whenever there was 
conflict between the manager and any of the 
labourers, the manager noticed that the working 
pace of the whole team had slowed down. He had 
also noticed that the labourers muttered, but 
did not articulate openly, things about pay 
increases with greater frequency than before. 
He cornered the wi tvoet of the farm, laced him 
with wine, and found out that M had been talking 
to the labourers about their rights. Maybe it 
was only a coincidence of images, but the way 
the manager expressed this process was:"M het 
die volk (meaning the workers) se koppe 
dronkgepraat" M talked them into a drunken 
confusion. What is interesting about this 
expression is that it defines worker consciousness 
as an intoxicant, an opiate. By imp1ication 
that is false consciousness as opposed to the 
correct consciousness epitomised by unquestioning 
submission. Totted consciousness thus stands 
in diametric opposition to worker consciousness. 
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M was summarily dismissed and labour 
None of the relations restored to 'normal'. 
other labourers took up M' s impetus towards 
improving their lot. 
Perhaps another expression of how liquor is used 
to inhibit labourer's progress, and ultimately 
pay increases comes from D, one of the labourers 
on farm no. 2. 
"As 'n man 'n slag iets w il opbou en voorentoe 
kom, en hy werk goed, en hy se virrie Boer: 'Baas, 
hoekom doen ons dit nie s6 nie'. Dan se die 
baas vir hom: '0, my klong, jy hou jou slim'. 
En as ons tshaila, dan se die baas:'Jy, kom hier, 
my klong, laat ek jou iets gek as jy so slim 
is'. En hy gee die man 'n dop en hy gee die man 
nogga dop. En die man se: 'Gesondheid baas'. 
En die Boer se: I Die klong is 'n slimjan, laat 
ek hom nog 'n dop gee'. En die man se:'Gesondheid 
baas' , en hy drink. Die ander 5~ggend, die man skrik wakker, en hy's 'n bobbejaan". 
The second type of escape is away from coercive 
management farmers to cooptive management farmers. 
There is a growing trend away from coercive 
management, although by 1984 I estimate that 
only approximately 20% of the farms in the 
Stellenbosch area had made the transition. Of 
the 18 farms surveyed 14 ( 77,7%) 
labour force by means 




of the male 






expressed the wish to work 
(onbeskofte en oorlamse) 
farmer/manager. 30% Expressed the wish to work 
in towns for more money, and the remainder ( 15%) 
were resigned to staying on their farms. I have 
already referred to the aspirations of the children 
of the labourers .60 
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On cooptive management farms the wages, the 
conditions of housing, recreational facilities, 
and the quality of the relationship between 
manager/farmer and the 
far preferable to the 
make that transition. 
labour force,61 all seem 
labourers who desire to 
The trend on these farms 
seems to 
of the 
entail raising the standard 






compensate in the 
of reproducing the 
can favourably compete with 
conditions. The increased 
is anticipated 
long term for 
labour force. 
in return will 
the higher cost 
The tot system 
is incompatible with the aims of this programme. 
social workers are Indeed, 




"The planning of a prevention programme for this 
community must aim at the total upliftrnent of 
the entire community. Prevention of alcohol abuse 
and the establishment of a healthy, independent 
community will be the long term objectives. In 
this way, the farm-owner will be assured of better 
production and the community of farm workers wi 11 
achieve greater independence in determining their 
own needs, as well as in decision-making and 
problem-solving" .62 
Bearing in mind that there are differences in 
the style of cooptive management, there are 
nevertheless some common features which emerge: 
they recruit workers who have a higher education, 
not only in terms of schooling, but notably skilling 
on the job. They prefer workers who are prepared 
to shoulder responsibility, and offer incentives 
to encourage it. To this end they differentiate 
markedly in rewards for the differing skills levels. 
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(Tractor drivers get R60,00 a week as opposed 
to labourers R48,00). They encourage worker 
committees and the process of airing grievances 
by negotiation. They encourage workers to occupy 
their recreational time constructively and make 
facilities (TV-rooms, halls, movie-shows, sports 
fields) available to them. The level of housing 
provision is far higher than on coercive management 
farms. They usually have full electricity, 3-
4-roomed dwellings, indoor bathrooms and toilets, 
indoor running water as well as water heaters/ 
either electric or solar). 
They encourage labourers to 
vegetable and flower gardens, 
cultivate their 
for which land 
own 
and 
water facilities are made available. 
The tot system does usually not operate on these 
farms, and heavy drinking is penalised. 
of the children is encouraged and the 
centre for labourers (Kromrne Rhee) 






The coopti ve management farmers are usually more 
receptive to requests for emergency assistance 
than their coercive counterparts. In general 
there exists a more congenial atmosphere indicating 
mutual respect rather than antagonism and conflict. 
Conflict is diffused by negotiation rather than 
by punitive measures. One farm, I am told, even 
has a 'people's court' where transgressions are 
adjudicated by way of a vote of the labourers 
themselves, under the chairmanship of the farmer. 
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looking. Then there is outright breaking and 
entering. The cellar containing the wine was 
broken into five times in eight years. One of 
these break-ins has been described on p .165 above. 




their own 'mosblikke' during three of 
months. All the serious drinkers make 
Grapes and vegetables were also a source of income 
subsidation. They were either stolen and sold to 
itinerant hawkers in exchange for other groceries 
or to pay for credit. Often they were donated 
to friends/relatives or employers in the towns. 
This excludes, of course, the grapes and vegetables 
they consumed themselves. The same applied to 
the honey, although it was more difficult to 
harvest. 
A particularly enterprising labourer, who had 
volunteered to care for the pigs had a side-line 
of piglets and pig-food. These he sold to labourers 
on a farm (a coopti ve management farm) where the 
labourers were allowed to keep limited numbers 
of livestock for themselves. He explained the 
diminished numbers to the manager as deaths due 
to injury (a sow quite frequently injures a piglet 
when attempting to stand up or roll over). This 
side-line continued for a number of years before 
the information leaked to the farmer. 
Another lucrative side-line this labourer, a tractor 
driver, devised, involved 'borrowing' a battery 
from one of the tractors and then hiring it out to 
power a TV-set. The TV-set-owner in turn, a post-
office worker who rented a house from a neighbouring 
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farmer, charged other labourers 20c an evening 
for viewing, and sold a little liquor at the same 
time. The labourer was caught out when he was 
too drunk to return the battery by sunrise. 
Cheating the farmer at harvest time also helped 
to augment meagre wages. Particularly when picking 
was paid for on a piece-work basis, the number 
of baskets picked was inflated when the farmer 
clipped the family's card. 
In all of these cases the labourers justified 
their actions as necessary. There were, according 
to them, so few other means of 'making a little 
extra' . In the case of inflating basket numbers 
they expressed it more cogently: "Die Boer force 
ons on n paar maandjies by te sit, anders kan 
ons nie by bly nie" (the farmer forces us to add 
a few baskets, otherwise we can't keep up (with 
living costs)). Very little stigma is attached 
to these transgressions in the eyes of the 
labourers. These 'crimes' are considered normal 
means of redressing the wrong of underpayment. 
All labourers on all the 14 farms complained 
bitterly about the low wages and the cost of living 
which escalates faster than their wagesft4 Over 
the last eight years they have received an average 
annual wage increase of 11,5%. 65 Statements such 
as "innie ou dae wassie lewe nog goedkoop gewees" 
bear out their impression that there has been 
no progress, no advancement in nearly ten years. 
Yet some of them realise that the farmer's wealth 
emanates from their labour: 
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"Se vir my, S, wiese hanne werkie wingerd, hie? 
Kan die Boer allie drywe self sny? Kan hy self 
wingerd sny en skoffel en pype skyf? Help die 
Boer se vrou lote vasbind? Wie sit oppie trekker? 
Dis die twee hanne (shows his hands) wat die Boer 
ryk maak. Kyk daa koep hy hom weer 'n nuwe kar 
en die ou ene' s nog nuut. En daar' s nie eers 'n 
badkamer innie blok vir onsie !" 66 
This statement must be seen against the continuous 
denunciations on the part of coercive managers 
that the labourers are hopeless drunken fools 
who keep their houses like pigsties and break 
all the windows, that they are stupid and will 
never be able to uplift themselves or ever survive 
if left on their 
goodwill of the 
all. .... 
own, that it's by the grace and 
farmers that they can eat at 
In an interview in April 1983, an English-speaking 
farmer who considers himself 'open-minded', but 
whom I would classify as a coercive management 
protagonist, expressed himself as follows: 
I'd be very happy to pay these bastards more if 
it would improve their productivity, but it just 
makes no bloody difference. They just spend more 
on booze and I sit with the bloody problem ..... . 
I've never had as many problems as in the last 
two years from these drunken shits. If it isn't 
from the H (a bottle store) then it's from the 
shebeens that they get it. I've cut them down 
to a bottle on Friday nights but they go to they 
shebeen and get more. At lunchtime the sods go 
there and end up bloody fighting in the vineyards 
in the afternoon. And my driver drunk on the 
tractor. . . . . . I reckon the only way to get these 
Coloured bastards to work properly is to work 
them hard treat them like shit and take no 
nonsense!..... I'm thinking of kicking all these 
drunken idiots off the farm and getting me a 
bunch of Blacks ... ". 
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Under the circumstances of these opposing 
perceptions of each other it is not surprising 
that the labourers, not in any organised fashion 
- we have seen that that is too dangerous - lash 
out at the farmers both directly and indirectly: 
During the six years that I was in charge of 
transporting the grapes to the winery there were 
numerous incidents of stones and pairs of scissors 
in the baskets. These hard objects were capable 
of severly damaging the de-stalking machines at 
the winery and usually held up the grape deli very 
process of all the farmers delivering to that 
co-operative for anything up to two hours. These 
incidents were usually interpreted by the farmers 
as negligence on the part of the labourers, or 
the deeds of children playing with stones amidst 
the pickers. But as I became more familiar with 
some labourers, it became clear that some of these 
incidents were not mere oversights but conscious 
attempts at resistance (toe-wrecking. It was the 
easiest, safest, most anonymous way of expressing 
unorganised anger not only at the farmer who 'owned' 
them, but at all the farmers delivering to the 
co-op ("allie Boere"). 
The same motivation applies to some of the other 
'accidents' that involved damage to the farmer's 
property: driving a tractor into a ditch, 
vandalising a borehole, letting animals out of 
enclosures to run onto the road, dismantling a 
pump, opening up dam-sluice taps to let the precious 
water out, in juring animals (nearly fa tally) . 
All of these incidents took place on farm no. 
1 in the last four years. On farm no. 2 some 
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unidentified labourer/s broke into the manager's 
store, and apart from helping themselves to some 
of the contents, vandalised it and defecated on 
the counter. This action was met with awe and 
approval by the rest of the labour force once 
it was discovered, despite the fact that they 
depend on the store for groceries and credit. 
They felt that it had been deserved by the manager, 
who, they claimed, was continuously cheating them. 
(Most of them could not read the prices, and the 
long calculations of how much they still owed 
the farmer were too much for their innumeracy). 
The following incident which became elevated to a legend 
on farm no. 2 is told and retold with great relish 
by the labourers: the manager, the ex-amateur-
boxer, had the habit of 'challenging' labourers 
to boxing matches in the barn on rainy wintry 
days when outside work was impossible. They were 
firstly not in his weight division and secondly 
not as experienced as he, and thirdly, given the 
power balance were in no position to refuse the 
challenge. By making it seem like a 'fair' sporting 
match he was actually 'legitimately' beating them 
up. What's more, he had the habit of starting 
to knock the labourers around while they were 
still busy changing gloves. The entire process 
was very humiliating and enfuriating to the 
labourers. One day, however, a Black worker became 
so enfuriated with the manager, that he felled 
him with one blow (so the legend goes) to the 
great jubilation of his fellows. The boxing matches 
ceased from that day onwards. 
In less heroic terms farmer no. 1 has had stones 
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thrown at his truck out of the darkness. A less 
direct, more symbolic incident was breaking into 
his house and depriving him of the symbolic source 
of power- a revolver.67 
All these crimes have very strong overtones of 
resistance. They are sporadic, usually anonymous 
examples of lashing out and lashing back at coercive 
management strategies. In the context that I 
have attempted to describe above they can be seen 
as alternatives to organised resistance. 
C CONCLUSION 
Burdened with a far greater financial load and 
'managerial' responsibility in reproducing their labour 
force than their urban counterparts, most farmers 
have chosen the cheapest, and, in their opinion, the 
most effective way of doing so: coercive management. 
This is a method, constituted by a host of structures, 
practices and attitudes, whereby a labour force, indeed 
the entire working class of that agricultural sector, 
is reproduced to meet the perceived needs of capital. 
The State has, for its part, largely refrained from 
interfering with this method. In fact, through the 
absence of substantial legislative intervention, it 
has actively condoned the coercive management. 
Winefarming capital has, therefore, been allowed to 
extract surplus from its labour force largely by 
establishing its own labour relations. The relative 
importance of these primary producers in the economic 
and political make-up of the ruling class has been 
of substantial assistence in bringing about this 
situation. 
This has been most notably the case with the State's 
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refusal to outlaw the tot system. The tot system, 
one of the most important elements of coercive control, 
institutionalises heavy drinking, and in some cases, 
alcoholism. The effect of perennial high alcohol 
intake on the labour force is physicaJ, mental, 
psychological underdevelopment. This effect does 
not only apply to the labourers themselves but, to 
their entire families indeed, to the greatest part 
of the rural labour force. 
Considering the skills that are required of winefarming 
labour, this process of underskilling through 
overconsumption of liquor is not contradictory. In 
the system of coercive management: a poorly-skilled 
workforce is what the farmers desire. Liquor 
dependence, therefore, also contributes to locking 
labourers into farming, making it i~possible for them 
to compete successfully with urban labourers. 
Equally important is the effect that the tot system 
has on shaping the labourer's perceptions of themselves 
and their situations. The craving for liquor, 
historically induced by the winefarmers, mystifies 
the use of liquor as a control mechanism. By craving 
it and continuously consuming liquor the labourers 
are perpetually consenting to their own subjugation, 
and underdevelopment. 




other practices, inhibit 
farmers to reproduce their 
organisation, 
labour force 
The responses which coercive management has evoked 
have been predominantly escapist. Those few actions 
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which entail lashing out and lashing back at the system 
have been and are sporadic and unorganised. They do 
not compare with the organised rebellion of adolescent 
1 primitive rebels 1 so revered in the literature. 68 Farm 
labourers who strike back at the system are not caught 
in the transition from precapitalist to capitalist 
modes of production, nor have they recently been 
proletarianised. Their actions are, given the 
circumstances of their bondage, the only viable form 




This study has shown that the ambivalence of liquor as 
a commodity can be, and has been, exploited by liquor 
capital and the State to play a part in reproducing the 
Black and 'Coloured' working class to their respective 
needs. The overtness or subtlety by which such 
exploitation has occurred has depended on two factors. 
The first factor has been the extent of the recognition by 
the respective parts of the working class of the manner in 
which liquor was used 'against' them. The second factor 
has been the intensity of the opposition to such use of 
liquor from other fractions of capital whose labour force 
was being undermined by excessive drinking. The fractions 
of capital opposed to the excessive use of liquor entered 
into alliance with religious and moralistic g~oupings. 
The ambivalence of liquor lies therein that it is at 
once an accepted recreational commodity, which helps 
workers to relax and enjoy themselves after work, and 
at the same time it is potentially destructive of 
productivity if its leisure use spills over into the 
workplace .I 
The implications of this ambivalence are numerous as 
well as complex. For if liquor production is to take 
place on a capitalist basis, and producers are to strive 
to expand profits then they will have to enlarge production 
and distribution. As soon as this deleteriously affects 
the accumulation potential of other fractions of capital, 
they may change their erstwhile tolerance, or even support 
of liquor production, into opposition, and they will 
put pressure on the State to intercede. The strength 
of the contending forces at the time will substantially 
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affect the intensity and efficacy with which the State 
will intercede. 
There are numerous examples in our history in which varying 
levels of intercession were undertaken by the State. 
Thus chapter two has revealed partial prohibition 
of consumption by the working class, total prohibition 
of consumption by sectors of the working class and State 
control of production and distribution of certain alcoholic 
commodities. 
criminalised .2 
Even, at times, liquor production has been 
But the complexity of the conflict between fractions 
of capital is deepened by the fact that the State is 
no mere impartial arbiter over this feud. Its task of 
reproducing the working class to the needs of capital 
in general is fraught with contradictions: 
Firstly, the State has to ensure conditions under which 
capitalist production and reproduction are favourable. 
In the case of the Black urban proletariat that implies: 
a) securing a labour supply by prising subsistence farmers 
off the land and proletarianising them. 
b) criminalising most forms of independent survival 
so that people are compelled to sell their labour. 
c) providing collective consumption items at minimal 
cost to the ruling class by exploiting the consumption 
expenditure on liquor by the Blacks themselves. 
d) ensuring control through dependence and coerci 'le 
management. 
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In all of these four aspects liquor production and 
distribution can, and has been used by the State itself 
to shape the Black urban working class. 
Secondly, the regional requirements of capital in general 
are dependent on the composition of capital in each region, 
the type of production undertaken there, and the labour 
relations demanded by the dominant form of capital in 
that region. 
Thirdly, the State is itself no mere body over and above 
capital ministering to its needs. It is penetrated by 
capital and ideological groupings in such a way that it 
becomes itself an agglomeration of different factors whose 
strategies relating to liquor matters may at times conflict. 
It is argued that this complex and contradictory situation 
is not one capable of a clear resolution. At best, 
measures can be introduced from time to time to ameliorate 
the flagrancy of some contradictions or adverse affects. 
The Soweto uprisings of 1976 starkly revealed the 
contradictions which underlay both the production and 
distribution of liquor, and the deeper rifts in the society 
as a whole. The reaction of the State to the uprising 
were clearly visible efforts of social engineering. Other 
interventions by the State have been less visible. 
However, they have been found to be equally far-reaching 
in their effects on parts of the working class. Indeed 
the dramatic events of 1976 and our understanding of 
the reshaping which followed provided a convenient 
theoretical handle with which to grasp the complex 
interrelationship between capital, the State, and liquor. 
Thus, in the case of urban Blacks, the crucial reshaping 
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device relating to liquor was the decriminalisation of 
shebeens. Its effect was: 
a) to allow liquor capital to expand its markets; 
b) to shape the urban Black population to antagonistic 
classes. Shebeeners will become petit-boureois; 
c) to mask the blatancy of liquor distribution as part 
of an ideological repertoire; 
d) to change the basis of finance for the reproduction 
of urban Blacks .. 
These and other reshaping processes are by no measure 
a solution to the problems which motivated the uprisings. 
Those contradictions run far deeper. But they did 
demonstrate the overall dynamics amongst liquor capital, 
the state and the urban working class. Moreover, it 
demonstrated that the structure of the liquor industry 
necessitates a distribution dispensation which will allow 
increasing quantities of liquor to reach urban Blacks, 
unimpeded by over-zealous policing measures. 
The structure of the liquor industry is, however, no 
mere coincidence. It exists in its present form because 
of the peculiar relationship it has had to the incumbents 
of State power throughout its history. This applies 
particularly to primary liquor capital in the wine-growing 
Western Cape. 
These farmers, were the first and most important grouping 
of capitalist agriculture at the Cape. They consequently 
enjoyed considerable access to the rulers who, at times, 
were accommodating in their legislative enactments. This 
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was particularly so once the winefarmers organised 
themselves into an economic and political pressure group 
in the late nineteenth century. This grouping, the 
Afrikaner Bond was the forerunner of the Afrikaner 
Broederbond which, in the early two decades of this 
century, launched itself into a trajectory that would 
ultimately secure State power for itself and its 
ideological allies. 
The winefarmers were an important component of this 
alliance. They were the first manifestation of indigenous 
capital, Afrikaner capital. With their resources 
constituting the initial capital, Afrikaner finance capital 
was launched. They were advantageously placed to benefit 
from moves towards extending the role of capitalist 
agriculture. The liquor industry was structured in such 
a way that, despite perennial surplusses the wine-farmers 
were guaranteed accumulation by fixed prices and 
monopolised marketing. But while production was structured 
towards efficiency, distribution was hampered by 
prohibitionist legislation. 
The fact that the State extended its approval to the 
1979 agreement whereby the liquor industry was monopolised 
even further than had been the case prior to 1976, is 
enough evidence to demonstrate that the capital-State 
alliance that was the basis of reform initiatives was 
working in favour of liquor capital. 
The interaction between liquor 
State took on a different form 
capital, 
in the 
the Western Cape 'Coloured' working class. 
labour and 
reproduction 
In a region where 
strongest, and where 
primary 
the 
liquor capital was at 






and is the consumer of by far the bulk of wine produced 
in the country, prohibition did not seem apposite. Yet 
the legal distribution allowed to 'Coloureds' prior to 
1962 was limitedto white-owned outlets in the white areas, 
and the ubiquitous tot system on the farms. 'Coloureds' 
were in 1962, by a similar process of cooption as is 
currently happening to Black shebeeners, allowed to become 
legal distributors. Again, a petit - bourgeoisie was 
'created' through liquor distribution. 
Despite the strength of liquor capital in the region 
prohibitionist pressure did not allow for 'satisfactory' 
distribution. By a process of collusion the State and 
liquor capital generated a situation whereby symbolic 
policing allowed vast illicit distribution to take place, 
while at the same time maintaining a facade of deference 
to the prohibitionist lobby. 
Gusfield has argued that the legal restrictions on liquor 
distribution in the USA were promulgated in the knowledge 
of their unenforcability. Consequently their main purpose 
was symbolic from the outset. 4 While this argument has 
some merit if applied to Blacks in this country it would 
be wise to look to the symbolic import of enforcement 
process as well. Burman has clearly shown that the way 
in which legislation is applied and interpreted 
substantially affects its symbolic and instrumental 
efficacy.5 
The case study in this thesis on 'Coloured' shebeens 
has demonstrated that symbolic enforcement of restrictive 
distribution legislation has a profound impact on the 
method of maintaining State control over the 'Coloured' 
townships. By a process of selective enforcement the 
State, through its police force, allows some shebeens 
to exist on the condition that they allow themselves 
213 
to be coopted into an uneasy alliance with it. The 
shebeens and their gangs are allowed by proxy to police 
the townships in such a manner as to maintain and reproduce 
their illicit liquor dealing. The arbitrariness of 
selective enforcement, however, usually precludes long 
term accumulation and hence, class stratification from 
taking place in case of shebeens and gangs. 
In the process 
means the gangs 
of policing the townships 





in a situation where it would otherwise be hard -won and 
secondly, retard political organisation and recreational 
activity. In so doing selective enforcement contributes 
towards keeping the urban working class relatively docile 
while at the same time encourages greater liquor 
consumption. Both the needs of liquor capital and the 
State are thereby met. 
The case study of the manner in which the winefarming 
yet another different labour force is reproduced reveals 
dynamic. In this case there are no 





and extended reproduction. The role that liquor is allowed 
to play is far more instrumental and far more overt than 
in urban situations. 
Farmers have been able to demand greater latitude from 
the State because of their relatively heavier burden 
in reproducing the labour force. Collective consumption 
items such as land, housing, water and occasionally 
electricity and recreational facilities, are largely 
the responsibility of the farmers. They, too, have to 
'police' their labour force. The method the majority 
of them have used successfully for this purpose is, what 
I have called coercive management. 
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Quintessential to coercive management is the tot system, 
the administration of which was deregulated by the State 
and vested in the discretion of the farmers themselves. 
Not only does the tot system and its resultant heavy 
drinking contribute towards the underdevelopment of the 
labourers themselves, but it also substantially reduces 
the chances of their entire families of moving up in 
the world, and out of farming. The tot system can thus 
be seen as suitably skilling or rather deskilling a whole 
population to the perceived needs of agricultural capital. 
But the ambivalence of liquor has a consequence which 
is most blatant in the farming situation . The alcohol 
dependence which is structurally induced in the greatest 
part of the labour force provides an ideological hold 
on the labourers. Their craving for liquor implies that 
they approve of its effects. Their desire for it masks 
the fact that it is institutionally administered. What 
is more their resultant moral and economic impoverishment 
is used as a rationale for keeping them underdeveloped, 
poor and dependent. The tot retards if not the desire, 
then the ability of farm labourers to organise and improve 
their conditions. In so doing it contributes to their 
remaining occupationally and spatially immobile. 
The second aspect of coercive management is a combination 
of criminalisation and recriminalisation. Garland and 
Young have contended that it is too simplistic to see 
the State as the only source of punishment 6 or, as they 
call it, penality. Other institutions too wield, albeit 
sometimes 
the same 
informally, the power 
effect. The farmers 
of 
of 
a blatant example of its efficacy. 
criminalisation with 
the Western Cape are 
Indeed, the process 
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of recriminalisation takes Burman's argument a little 
further. The formal abolition of the Masters and Servants 
Act, and the subsequent recriminalisation of most of 
its provisions, serve the farmers on a symbolic level. 
On the face of it, the law is repealed, whereas in reality 
the farmers' hegemonic position is so powerful that the 
repeal has no instru~ental effect. It merely has a symbolic 
advantage to them. 
In its manipulation of liquor in the developing South 
African social formation, decriminalisation, selective 
enforcement, criminalisation 7 and even recriminalisation 
have been used by dominant social groupings as conditions 
have changed. Any intervention designed to deal with 
the undoubted social problems surrounding liquor would 
have to address itself to the full social matrix that 
this thesis has sought to portray. 
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APPENDIX I 
DETAILS OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR AGRICULTURAL SECTION 













Young men living on five winefarms but work-
ing in towns. 
Children on four farms at school-going age 
(25 boys, 23 girls) 
Farm labourers, both men and women on nine 
farms 
Drivers (both tractor and truck) working 
for 17 farms 
Girls no longer at school; working as chars 
and nursemaids in middle-class Cape Flats 
families. These girls live on four of the 
farms. 
Farmers or farm managers of 18 farms 
Winery managers 
Assistant winery managers 
Winery labourers (migrants) 
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APPENDIX II 
DETAILS OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED FOR SHEBEEN SECTION 















Gangsters in Elsies River BFK, DBM 
Peripheral part-time gangsters in Elsies 
River 
Shebeen-owners in Elsies River 
Managers of Elsies River retail liquor 
outlets 
Social worker - Thea De Vrouw 
Girl-friends and mothers of gangsters 
interviewed en route to prison-visits 
Garden Village gangsters BFK, DBM 
SANCA employees 
Employees of Stellenbosch Farmers Winery 
Ex-employee of Stellenbosch Farmers Winery 
South African Breweries employee 
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17. Wilkinson, P and Webster, D "Living in the 
18. 
interstices of capitalism: notes towards a 
conceptual redefinition of 'informal sector' activity 
in South African cities". Unpublished mimeograph, 
University of the Witwatersrand 1982. p.l. 
Van Der Merwe, H and Groenewa ld 
and Social Change Among Coloured 
Africa. Juta, Cape Town. 1976. 
C J Occupational 
People in South 
19. Wilkinson and Webster p.8-9. 
20. Wilkinson and Webster have adapted a table 
illustrating the range of in.:::ome opportunities 
in South Africa from Hart (1973} by Beaven and 
Mabin (1978)(3}. It is reproduced as Table I in 
their paper. 
21. Wilkinson and Webster, p.4. 
22. Wilkinson and Webster p.lO. 
23. This dependency will be expanded on below p.115 
2 4. See be low p. 123-5 
25. I am not suggesting that everyone lives one km 
away from a bottle store, it is a hypothetical 
situation which is fairly average in areas such 
as Elsies River, and Clarke's Estate. 
26. KWV Annual Report, 1982 Paarl p.7. 
27. Financial Mail 20.2.81 p.720. 
28. Njokweni, H M T. "Shebeens: A Contribution Towards 
A Study in Social Cohesion and Social 
Disintegration". Paper read at the Annual Conference 
of the Association of Sociologists of Southern 
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Africa, Rhodes University, Grahamstown. July 1981, 
p.6. This speech epitomised liquor industry opinion 
about shebeens in Black areas. The speaker was 
subsequently invited to address liquor marketing 
teams aimed at the shebeen clientele. See also 
Gordin, J. "The Lilies of the Field were put to 
Shame". Frontline September 1982 p.46, and "By 
virtue of the illegal nature of their activities, 
it stands to reason that shebeeners and runners 
would be subject to continuous police survei lance. 
Those involved are not deterred as far as they 
are concerned, they cater for the needs of the 
people who are denied proper facilities". This 
is an extract from a memorandum compiled by the 
National Tavern Association (undated but probably 
towards the end of 1980) p.3. 
29. See below P·98 
30. House of Assembly Hansard Parliamentary Debates 
29th March 1984, Member for Lanlaagte (Conservative 
Party) Mr S P Barnard column 4026- 4035. 
31. Malan Commission supra p.lO. 
32. Malan Commission p.7. 







34. Malan Commission p.4. 




1961 Minister of 
Parliamentary Debates 
Mr W C Malan, Member 
Parliamentary Debates 
Justice, Erasmus col 
36. This is seen 
lobby, or a 
Distribution' 
as a concession to 






37. Many thousands of people who identify themselves 
as gangsters have found formal employment and have 
loosened their gang connections a 1 i ttle. (Persona 1 
observation from four years of association with 
street/prison gangsters; corroborated by many 
'ourookers', seasoned gangsters). 
38. I was assisted by the strongest gang in the area 
at the time, the Born Free Kids, whose privileged 
access to information of that kind brought us closer 
to a 'true' figure than any other research method. 
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39. One of the five retail outlets on principle did 
not supply shebeens. 
40. Supplied by Jaques Roux of Stellenbosch Farmers 
Winery low-price wine manager. There are at 
least 400 shebeens in Black townships in the greater 
Cape Town area - Cape Times 26.2.1982. 
41. See above P·70 
42. All the five bottle-store managers in Elsies River 
Clarke's Estate agreed that faster turnover, 
bulk-discounts, lower overheads, no taxes, and 
the practice of decanting the liquor from larger 
containers into the consumer's own container, enables 
shebeens to sell 750 me of low-grade wine at 70-
85c/bottle compared with the 81-87c/bottle at the 
legal outlets (1982 prices). Decanting was 
particularly prevalent during the 'Swartvarkie' 
phase of liqueur distribution, when low-grade was 
sold in 2 0 litre black plastic containers. Public 
outcry spearheaded by a faction of liquor capital 
that was marketing low-cost wine more 'responsibly' 
(only in 4,5 litre containers) forced the State 
to outlaw this method of surplus disposal by June 
1983. 
43. These figures are very difficult to quantify exactly. 
Firstly, the Cape Wine and Spirits institute, which 
computes production figures and statistics for 
the grape-based sector of the liquor industry does 
not publicise information of this nature, but retains 
it only for in-industry use. My applications for 
the release of information were turned down. 
Stellenbosch Farmers Winery, the largest single 
producer and distributor of low-priced wine admit 
that 70% of their low-priced and slightly better 
than low-priced wine sales are located within a 
30 km radius from Cape Town ( Stellenbosch Farmers 
Winery management summary on low-price market manager 
± 1980). Managers at 3 co-operative wineries 
(Welmoed, Helderberg and Eersterivier) estimate 
the amount of wine consumed by farm labourers in 
tot-wine to be between 3% and 5% of all wine 
produced. Peninsula sales alone account for 66% 
of Stellenbosch Farmers Winery's national low-
priced volumes. 
4 4. For the Western Cape in 19 8 0 low-price wine 
constituted 71% of all grape-derived liquor consumed. 
(Extrapolated from CWSI statistics made available 
by Stellenbosch Farmers Winery abovenamed management 
summary). National figures were unfortunately not 
made available to me). 
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45. See above, Chapter 3. 
46. Several high-ranking officials at Stellenbosch 
Farmers Winery, interviewed in January 19 8 2, spoke 
about their delicate situation (Dave Hughes, Consumer 
Relations Manager, Sue Birch, Black Market 
Manageress). Stellenbosch Farmers Winery did not 
market 'Swartvarkies'. It was predominantly the 
co-ops which resorted to this 'irresponsible' form 
of marketing. Also see above, footnote 42. 
4 7. Interviewed with Hugh Solomons low-price manager 
6.1.82 Stellenbosch Farmers Winery. I have not 
come across evidence to the contrary. 
48. eg. Correspondences between businesses and 
Department of Commerce and Tourism or Department 
of Justice or eg. Soweto Taverners Association 
and their Journal E'spotini. 
49. Dave Hughes Interview 4.1.1982 Stellenbosch 
Farmers Winery Consumer Relations Manager. 
50. The Soweto Taverners Association (STA) and (NTA) 
National Taverners Association, have the appearance 
of being organised by the shebeeners themselves. 
In fact, they receive substantial organisational 
and resource back-up from both sides of liquor 
capital grape-based and beer. Interview Sue 
Birch Stellenbosch Farmers Winery 4.1.1982. 
51. The quantity presumption for illicit 
obviously does not operate in the case of 
retailers. See above footnote 15. 
dealing 
licenced 
52. See above P·58 
53. The manageress of one of the bottle stores in Elsies 
River maintained that the majority of her shebeen 
clients were women whose men had either left them 
voluntarily, or had been incarcerated, or become 
injured, unemployed or alcoholic. (Personal 
interview, October 1981). 
54. All other personal names are fictitious whereas 
the gang-names are real. 
I visited Joker's shebeen regularly at various 
times of day and night at least three days a week 
for the three months November December 1981, 
and January 1982. Thereafter my visiting frequency 
dropped to a monthly or once-every-two months update 
visit lasting as long as it needed to. Throughout 
the period, from June 1981 to the present, I 
been in weekly contact with members of the 
in whose beat Joker operates/operated. They 





55. Pinnock, Don Towards an Understanding of the 
Structure, Function, and Cause of Gang Formation 
in Cape Town. Unpublished MA Thesis University 
of Cape Town 1982 p.7- Defence Gangs. 
56. Pinnock, supra p.59-72. 
57. See Haysom, N Towards an Understanding of Prison 
Gangs, Institute of Criminology, University of 
Cape Town 1981. 
58. Pinnock, D supra p.7-10. 
59. Compare a British study of working class counter 
school culture: Learning to Labour (how working 
class kids get working class jobs) By Paul E Willis 
1980 Gower p.57. 
60. Big-buyer is the slang term for liquor dealer. 
61. Merchant or mert (merd) is the term for drug-dealer. 
62. This is not an attempt to be corny, melodramatic, 
poetic, nor am I venturing into amateur novel-
writing. I am attempting to convey the inversion 
of values where informal sector activity looks 
convincingly far better from most points of view 
than formal employment. 
63. It is interesting to note the conflation of the 
ruling White class with their most visible 
'instrumental' organ, the police, into the single 
term Boere. The term is also applied to policemen 
who do not share the ruling class' pigmentation, 
or to English-speaking South Africans who display 
racist or bossy tendencies. Boere, in this context, 
merely means "Whites", whereas it often includes 
the meaning of cops, fuzz, racist pigs. 
64. Lighties or small-fries. 
65. See Haysom, N p.6. 
66. The range of goods, services, processes which are 
cornrnoditised takes on enormous proportions in an 
environment where 'rehabilitation' involves the 
institutionalised denial of some of the most basic 
human needs. Prisoners have to buy their personal 
67. 
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safety from physical attack or sexual harrassment, 
either by paying regularly for it, or by joining 
a prison gang (which in itself involves denial 
of individual action and motivations). This is 
particularly prevalent in big communal cells, where 
up to 40 prisoners inhabit a space of approximately 
eight by six metres. (Personal observation during 
prison visit at Pollsmore, Victor Verster and Bienne 
Donne Prisons on 28th May 1984). 
For example, two eggs, four cigarettes 
a packet, just enough sugar or salt, 
to see a family through one meal. 
rather than 
tea, coffee 
68. In this case it would have been either a hawker's 
licence or a general dealer's licence. 
69. Six further members were serving prison terms ranging 
from six months to seven years. 
70. Common knowledge on the Cape Flats ; and 
D Elsies River. University of Cape Town, 
of Criminology 1980. 
Pinnock, 
Institute 
71. DBMD in tattoo language. 
72. Mongrels (MG 
For history 
17. 
or MG$); BFK =Born Free Kids tattoos. 
of Mongrels see Pinnock, 1982, p.l6-
73. The reformatories are commonly known amongst the 
gangsters as the high-schools of crime, prison 
being the University. See Pinnock, 1982, Chapter 7. 
74. See Slabbert, M and Van Rooyen J H Some Implications 
-"o....::f:---=T:-'a~t.;;-t..;:__;.o...:o_i_n~g __ I--'n~-:-a--=-n"""d __ O-:-u-:-t'-s_l_· _d-'e-::::--P-::r:-i_s_o_n . Ins t i t u t e 
of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 1978. 
Facial tattoos in particular jeopardise finding 
formal sector employment. 
75. Midgeley J : "Children on Trial" (a study of juvenile 
justice) in R Graser (ed) South African Studies 
in Criminology 1975. Cape Town p.l07. 
76. He managed to procure forged papers for his driver's 
licence from an ex-prison contact. 
77. He collected his supplies initially by hiring a 
taxi driven by an old prison-contact. 
78. One of his 
face) which 
the face 
gang nicknames was Vuilgesig (dirty-
is descriptive of tattoos all over 
having the connotation of an old-time 
gangster, 
of a 'dog' 





79. Scarface and Joker did not inform their forces 
that this was merely a strategy. They were deceiving 
even their own allies by this strategy. 
80. This is Joker's interpretation of his response. 
This information was not procured from the opposition 
shebeener. 
81. More about this aspect below P~15 
82. Their expansion into stolen goods only happened 
in June 1982, but is included in this context to 
illustrate the themes I am pursuing. 
83. Compare the change of style of operations imposed 
on gangsters once they upgraded their weaponry 
to guns. In 'Property Crimes and the Poor: Some 
evidence from Cali Columbia" by Chris Birkbeck 
in Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment by Colin 
Sumner. ed p.l62. 
84. E M Botha in Daggagebruik In Die Kaapse Skiereiland, 
Institute for Social Development, University of 
the Western Cape 1981 p.l3 erroneously refers 
to the mandrax as being called 'sout' in gangslang, 
whereas sout actually refers to the cigarette tobacco 
in both green and white pipes. 
85. Pinnock, 1982 p.343. 
86. Pinnock, 1982 p.362. 
87. A gang-brother is called My Bra, or Bla or Biou, 
or even conventionally Broe, or Broer in gangslang. 
Some brotherhood affirmation 'ceremonies' involve 
a wrist-cutting and blood-mixing procedure 
(interviews with gangsters). 
88. Compare Paterson, S. Colour and Culture in South 
Africa. p.165-6 
89. The Doekom's powers were supposed to include, so 
I was told by the gangsters, 'psyching' witnesses 
so that they didn't reach the court to testify, 
or if they did, so that they'd tell muddled stories 
unacceptable for purposes of convictions. A much-
repeated account relates to a Doekom 'magically' 
converting the incriminating bags of dagga in a 
dealing case into bags of straw. Court documents 
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and records are said to go missing as a result 
of the Doekorns' influence. One of the gangsters 
told me how a Doekorn had helped him secure an 
acquittal on a murder charge: the Doekorn made 
an incision across the forehead of the accused 
and let the blood trickle down his face to wash 
his thoughts clean. He then instructed the accused 
how to testify and what type of attitude to display 
to the court. Some procedural advice was given. 
The accused was then told to leave his shirt with 
the Doekorn and given a precise route to walk on 
his way horne. The gangster recounts that he was 
overawed by the powerful confidence and seeming 
wisdom of the Doekorn. He followed his advice, 
which cost him R50, 00 (and his shirt) and he was 
acquitted. 
90. See above P·85-9 
91. A fair percentage of this was spent on drugs, the 
remainder on food and clothing. 
92. Laities is a relative term. In this context they 
were lai ties in the private parlance of Joker and 
Scarface. Yet they were never addressed as such. 
The leaders always add res sed them as 'rnanne' (men) , 
broers (brothers), or by their gang nicknames. 
I have not come across a single gangster who doesn't 
have a special gang nickname which is usually 
the name the police also know them by. 




not suggesting that 
this path, but in 
scrutiny here, it 
all gangsters' 





94. Fighters: Many hundreds of hours of my gang 
observation time has been spent listening to fighting 
talk, revolving mainly around provocation strategies, 
fighting methods, stabbing techniques, types of 
weapons, means of 'honourable' withdrawal, victory 
celebrations. 
95. Playboys-cum-Studs: Nearly as many hours of gangtirne 
are spent recounting (probably considerably 
exaggerated) conquests of females, either with 
voluntary participation of the ladies or without 
their consent rape. During my three-month 
observation period, the 15-rnan core gang spoke 
about six rapes their members had 'scored' as 
individuals and one gang-rape during which eight 
gangsters all raped a girl several times on one 
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evening. Their attitude towards it later was one 
of daring bravado, having established their power 
over the girl. The concept of consent in this 
case is a contentious point. In the system of 
values adhered to by these gangsters, a woman was 
considered an 'ou breek' (an old break) once she 
has been been raped once, or has had sex once, 
with one of them. That gives them the 'right' 
to demand sexual services from her at any later 
stage. In terms of middle class values, 
or even the 'parent culture' working class values 
this their actions would still be considered as 
rape. Only one of the six rapes above involved 
girls whom they didn't already 'know'. This 
ambivalence about consent is simply one of the 
factors which accounted for the low level of rape 
charges relative to the actual rapes perpetrated 
by this group. Their highest-ranking member, besides 
Scarface had, by October 1983, 'notched up' 13 
rapes for which he had only been charged with two, 
and, was acquitted of both. Rape was looked on 
as a form of specially tittillating sport which 
they took great relish in, particularly if more 
than one of them was involved. This was unaffected 
by the fact that at least half of the 15 lai ties 
had girlfriends with whom they had sex fairly 
frequently on a voluntary basis. Six of the 15 
had sired at least one youngster, four of the six 
had two and one had three. These were supported 
only very erratically whenever a gangster felt 
like it. The common attitude was that they were 
under no obligation to support their offspring. 
Although having a child with a girl gave them a 
sense of power and ownership over them. Whenever 
they were imprisoned they expected to be visited 
by the mothers of their children. Most of their 
prison letters were addressed to them too. 
96. See Pinnock. The Brotherhoods Street Gangs and 
State Control in Cape Town 1984. David Philip, 
Cape Town, p. 6. Also see Criminology Source Book 
Gangs 1982 for pressclips of gang fights 
Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town. 
97. Liquor distribution ratios supplied by Stellenbosch 
Farmers Winery low-price wine manager, Jaques Raux 
6.1.1982. The figures for the period April 
September 1981 reveal that the five legal outlets 
in Elsies River/Clarke's Estate together account 
for 21,5% of low-priced wine sold in metropolitan 
Cape Town, whereas the two outlets in Retreat manage 
a close second position at 20%. 
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98. Pinnock, D. Elsies River, 1980. p.ll. 
99. Pinnock, D. 1980 pl2. He does not specify how many 
creches' and schools' plans were scrapped or shelved. 
100. Pinnock, D 1980 p.9. 
101. Personal observation. 
102. See Webster, D. The Reproduction of Labour 
and the Struggle for Survival in Soweto, for 





103. Pinnock,D 1980, p.ll. "Only 30% of Elsies River peo-
ple had regular jobs". 
104. Prominent amongst these were the hawkers who sold 
water and wood and building materials to the shanty-
people, vegetables and fruit to the wider population, 
and recycled metal, bones (for glue and dog-food), 
cardboard, bottles, rags and sometimes plastic. 
See video documentary "The Scrap Collectors" -
Institute of Criminology, University of Cape Town, 
1982 by Glover, Scharf, Fredericks, Delport and 
Von Willich. Other survival strategies entailed 
mending of all varieties of things (clothes, primus 
stoves, transistor radios, etc) , illicit taxi 
services, and also the Doekom. 
105. Pinnock D, 1980. p.5. 
106. See above chapter two and below, chapter five. 
107. Compare Jock Young: "Drugtaking, Reaction and 
the Subterranean World of Play" in Sociology of 
Crime and Delinquency in Britain by Wiles, P. ( ed) 
Vol 2. p.lOl. 
108. Pinnock 1980 p.l4 He draws this information from: 
Characteristics of the Total Population of Elsies 
River. Department of Urban and Regional Planning, 
University of Cape Town, 1971. 
109. See Pinnock D, 1980 p.l6. 
110. See Pinnock D, 1980 p.l8-57. 
111. Translated: "When the students indulge in politics, 
then the poor 'Coloureds' shop for free". In this 
context they included themselves as poor people. 
112. In mid 1983 a similar attitude was still extant 
amongst the 'Weekend Spoilers' of Riverton, Bishop 
Lavis, a group of approximately 16 gangstersranging 
from 18-24 years of age (personal observation). 
But when in June 1984 the United Democratic Front 
launched a blitz on Elsies River relating to their 
anti-election signature campaign, some gangs agreed 
to desist from exploiting the opportunity for their 
own purposes (personal communication with 
UDF-workers and the remaining stragglers of 
Scarface's gang). 
By contrast, some gangs in Lotus River had been 
co-opted by the pro-State 'Coloured' parties to 
pressurise registered voters to. vote in favour 
of the 'New Deal' (UDF organiser 13.8.84) during 
the build-up towards the election of 22nd August 
1984. See also Pinnock 1982 p.68. 
113. See footnote 102 above. 
114. See above, p.9~6 
115. The biggest set-back was a rift which developed 
between Joker and Scarface about Joker's pimping 
to the police. Scarface withdrew, moved out, and 
took a number of his BFK/DBM' s along with him to 
set up independently. 
116. Compare Phil Cohen: 'Policing the Working Class 
City' in CaEitalism and the Rule of Law From 
Deviancy Theory to Marxism' by Bob Fine, Richard 
Kinsey, John Lea, Sol Picciotto and Jock Young 
1979. Hutchinson, London p.ll8 at 135. 
117. On subsequent return visits to his shebeen during 
1982 and early 1983, during which time organisation 
had spread more widely, there was still no 
discernible slackening off of his trade for political 
reasons. His regulars had not been interested 
sufficiently to reduce their recreational liquor 
and drugs intake. What had transpired, Joker had 
noticed, was that the politicised residents had 
firmed their opposition to intoxicants. Compare 
also the Mitchell's Plain residents battle to 'keep 
the plain dry', Cape Times, 24.2. 82; Argus 3. 3. 82; 
Cape Times 7.5.82. 
118. 'Lux !ewe' luxury life, afkoel to cool off, 
really groove. 
119. For example, helping themselves to parents 
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housekeeping money, persuading an aspirant laitie 
to prove himself as a good potential gangster by 
conning a parent to send him to the shops to buy 
food and hand the money over to the gang for dope 
instead; selling a shirt, pair of trousers or 
any other clothing off their back or pawning them 
with whoever would fall for it. 
120. When a gangster on his own or in a small group 
was out for some money under circumstances that 
were not too urgent, and when they were relatively 
sober, the opening garnbi t of this 'robbery' would 
be 'gee entjie' or 'gee rneckie' (give us a fag 
or a light). Once the victim had cooperated he/she 
was then 'rationalised' into parting with some 
dope or liquor money "kyk hie, 'n man srnaak 'n 
blink vir 'n skyf, man, sien jy my broer" (look 
here we dig some dough for a pipe, brother). If 
the victim had any sense at all, and he was liquid, 
he willingly parted with some cash as a gift, albeit 
under a little duress. That was then understood 
as a gift. Female victims usually faced a lot 
of sexual chatting up or harrassrnent in the process 
whilst handing over the money. If the victim 
resisted or became cocky in any way, he'd/she'd 
get beaten or stabbed, and robbed more overtly. 
In more volatile moods or in larger groups the 
gangsters simply attacked their victim without 
the attempt of cajoling or persuading. 
121 . Compare above, p ·101 
122. The Sicilian Kids 28 gangs are looked down on 
as 'dirty', 'sub-human' because of their homosexual 
practices in prison. Ouside 
of prison it is not, to my knowledge, practised 
on a significant scale, the gangsters usually resume 
heterosexual tendencies. Ex 28-rnernbers who have 
given up gangsterism and take up formal employment 
are often well-liked by male employers because 
of a servility and 'closeness' which they display. 
The 26-Gang Alliance members refer to this as "hy 
hou horn oepe, soos 'n rneid voor die Boer" (he's 
open, like a bitch, to the Whites"). 
123. Their girlfriends knew about these sexual exploits 
which were considered legitimate (although 
reluctantly so) within their value system. Some 
girlfriends told me they had actually witnessed 
gang-rapes, consented to their boyfriends indulging 
once, but restrained them from going back for seconds 
by offering their services instead. (Interview 
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with two girlfriends whilst travelling to prison 
to visit their 'burks' (stud-gangsters). When 
questioned about sexual assaults on the streets 
at night, they took it for granted that the gangsters 
had that 'right' . Everyone knew that and violated 
the rule at their peril. 
124. Characteristic symbolic shows were eg. asking a woman 
of a rival gang to dance, which was really a direct 
challenge to that gang's possession of her. If 
she was not rescued by 'her' gang, she'd have to 
be 'broken' by the BFK/Dobermans and would then 
belong to them. If her gang was too weak to rescue 
her, this symbolic defeat had implications for 
their territorial delimitation (presuming they 
occupied contiguous space) and of course market 
share with regard to shebeening. on three of the 
five discos they attended between October and January 
1981/82. These challenges ended up in 
gang-skirmishes in and outside the hall. 
125. Apart from, of course the dominant culture which 
they chose selectively to appropriate to their 
own survival and stylistic needs. Their rhetoric 
and some of their actions did challenge the police, 
but this was seldom demonstrated in an open show 
of force. Clandestine and opportunistic lashing 
out at the Boere was, of course, high amongst their 
priori ties but it assumed more of a character of 
peripheral sniping than frontal assault. 
126. Wilkinson, P and Webster, D supra p.6. 
127. See Pinnock D, 1982 on the substitution 
structure, chapter 9. 
of family 
128. Pinnock, D, 1982 p.344-354. 
129. This was complicated by the fact that the father-
figure was not the natural father of the gangsters 
in three of these cases. 
130. This phenomenon seems to 
there are usually always 
usually do not tattoo 
usually accepted into the 
be extremely rare. 
women around a gang, 





131. The Sly Corners, according to him were in the mould 
of a mixture between informal sector survivalists 
and vigilantes, the community police of the area. 
They weren't as 'onbeskof' or 'oorlams' 
(disrespectful and outrageously vulgar) as the 
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youngsters of the eighties. They were keen 
participants in the Coon Carnivals in his day. 
132. In my initial stage of becoming acquainted with 
the dynamics of families whose ranks included a 
gangster or two, I thought that the mother's 
protestation that their son was basically a good 
boy led astray by bad company was a mere strategy 
to secure a lenient sentence or personal judgement. 
Only quite late into the research did I discover 
that many of the mothers genuinely didn't know 
about their son's activities, and that he/they 
must have been keeping the truth from her/them. 
133. They all considered this a very low income, as 
it was seldom, if ever, received in one batch. 
As soon as money came in, it was usually used for 
dope, food, cigarettes and clothes (clothes served 
both as symbols of style as well as goods that 
could be pledged or pawned, in the latter context, 
thus, a form of savings). 
134. I became used to being thanked by mothers for goods 
I had no clue about. These were stolen goods, 
which they told their parents, I had donated to 
them. 
135. Paradoxically, they clung to the girl and their 
children once they were in prison expecting them 
to visit regularly, arrange for food-parcels (if 
they were awaiting trial), lodge money on their 
'property' and provide all the support-structures 
that can be mustered from the outside (letters, 
parole, messages, canvassing support from fellow 
gangsters, favours from friends in prison). 
136. I was not aware of any girls who took the gangsters 
to court for non-support. But they did apply for 
a maintenance grant once the fathers of their 
children were imprisoned (same interview as in 
footnote 123, above). 
137. Pinnock, D 1982. p.260-342. 
138. To keep up a facade of policing Joker's 
was raided by the local police twice between 
1981 and January 1982 but discovered 
incriminating due to a tip-off he had 





139. Only once, and then by chance, was I able to overhear 
one of these meetings. I was arranging bail for 
one of the laities while Joker was bargaining about 
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the price for information on a murder case that 
the police were having difficulty in finding any 
evidence. Although, as he told me later, Joker 
had no information about it himself at the time, 
he feigned knowledge about it so that his 
relationship with the detectives would not be 
jeopardised. On returning home he made a concerted 
effort to find out about the murder from the laities 
and the people whom they referred him to. 
Indirectly, thus, he was doing some of the groundwork 
for the police in the exectution of their duties. 
139. Four housebreaking, three robbery and two assault 
with intent to do grievous bodily harm cases 
they were rescued even before being formally charged. 
141. Four first offences for possession of Dagga, three 
robbery, three housebreaking and one theft case. 
142. It is unfortunate that a single researcher is unable, 
for safety reasons, to gather information about 
the interactional dynamic between two opposition 
shebeens and the police. The only source of 
information about the communication between the 
opposition shebeen and the police was Joker's 
police contact. 
143. Perks are obtainable for policemen at all shebeens 
so it is more likely that information was the 
main reason for protecting Joker. 
144. Interview with an ex-customer of Joker's shebeen. 
145. 
Occasionally, residents came to complain about 
the activities to Joker whilst I was at his shebeen. 
See footnote 95 above. 
146. Compare Platt, Tony "'Street' Crime - A View From 
the Left in Crime and Justice 1981 MacMillan, London 
p.27. 
147. He was fond of impressing not only me, but customers 
and visitors as well, with his magnanimity, public-
spiritedness, and 'trustworthiness'. The latter 
was his technique for extracting secrets from 
community members. 
148. Needless to say it was crucial for his survival 
that the link between his permission or authorisation 
and the gangsters' processing was not recognised. 
149. The danger lay therein that I would become associated 
with Joker and his sellout strategy, which would 
have invited retaliation against me on the part 
of the laities. 
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150. The first occassion was May 1983 when five laities 
(with the tacit consent of the others) bust the 
shebeen; the second occasion was in July 1983 
when another six laities broke away. 
151. By that stage they had taken to wholesaling dagga 
to shebeens in rural villages. 
152. Some 35 krn away from Elsies River. 
153. The Garden Village Community was materially far 
better-off than his Elsies River constituency. 
A smaller percentage of the population was likely 
to have constituted his clientele there, whereas 
the rest probably regarded him as an unwelcome 
intrusion. A superficial profile of that community 
derived from a BFK and a schoolteacher indicate 
that it is a fairly tightly knit grouping of long-
established families, many of whom have been living 
there for several generations. There seems to be 
a relatively low unemployment rate, and the majority 
of the occupants are not in unskilled employment. 
154. Mitchell's Plain has been prominent in the press 
since late 1983 with regard to a high crime-rate 
and an increasing gang-presence. The 'Weekend 
Spoilers' of Riverton, Bishop Lavis, with whom 
I had some contact, also dissolved because some 
prominent members' families moved to Mitchell's 
Plain in 1983. 
155. The case was heard between 4th and 20th September 
1984 in the Cape Supreme Court and is as yet 
unreported. Press reports appear in Cape Times, 
6.9.84, Weekend Argus 15.9.84, Cape Herald 22.9.84. 
156. It is a pattern common to the First World countries. 
157. 
See Pinnock D, ( 1983) quoting English and American 
Studies, p.324 and 325. 
Joseph Gusfield "Moral Passage 
Process in Public Designations of 
Social Problems 15 fall 1967, p.l75-88. 
The Symbo 1 i c 
Deviance" in 
246 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5 THE REPRODUCTION OF 
AGRICULTURAL LABOUR AND THE TOT SYSTEM 
1. 
2. 
The Masters and Servants Act, abolished 
only, criminalised most actions which are 
simply cause for civil actions the 




Marais, op cit p.266: and Ross, R. 
the Cape Gentry p.l2: and Worden, N. 
Emancipation and Rural Labour in A 
Context. p.l2. See above chapter two. 
The Rise of 
Cape Slave 
Comaprative 
3. "Goei (gooi) dop" - to administer the tot - personal 
interview with Moravian cleric at Genadendal June 
1983. 
4. Cape Coloured Liquor Commission of Inquiry 
Commission) p.ll 1945 it was reduced 
daily two quarts ( 2, 2 7 1 i tres) to one and 





5. Bunting, Brian. "Liquor and the Colour Bar" in 
Africa South 2, 4 July/September 1958 p.40. 
6. Bunting op cit p.36. 
7. Plaut, Timothy. Farm Schools for African and 
Coloured Children 1n South Africa Paper No 17 
Saldru Farm Labour Conference, September 19 7 6, 
University of Cape Town and Theron, Jan Farm Labour 
in the Ci trusdal Valley. Paper No 22 Saldru Farm 
Labour Conference p.lO. "The school is rented 
by Coloured Affairs from the farmer implicit 
in any notion of how far education and 
'opheffingswerk' may extend is the fact that the 
farmer own the land, the school, the house the 
teacher lives in". 
8. Leipoldt, C L 300 Years of Cape Wine 
Cape Town 1952, p.l76-8. 
9. Meaker Commission op cit p.ll. 
10. I D, and p.21. 
Stewart, 
11. Commission of Inquiry into The General Distribution 
and selling prices of Intoxicating Liquor, UG 55/1960 
p.l2. 
12. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters 
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Relating to the Coloured Population Group. RP 
38/1976 p.498. 
13. Sue Birch Black Market manageress, Stellenbosch 
Farmers Winery, personal interview 6.1.82. 
14. See annual reports of the Department of Coloured, 
Rehoboth and Nama Relations 1974-1980. 
15. Groenewald, C J n Sosiologies Ondersoek na die 
Aanbod van Landbouarbeid in Wes-Kaapland. MA-Thesi s 
University of Stellenbosch 1972. 
16. These are the central attitudes 
I interviewed who were living 
working in the towns. (1981-84). 
of all the 48 men 
on five farms but 
17. Theron, J op cit bears out this contradiction: 
schooling is considered of little value for farm 
labour: it usually only makes them 'uppity'. p.lO. 
Farmers in my research area either force youngsters 
who refuse to work for them off the farm (splitting 
up the family) or charge a head-rental varying 
from R2 Rl2, 00 a week - the average being R4, 00 
a week for living on the farm. They sometimes 
also threaten the whole family with eviction. 
18. Theron Commission op cit p.l42. 
19. Possible explanations for bouncing back: 
a) Redundancy 
b) Feuds with fellow-workers - particularly likely 
if antagonistic gangs are involved 
c) Arguments with employers 
d) Dismissal for some misdemeanor 
e) Pressure exerted by farmer on the farming people 
f) The lure of liquor on the the farms, particularly 
in summer when labourers illegally make their 
own 'rnosblikke' tins or plastic bags filled 
with crushed grapes left to ferment in the 
sun for a few days - a highly potent drink. 
20. The cooperative wineries stipulate a period within 
which each grape variety may be delivered to the 
cellar. A farmer with a relatively low tonnage 
of an early variety ( eg. Steen) may have to wait 
a day or two before he may commence harvesting 
a later variety (eg. Cinsaut). 
21. Farmers say that ordering migrants is 
shopping at a supermarket. They order 
of labourers, age and height to their 




a specific date, and then simply collect them at 
the Labour Bureau on that day - personal interviews. 
22. Theron Commission op cit p.l40. Another source 
for the Western Cape in 1959/60 designates Blacks 
as being 18,5% of the permanent, and 13,3% of the 
casual Black labour force of 203 676 of which the 
remainder were 'Coloured'. -Verslag van die Kommittee 
van Ondersoek na Landelike Hervorming Deel I, 
1975 p.244. 
23. 'Mos' is a potent drink made by crushing grapes 
and leaving them in the sun for a few days to ferment 
in a tin or plastic bag. 
24. He broke the man's jaw-bone, arm, three fingers, 
badly damaged his hip, and concussed him seriously. 
The weapon used was a pick-axe handle. 
25. It transpired that he had been released from prison 
recently after serving a long term sentence, and 
was already being sought by the police for a 
stabbing. 
26. Vaaljapie is the tot-wine which is free of the 
preservatives ( S02 ) which contribute to hangovers. 
Hence the perennial claim of the farmers that it 
is healthier than bought bottled wine. Vaaljapie 
is collected from the cooperatives in 20 litre 
plastic containers, similar in shape to the 
containers called 'Swartvarkies' in which cheap 
wine was sold to the labour force between 1976 
and 1982. Farmers in 1982 paid 27c/litre for 
Vaaljapie. 
27. During harvest-time I was free to gather information 
through my legitimate status as a truck-driver 
conveying loads of grapes to the cooperative. 
The tenor of the stories were the same for six 
years in succession. 
28. They either have to pay someone else to carry their 
baskets at harvest-time, or if they attempt it 
themselves, fade early in the day. For physically 
exacting tasks such as spade-work, or moving 
irrigation-pipes they function very poorly, if 
at all. Some of the farmers (particularly those 
practicing coercive management) are happy to find 
reasons for evicting them: eg. the old labourer 
who was seriously injured and rendered incapable 
of working (footnote 24 above) was only allowed 
to stay after specific appeals had been made to 
the farm owner on the grounds that he had been 
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on the farm for 17 years and had two married sons 
working on the farm. 
29. The Theron Commission op cit states: "Of all the 
farm workers who left their employment during 197 3 
and 1974, 27 per cent moved to towns and cities. 
Of those who were engaged during that period, 69 
per cent came from other farms and 11 per cent 
from towns and cities, while 16 per cent began 
working for the first time" p.l42. 
30. This is a point frequently overlooked by writers 
and analysts of the farming situation. See, for 
example, Patterson, Sheila. Colour and Culture 
in South Africa 1953, London Routledge and Kegan 
Paul p. 8 3: indirectly, she is alluding to ski lling 
when speaking about incentives to better farm 
labourer's lots: "The motive for not abolishing 
the system was to find an avenue for disposing 
of 700 000 gallons of wine a year and keep the 
cash wages bill low. Possibly it is also hoped 
by winegrowers that the taste for wine thereby 
acquired will stimulate canteen and bottle store 
sales, as indeed it does. Behind both the tot-system 
and the system of part-payment in kind on farms 
throughout the country, there may, however, lurk 
the feeling, conscious or unconscious, that the 
established status hierarchy is more easily 
maintained if the labourer is kept on a low economic 
level, without the independence (and franchise 
rights) that a higher cash wage would bring, or 
the incentive to better his lot by hard work". 
31. The pruning-courses offered at Kramme Rhee, the 
only agricultural training centre for the wine 
industry last either one or five days in 197 9 
88 labourers attended the one day course, and 59 
the five day course. Between 1964-1979 the total 
numbers of labourers attending these courses were 
as follows: 
32. 
Pruning of vines (one day 
" " " (five day 
77 2) 
770) 
Source: Annual Report Department of Coloured, 
Rehoboth and Nama Relations for the period 1. 04.79 
to 31.03.1980 p.7. 




No 4. (Cape Provincial 
Land Use. Cape Town. p.57-
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33. Theron Commission op cit states that 52% of all 
farm labour had no schooling, while 6% had at least 
Std 5. 
34. The reasons for grounding in the seven cases, as 
supplied by the labourers themselves were: 
1) Does not want to vie for favouritism with the 
farmer. Fears lack of respect from fellow-
labourers for being a favoured driver. 
2) Damages too many vines. 
3) Had an accident while driving (illegally) on the 
road. 
4) Drove the tractor into a ditch (high clearance 
tractor) and damaged front fork. 
5) Drinks and drives. 
6) Uses the tractor to make money for himself 
by carting wood and selling it to the labourers. 
7) Enough drivers on the farm and the farmer prefers 
the others. 
35. Still-birth rate reflects the number of still births 
per 1 000 births. 
36. Infant mortality rate is the number of deaths of 
children under five years per 1 000 live births. 
37. Joubert, E R and Theron, C J "Vital Health 
Statistics for Stellenbosch Area" in Malnutrition 
in the Stellenbosch Area Papers coordinated by 
Hans Steyn. Carnegie Conference Paper No 184. 
Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development 
in Southern Africa. Cape Town, 1984. Appendix 5 
p. 2. 
38. Heyns, M. "Details of the Stellenbosch Area" in 
Malnutrition in the Stellenbosch Area op cit p.l. 
39. Op'T Hof, Dr J: "The Fetal Alcohol Syndrome" (sic) 
Paper presented at the Conference Alcohol in 
Perspective, 1981, Johannesburg. SANCA p.S. 
40. Id at p.9. 
41. Although the quantities consumed by this woman 
are the same as the previous one, it does not appear 
to affect her as badly, nor is liquor the prime 
focus of activities over the weekends. The heavy 
drinkers seem to make drinking the main purpose 
of their free time. 
42. Vergnani, T. "Associated and Determining 
of Malnutrition in Children Under the Age 




43. Id p.5. 
44. Steyn, H J. "An 
Sub A Pupils 
Malnutrition in 
Appendix 2 p.2. 
Anthropometric Survey of Coloured 
in the Stellenbosch Area" in 
the Stellenbosch Area op cit 
45. Id p.9. 
46. Control is not used here in a static sense: see 
Stedman-Jones, G. "Class Expression Versus Social 
Control" in History Workshop Vol 4 1977. 
47. In the interviews with the 18 farmers/managers 
the most common substantiation was "Well, if 
you withhold liquor from them, they don't pitch 
up for work, or get angry". Some farmers met with 
resistance from their labourers. The second argument 
repeatedly put forward is "If you pay them more, 
they'll just spend it all on drink". This is 
certainly borne out in reality on most farms and 
forms a quasi-justification for the farmers keeping 
the labour force at or below that level of bare 
subsistence. 
48. La Hausse, Paul. "Alcohol, the Ematsheni and Popular 
Struggle in Durban The Origins of the Beerhall 
in South Africa, 1902-8". Centre for African Studies 
Seminar Paper, University of Cape Town. 1983. 
49. Cape Times 1.10.84, Sunday Times 7.10.84. 
50. For example: The South African Institute of Race 
Relations Submission to the Manpower Commission 
on Farm Labour The Farm Labour Project, 
Johannesburg 1982. and Haysom, N, and Thompson, 
C. Farm Labour and the Law Carnegie Conference 
Paper No 84, Cape Town 1984. 
51. Saving under below subsistance conditions is a 
rarity. 
52. See above p .31- 2 
53. Some farmers 
anticipation of 
is anything that 
which does not 
they'll rather do 
change their work-programme in 
the low productivity. If there 
can rather be done productively, 
demand physically exacting work 
that than pick grapes. 
54. Argus 14.3.81 and Cape Herald 25.8.84. 
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55. The housing situation on the farm is : three-roomed 
cottages with electricity (lights and one plug 
per house), outside taps (one for six houses), 
outside toilets (three for 12 houses) and one cold 
water, outside shower for the twelve houses. She 
has fridge, television, numerous fancy electrical 
appliances (hairdryer, kettle, electric haircurlers, 
etc) whereas most labourers only have a kettle 
and a hot-plate. In addition the farm-manager stood 
surety for her purchasing a car, something totally 
out of the reach of the average labourer. 
56. See the Case of M below p.193 
57. Hofmeyr, W "Rural Struggles in the Western Cape, 
1929-30" Centre for African Studies Seminar Paper 
1983 University of Cape Town and "Rural Popular 
Organisation and its Problems Struggles in the 
Western Cape, 1929-30" in Africa Perspective Vol 
22, 1983 p. 26 and Roux, E. Time Longer Than Rope 
The Black Man's Struggle for Freedom in South 
Africa 1948 University of Wisconsin Press p.230. 
























HEAVY ALCOHOLICS TEETOTALLERS 
DRINKERS 
12 3 0 
11 5 0 
9 2 0 
14 3 1 
46 13 1 
59. Translation: "If a man wants to improve himself 
and build up something for himself, and he works 
well, and says to the farmer: 'Master, why don't 
we do things like this'. Then the farmer says 
to him: 'So, a clever boy, are you?' and when we 
knock off, the master says: You there, come here, 
boy, let me give you something if you're so clever'. 
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And he gives the man a tot, and another tot, and 
another tot. And the man says: 'Cheers Boss' 
(the customary response to getting a tot) and the 
farmer says: 'This boy is a know-all, let me give 
him another tot'. And the man says: 'Cheers, Boss' 
and he drinks. The next morning the man wakes up 
with fright, and he's a baboon". 
6 0 . See above p .176-6 
61. The agriculture unions, the Foundation for Rural 
Development, and the Forum Vir Landelike Gemeenskaps-
werk, are all encouraging farmers to adopt more 
cooptive methods of reproducing the labour force 
Annual Report of the South African Agriculture 
Union 1980 p.35-56; and chairman's report delivered 
at the third AGM of the Forum Vir Landelike 
Gemeenskapswerk 18.11.1983 at the KWV, Paarl. 
62. du Toit, V. "An example of a practical prevention 
programme" Paper presented at the Conference: Alcohol 
in Perspective Johannesburg 12-14 October 1981. 
6 3. Heyns, M. "Details of the Stellenbosch Area" p. 2. 
in Malnutrition in the Stellenbosch Area 
coordinated by Hans Steyn: Carnegie Conference 
Paper No 184, Cape Town 1984. 
64. The Consumer Price Index of 1975=100.0 
The Consumer Price Index of 1982=232.6 
65. Khan, B. "The Effects of Inflation 
in South Africa" Carnegie Conference 
p.28 University of Cape Town 1984. 
Rl2.00 a week cash wage in 1976 and 
in 1984. 




66. Translation: Tell me, S, whose hands work this 
vineyard? Can the farmer pick all the grapes himself? 
Can he himself do all the pruning, weeding and 
move the (irrigation) pipes? Does the farmer's 
wife help tying on the shoots(to trellises)! Who 
sits on the tractor? It's these two hands (shows 
his hands) that enrich the farmer. Look, there 
he goes and buys himself a new car again, and the 
old one's still new. And we don't even have a 
bath among all our houses! 




of a labourer's son making a last ditch 
even the score between farmer and labourer 
in the Cape Town Supreme Court on the 
The case of S V P (as yet unreported). 
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P was charged with murder. The evidence revealed 
that there was a continuing conflict between P, 
thirteen years old at the time, and a farmer. The 
farmer, the court was told frequently travelled 
with a sjambok in his truck, and sometimes wore 
a revolver in his belt while supervising the labour 
force. The tension between P and the farmer rose 
to such a level that some labourers on the farm 
took P to the truck, showed him the revel ver on 
the seat, and said that the gun will 'be his death'. 
P stole the gun and hid it. He later broke into 
the farmer's house to steal bullets for it. Then 
he set off to shoot the farmer, intending to kill 
him. He broke into the house, was startled by 
movements in the farmer's bedroom and withdrew 
into the neighbouring bedroom, in which the farmer's 
18-month old daughter lay asleep. Turning around 
in her sleep she startled him and he shot her dead, 
and fled. P, 15 years old at the time of his trial, 
was found guilty of murder and sentenced to ten 
years imprisonment. Evidence about his family 
background showed that both parents were heavy 
drinkers, and that P had had a materially and 
psychologically deprived upbringing. An appeal 
is pending. 
68. See Van Onselen, C, Volume 2, New Nineveh. Chapter 
4 for a comparison between Hobsbawm's 'Primitive 
Rebels' and Van Onselen's Ninevite Lumpenproletarian 
gangs as possessing revolutionary potential. p~l95. 
69. They are not comparable to the Machine-Breakers 
of the late 19th Century England, the Luddites. 
These were organised groups of artisans using 
wrecking as one of their means of redressing social 
injustice. See Thompson, E P. The Making of the 
Engllish Working Class, Pelican, Harmondsworth 
1963 p.598-659. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
1. Young, J. "Drugtaking, Reaction and the Subterranean 
World of Play" p.l05. 
2. Van Onselen, C. Randlords and Rotgut 1886-1903. 
Volume I New Babylon. p.92 
3. Ross, R. "The Rise of the Cape Gentry" p.l-4. 
4. Gusfield, J R. "Moral Passage : The Symbolic Process 
in Public Designations of Deviance" in: Crime and 
Delinquency by Carl Bersani. Collier-MacMillan, 
London 1970. p.76-7. 
5. Burman, S B. "Symbolic Dimensions of the Enforcement 
of Law" 3 BJL and s. 1976 p.204-17. 
6. 
7. 
Garland, D. and Young, 
Heinemann, London 1983 
P. (eds) 
p.9-10. 
The Power to Punish 
Rabie, M A and Strauss, 
Introduction to Principles. 
1981 (3rd Edition) p.54-6. 
S A. Punishment, An 
Lex Patria, Johannesburg 
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